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Abstract 
 
Long-term unemployment creates a series of individual, social, and economic problems. Long-
term unemployment has been treated with a wide variety of public policies: this thesis focuses 
on one approach - active labour market policies. Active labour market policies in the UK have 
emerged in stages, as the welfare state has incrementally evolved from a largely state-
dominated and passive social security system to a market-led, work-first system where an 
escalating percentage of benefit recipients are expected to be actively seeking work. The 
theory and evidence underpinning these developments are explored in the first fives chapters.  
 
In the last decade, British governments have sought the assistance of private and voluntary 
sector organisations in the delivery of active labour market policies, using a system of payment-
by-results to encourage these organizations to move individuals into, and sustain, employment. 
These are the core features underpinning the case study of this thesis, the Flexible New Deal. 
The Flexible New Deal is a programme for all long-term unemployed persons, which operated 
between the autumns of 2009 and 2011. In chapter six the objectives, structure and expected 
outcomes of FND are detailed, and these are used to contextualize the core research problem. 
With the use of data analysis and fieldwork the thesis seeks to answer whether the national 
contracted market in labour market attachment has created a more effective and efficient 
system for transferring the unemployed from benefits into work than the systems before it.  
 
Within the broad parameters of the primary question, two further questions are considered. 
The first, whether the contracting process can identify the best and worst providers in the 
welfare market, and the second, whether work-first models of welfare-to-work are effective in 
different economic environments.  
 
Using careful data analysis, the results chapter shows that the Flexible New Deal did not meet 
the government’s own objectives for the programme, and it did not outperform the 
programmes it was designed to replace. In some areas of the country, the distance from 
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attaining the targets were much greater than others, and these differences are shown to be 
largely reflective of the labour market characteristics of the operating areas.  
 
The thesis concludes by returning to the theme of path dependence established in Chapter 4 as 
the explanatory factor behind the reform of welfare-to-work programmes. It explains that 
despite market-driven active labour market policies not meeting their own objectives, the 
policies are likely to continue to be deployed by future governments.  
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Introduction, Research Questions and Methodology 
 
  
The benefits system in the United Kingdom has changed over the past three decades; the most 
substantial transformation is evident in the delivery of unemployment benefits.  In this policy area, a 
once relatively passive welfare system has come to be regimented by interventionist active labour 
market programmes. The prime objective of these schemes is to move individuals from out-of-work 
benefits into unsubsidized employment.   
 
These policies are now widely accepted as integral to, and effective at, managing levels of 
unemployment in the labour market by assisting people to move from benefits and into work.1  In this, 
there has been a pattern to the systemic reforms. Since the end of the 1970s unemployment policies 
have become increasingly focussed on unemployment at the individual rather than macro-economic 
level, where as Lowe phrases it the ‘abandonment of ‘full’ employment [...] reduced the active role 
which government played in the promotion of individual welfare.’2 As the state has drawn back from 
delivering ‘full employment’ in the traditional (Keynesian) sense, it has become more interventionist in 
the lives of the individual benefit recipient, while decreasing its role as deliver of unemployment 
services. This is shown through two observable trends presented in this thesis. First, that there has been 
a continuous tightening of eligibility tests for benefits and escalation of compulsion directed at 
individual active labour market programme participants.3 Second is there has been a movement 
towards a diversity of delivery arrangements in welfare-to-work initiatives.4 With regard to the former, 
                                                          
1
 OECD (2006) General Policies to Improve Employment Opportunities for All, OECD Employment Outlook 2006, OECD, Paris, 
p71 
2
 Lowe, R. (1999) The Welfare State in Britain Since 1945, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p339 
3
  Trickey, H. and Walker, R. in Lodemel, I. and Trickey, H (2000) An Offer You Can’t Refuse? Workfare in an International 
Perspective, The Policy Press, Bristol, p186 
4
 Bruttel, O. (2004) Contracting Out the Public Employment Service and the Consequence for hard-to-place Jobseekers: 
Experiences from Australia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Paper for 2
nd
 Annual ESPAnet Conference, Oxford 
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services and benefits have gradually moved away from universal and (relatively) passive cash transfers 
towards a complex system of conditionality (which mandates a series of activities, including work, in 
order to merit continued benefit receipt). The latter is demonstrated by the increased role of the 
private and voluntary sector in delivering a ‘contracted’ quasi-market in welfare-to-work services. 
 
These themes are connected by the personalisation of the welfare state, where the problem of 
unemployment is ever-more bound with the deficiencies of the individual, in turn, decreasing the direct 
responsibility of the state. The thesis will demonstrate the proliferation of these tendencies since they 
represent a fundamental change in the relationship between the state and the individual. Now an 
individual’s right to receive benefits is being matched increasingly with greater levels of personal 
responsibility.  This is itself being complemented by a growing use of contracted service providers for 
the delivery of unemployment related policies. 
 
The situation in the UK now is one where the government contracts out active labour market policies 
for delivery by the for-profit and voluntary sectors, who are rewarded on their performance at moving 
individuals back to the labour market by the fastest possible route. The policy manifestation of this is 
the Flexible New Deal, the case under inspection for this thesis, and the last major welfare reform of the 
Labour government, implemented in 2009.  
 
Research Question  
In October 2009, the Flexible New Deal (FND) began to replace a number of existing welfare-to-work 
programmes and introduced private contractors to handle the majority of cases of long-term claimant 
unemployment. In some areas there was to be direct competition between contractors, in others a 
regional monopoly was in operation. As will be explored in successive chapters, both theory and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
University, available at http://www.spsw.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/static/Espanet/espanetconference/papers/ppr.11A.OB.pdf.pdf 
[accessed 20/01/10] p2 
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practice have suggested that the national quasi-market of work-focussed employment services should 
produce improved employment outcomes. This is premised on the expectation that ‘a quasi-market [in 
employment policy] will deliver more efficient, effective and de-bureaucratised employment services.’5 
This hypothesis will be tested using comparisons between the Flexible New Deal and those programmes 
it was to replace.  
The core research question is:   
Has the implementation of a national contracted market in labour market attachment created 
a more effective and efficient system for transferring the unemployed from benefits into work 
than existed before the reform was introduced?   
To address this question, the research will compare the Flexible New Deal to active labour market 
policies that existed prior to the 2009 welfare reforms. Greater effectiveness was treated in the narrow 
manner of moving more individuals into 13-week employment than existing programmes, and greater 
efficiency in the economic constraints of being as effective using less financial resources.6   
Within the parameters of the broader research question are two sub-questions:  
1. Does contracting competition between providers serve to identify the best, and worst, 
suppliers in the quasi-market? 
2. Is the emphasis on rapid labour market attachment effective in all labour markets? 
These questions are of value because there has been considerable academic insight into active labour 
market policies, but there has been limited attention on the effects of contracting out welfare-to-work 
programmes in the UK, and the field remains in its infancy. In summarising the evidence behind quasi-
markets in employment programmes in 2008, Bredgaard and Larsen explain that ‘the efficiency gains 
and cost-savings, which are spurring the introduction of quasi-markets, are still largely unknown and 
                                                          
5
 Bredgaard, T, and Larsen F. (2008) Quasi-Markets in Employment Policy; Do they deliver on their promises? Social Policy and 
Society v7.3, p341 
6
 Alternatively more effective on the same resources.  
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undocumented.’7 On the specific case study in question, the Flexible New Deal, the one research report 
conducted deals with neither effectiveness nor efficiency in a holistic manner. As a qualitative study 
commissioned by the Department of Work and Pensions,8 the appraisal conducted by the Policy Studies 
Institute focussed heavily on customer’s experiences of particular processes with the programme in the 
middle of programme operation, rather than a full analysis of programme outcomes. This thesis will 
therefore contribute to debate concerning the effects of contracting out by providing an, at present, 
unique data analysis of a major government employment programme.   
 
Within this broader national appraisal of the Flexible New Deal there is an opportunity to explore how 
the contracting process at the local level, and identify the factors that determine the performance of 
contracted agencies. Specifically, it permits an exploration of one of the primary purposes of 
contracting: to identify and maintain the most effective contracting agents, and remove the worst.9 
Many accounts of the (re)tendering process in contracted employment services have been offered,10 
but little has been written about the challenge of ‘picking winners’.   
 
Finally, the timing of the programme and the spatial analysis provide an opportunity to explore the 
effects of work-first during a period of recession, where historically these programmes have been 
evaluated (and celebrated) during periods of economic expansion.11 Because work-first programmes are 
now the norm in the UK, the effectiveness of these in weak or constricted labour markets is profoundly 
important.  
                                                          
7
 Bredgaard, T, and Larsen F. (2008) Quasi-Markets in Employment Policy; Do they deliver on their promises? Social Policy and 
Society v7.3, p351 
8
  Vegeris, S. et al. (2011) Flexible New Deal Evaluation: Customer Survey and Qualitative Research Findings, DWP Research 
Report no.758, Policy Studies Institute and IFF Research, TSO, London 
9
 DWP (2008) DWP Commissioning Strategy, DWP, Cabinet Office, London, p21 
10
 For instance, see Eardley, T. (2003) Outsourcing Employment Services: What have we learned from the Jobs Network? Social 
Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, pp5-8, or Finn, D. (2008) The British Welfare Market: Lessons from 
Contracting Out Welfare to Work Programmes in Australia and the Netherlands, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, London, pp18-
19 
11
 Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2000) Work-First: workfare and the regulation of contingent labour markets, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, v.24, p123 
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How these research questions are to be broadly addressed in this thesis is explored in the following 
section.  
Methodology 
This section outlines and justifies the methodology the project used to address the core research 
question.  It will explore a number of available methods of public policy analysis, and detail how the 
predominantly quantitative approach will be executed. Before doing so, it is pertinent briefly to mention 
the use of documentary sources. As Chapters 5 and 6 are premised on the development of active labour 
market policy, the chapters use an array of green and white papers, government legislation, and reports 
to the Work and Pensions Select Committee. A range of academic journal articles and reports dealing 
with the welfare state and its active labour market policies have been used to help supplement the 
primary documentation. The goal has been to build a full picture of programme structure and 
anticipated consequences, and these anticipated consequences informed the quantitative and 
qualitative methodology. In particular, the specific design of the programme and its distinguishing 
features must be accounted for, as is necessary for appropriate comparisons with simultaneous active 
labour market policies. As Burnham et al., argue ‘careful use of a wide range of documentary material is 
one of the most reliable methods open to the political researcher and provides an opportunity for the 
production of authoritative studies, even if the ‘definitive account’ remains out of reach.’12 To 
compensate for the inevitable discrepancy between what the documents say, and what is actually 
occurring in employment service offices, qualitative research was undertaken to inform the case study 
in question.13 
The Case Study 
The research project is a case study of the Flexible New Deal. The use of case studies is widespread in 
social science research. This is because they enable the researcher to study a single policy area in depth, 
                                                          
12
 Burnham, P. et al. (2004) Research Methods in Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p188 
13
 For a seminal account of this problem see Pressman, J.L. and Wildavsky, A. (1973) Implementation: How Great Expectations 
in Washington are Dashed in Oakland, University of California Press, Los Angeles. 
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utilising both quantitative and qualitative data to build a comprehensive picture of the policy in 
question.14 According to Denscombe, this singularity is their defining feature where ‘case studies focus 
on one instance ... of a particular phenomenon with a view to proving an in-depth account of events, 
relationships, experiences or processes occurring in that particular instance.’15  The common criticism of 
case studies is equally associated with their singularity, that ‘explanations and generalisations are 
limited to the particular case study.’16 The findings for the case in this research project will not be 
suitable for generalisations concerning all active labour market policies, but the data analysis will be 
replicable for future studies of active labour market policies in the UK.   
The case under study in this project, the Flexible New Deal, is a public policy. What is meant by public 
policy is an area of dispute in the literature, and the debate too large to warrant discussion at this 
stage.17 A sufficient explanation is offered by Goodwin et al. who state that ‘Ruling is an assertion of the 
will, an attempt to exercise control, to shape the world. Public policies are instruments of this assertive 
ambition.18 Public policies are therefore an exercise in control, introduced in order to achieve 
something, or prevent something occurring. For Goodwin et al, ‘Policy gets made in response to 
problems.’19 Such problems range from the multi-layered, such as low national life expectancy, to the 
specific, such as an excessive number of road traffic accidents. As is common amongst the public policy 
literature however, problems do not exist until they are identified as such, and importantly that public 
policy-making is ‘In part … a matter of transforming sheer ‘puzzles’ into ‘actionable problems;’ if no 
solution can be envisaged, then for all practical purposes there simply is no problem.’20 In the case of 
this research project, a clear and identified problem exists in the form of and volume of long-term 
                                                          
14
 Burnham, P. et al. (2004) Research Methods in Politics, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, p53 
15
 Denscombe, A. (2003) The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects, Open University Press, 
Maidenhead, p32 
16
 Burnham, P. et al. (2004) Research Methods in Politics, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, p55 
17
 For a fuller discussion of the term see Hill, M. (1997) The Policy Process in the Modern State, Prentice Hall, London, pp7-18 
18
 Goodwin, R. et al.in Moran, M. et al. (eds.) (2006) The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, OUP, Oxford p3 
19
 Ibid, p26 
20
  Ibid, p26 
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unemployment in the UK. Correspondingly, there is an obvious desire amongst policy makers to a) 
recognise it as a problem, and b) seek a solution.  
Having established identifiable problems and solutions, policy analysis enables the researcher to 
‘discover what governments do, why they do it, and what difference, if any, it makes.’21 In particular, 
policy analysis facilitates the exploration of ‘what is ‘working’ and what is not’ and consequently what 
refinements, policy improvements and policy learning’ could be achieved.22 The analysis of public policy 
therefore renders the possibility of understanding whether the solutions, in this case the Flexible New 
Deal, to the given problem of long-term unemployment, have achieved their initial aims.  
 
General Method  
Addressing the primary research question requires the analysis of quantitative data. As the most 
appropriate method for evaluating the performance of an active labour market programme is to 
measure the number of individuals moving from social security to employment, the use of quantitative 
information is essential. The numbers moved from employment to work are meaningless without either 
a) an understanding of common performance levels, or b) performance objectives. Both of these 
elements are key to the method in this thesis. The level of performance which is expected from the 
policy case study, FND, has been outlined in three quantifiable ‘Critical Success Factors’ assigned to it by 
the Department of Work and Pensions, which were:   
 Suppliers will meet or exceed the Short Job Outcome targets (13 weeks employment) agreed in 
their contract;  
 Suppliers will meet or exceed the Sustained Job Outcome
 
targets (26 weeks employment) 
agreed in their contract;  
                                                          
21
 Dye, T. (2011) Understanding Public Policy, 13
th
 Edition, Longman, Harlow, p5 
22
 McDonnell, A. (2010) Understanding Policy Success, Palgrave, Basingstoke, p11 
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 Suppliers will deliver a service that represents excellent value for money and a step-change 
improvement in performance compared with previous programmes; 23 
It is therefore clear that these objectives will require the analysis of performance data of the 
programme itself, of other programmes, and expenditure to assess the efficacy of the quasi-market in 
employment services.  
To appreciate fully the operation of the Flexible New Deal’s welfare market requires an exploration of 
the programme first at the national level to evaluate its aggregate efficacy. This will serve to assess 
whether the programme met its Critical Success Factor objectives, and is also necessary for evaluating 
the programme against the other legacy programmes explored in this thesis to appreciate the FND’s 
added value. Because the programme has been contracted out to a number of different provider 
organisations, it is also necessary to explore the programme at the local level to evaluate spatial 
differences in provider performance. This will offer insight into the competition elements of private 
provision and address the two research sub-questions of the thesis. In accordance with the case study 
analysis, this will produce a fuller picture of the Flexible New Deal.  
 
 
Quantitative Data Collection 
The quantitative data collection process involved collecting, processing and adapting a selection of 
government and independent datasets. All data used in this project are interval/ratio data, which 
permitted a degree of adjustment not available to other categories of data.24 Most of the data used is 
‘whole population’ data rather than sample data, which largely eliminated the need for tests of 
statistical significance tests that are necessary when attempting to apply a sample to an entire 
population. The fundamental source of Flexible New Deal information was the Delivery Directorate 
                                                          
23
 DWP (2008) Flexible New Deal Phase 1 Invitation to Tender: Provision Specification and Supporting Information, DWP, p15 
24
 For a discussion of the differences  and uses of different data categories see Denscombe, M. (2005) The Good Research Guide 
for Small Scale Social Research Projects, 2
nd
 Edition, Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp237-238 
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Report. This data set is full population data, pertaining to every individual who participated in the 
Flexible New Deal, making systematic sampling unnecessary. As John argues, the larger proportion of 
the population included in the dataset, the greater the strength of generalisations derived from the 
data.25 In this case, the Delivery Directorate report includes information on all 407,690 participant spells 
on the Flexible New Deal. The data was gathered by the Flexible New Deal prime provider organisations 
that were required to record and report accurate information to the Department of Work and Pensions 
concerning a selection of activities, including the volume of participants registered to their organisation, 
their labour market status, and the destinations of the customers upon exiting the programme. This 
applied to each of the contractors in each of the geographic districts of FND operation (henceforth 
known as Contract Zones).  
It is important to note the discrepancy between the data input, and the data output. As John reminds, 
‘official information is what politicians and bureaucrats wish to make public.’26 The rich variety of data 
provided to the DWP by providers was curtailed when consolidated into the national database.  The 
dataset included total participants in each contractor in each area joining the programme, the number 
entering a short-term job (at least 13 weeks), and the number entering sustained work (at least 26 
weeks). These have been publicly available on a monthly basis through the Delivery Directorate Report 
on contracted employment programmes, with the final statistics released in November 2011.27 
However, a number of characteristics were omitted by the DWP in their consolidation of the data that 
could have contributed further to the understanding of the Flexible New Deal, such as the gender of 
participants, and the job entry rate of each contract area.28  
The information in the Delivery Directorate Report was recorded against the robust, unambiguous 
criteria outlined above and then crosschecked and revised in a number of ways by the Department of 
                                                          
25
 John, P. in Marsh, D. And Stoker, G. (eds.) (2002) Theory and Methods in Political Science 2
nd
 Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, p218 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, DWP, available at 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd [accessed 11/04/2011]  
28
 The exclusion of these variables was not explained by the DWP. 
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Work and Pensions. First, the data was authenticated by Jobcentre Plus to verify that participants had 
exited Jobseeker’s Allowance. This process was automatic, and used repeatedly to check whether the 
customer has left the JSA for a sufficient period to merit the job outcome criteria. A DWP inspectorate, 
the Provider Assurance Team (PAT), undertook the second check. Specifically, the PAT visited individual 
providers and manually checked their physical records.29  
 
To provide a richer understanding of the data, further data sets were collected to provide information 
on the levels of supply and demand in the contract area labour markets. On the demand side, ILO 
unemployment, Claimant Count, and Claimant to Vacancy ratios were used to match provider 
performance with the local labour market. On the supply-side, data regarding benefit receipt length, 
and educational attainment were used in attempt to evaluate the quality of supply within the area. The 
labour market data was obtained from the Nomis Local Labour Market system.30  
 
Analysis 
The review of the literature in Chapter 2 highlights a selection of tools deployed to evaluate active 
labour market programmes. It is observable that most have utilised quantitative methods to assess 
impacts on aggregate employment, unemployment and wages. This project will continue the trend by 
using data analysis to quantify the outcomes of the Flexible New Deal, and make inferences of relative 
success or failure by triangulating outcomes with expectations from the literature and quantified 
outcomes of comparable simultaneous active labour market policies.  
 
Quantitative data analysis presents many methodological choices and opportunities for understanding 
unemployment programmes. In this project, the method of analysis was determined by the nature of 
                                                          
29
 Department of Work and Pensions (2010) Provider Referrals and Payments System Q&A, DWP, available at 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/prap-qanda.pdf [accessed 03/10/11] p6 
30
 NomisWeb (2011) Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/ [accessed 03/10/11] 
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the available data. As Heckman argues in his detailed discussion of ALMP evaluation methods, ‘The 
choice of an appropriate [method] should be guided by the economics underlying the problem, the data 
that are available or that can be acquired, and the evaluation question being addressed.’31 The absence 
of certain key pieces of information, such as job finding rates, or participant tracking, prevented the 
longitudinal-based methods like ‘propensity score matching’32, or an ‘event history analysis’ approach,33 
which have been deployed to some effect in evaluating impacts of employment policies and duration of 
these interventions. These data allow for the measurement of net impact by creating counter-factual 
scenarios, which allow the comparison of the treated client group against the untreated.34  
Submitted formal requests for access to longitudinal data were rejected by the DWP on two occasions 
on data protection grounds. The lack of longitudinal information does not inhibit a comparative analysis 
of active measures, as a direct quantitative approach based on total employment outcomes can be 
achieved.  A precedent for this approach is found with Considine’s approach to evaluating the Australian 
Jobs Network, which used the official labour market outcomes of public, private and voluntary agencies 
over time to assess the relative impact of a private sector led welfare-to-work scheme.35 Like 
Considine’s study, the analysis will assess the employment outcomes of agencies within the programme, 
and these will be evaluated against the government performance targets. The findings from the Flexible 
New Deal data analysis will, using the same method, be compared with three other existing 
programmes with similar client groupings, to observe any relative impact. This is necessary to address 
whether the Flexible New Deal demonstrated a tangible improvement on existing arrangements that it 
was to replace. The existence of a number of welfare-to-work programmes operating simultaneously, 
                                                          
31
 Heckman, J. Et al. (1999)  The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs, in Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. 
(1999) The Handbook of Labor Economics Volume 3, Kenneth Arrow, Stanford, p1868 
32
 For a discussion see Bryson, A. et al. (2002) The Use of Propensity Score Matching in Active Labour Market Policies, 
Department of Work and Pensions Working Paper 4, HM Stationary Office, London 
33
 For a discussion see Allison, P. (2004) in Hardy, M. and Bryman, A. (eds.) (2004) Handbook of Data Analysis, Sage, London, 
pp369-386 
34
 For one example see Belzil, C. (1995) Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Over Time: An Analysis with Event History 
Data, The Review of Economics and Statistics V77.1 pp. 113-126, for another, see DWP (2012) Early Impacts of Mandatory 
Work Activity, Department of Work and Pensions Ad Hoc Analysis, DWP Publications, available at 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/adhoc_analysis/2012/early_impacts_mwa.pdf [accessed 17/06/2012] 
35
 Considine, M. (2002) Selling the Unemployed: the Performance of Bureaucracies, Firms and Non-Profits, Social Policy and 
Administration, v34.3, pp278-279 
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with similar client groups, offers a valuable counter-factual. Using an array of inputs from the 
Department of Work and Pensions’ own models of how programmes, client groups, and expectations 
are different, an assessment of any benefit is possible. A detailed explanation of the specific 
methodology behind the data analysis is discussed at length in Chapter 7, but a brief description is 
offered here.  
 
The data has been treated in a two-step process. The first leaves the data in its final format, but divides 
it into contract area types to identify the effects of competition in the quasi-market. The second stage 
required a minor remodelling to account for the abrupt termination of the programme by the Coalition 
government in October 2011 and offer a more reasoned description of programme performance. The 
remodelling process was detailed in Chapter 7. Using both standard and remodelled datasets, trends 
were explored in the national and contractor-level results. To help address the core research question, 
the Flexible New Deal outcomes were carefully compared with national targets and against other 
simultaneous active labour market policies to observe whether such a ‘step-change’ (quantified in 
Chapter 6) has occurred. Further exploration has occurred at the contract area level, where results were 
evaluated in light of local labour market conditions using the data sets described above. These have 
provided a more holistic understanding of where and how the programme has performed strongly. The 
analysis of data at the contract level served also to indicate why some contractors or contract areas 
have performed better or worse than others have. The ‘why’ was explored further using qualitative data 
and survey work by other researchers.  
Finally, the quantitative data has been used in collaboration with figures released in documentary 
sources to provide a cost-benefit analysis. A standard gross cost-to-participant approach is adopted, and 
is germane to the core research question because it gives a stronger indication as to whether the 
performance of the Flexible New Deal was a reflection of the resources at its command. 
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Qualitative Data  
As part of understanding the Flexible New Deal, the use of qualitative data was necessary, but only at a 
supplementary level. For the purposes of the case study qualitative data is deployed primarily to  
understand whether the principles and objectives outlined in national and local policy documents are 
reflected in the services received by customers. As Bryman argues, a more complete response to the 
research question can be facilitated by using one method in support of another, because one method 
may leave knowledge gaps that the other can fill.36 A stronger grasp of detail through qualitative data is 
pertinent to understanding the Flexible New Deal, as often what programmes were believed to be doing 
at the national level may not be reflected at the customer or provider level; what may be outlined in 
official policy documents may not be occurring on the ground. Secondary qualitative data produced by 
the Vegeris et al. at the Policy Studies Institute was used specifically for Chapter 6 in order to verify that 
the regulations intended by policy documents were being applied in practice.37  
In addition to the utilisation of secondary qualitative data to bolster the policy documents, a handful of 
face to face interviews were pursued to give the researcher a stronger grasp of the day to day of a 
customer’s FND journey, and close any gaps in the researcher’s knowledge of FND operations. The 
interviews with FND participants and a member of staff were achieved through an opportunity-sampling 
approach. There is precedent for this approach; in attempting to interview men in the hidden economy, 
Sixsmith approached men as they left the Social Services offices as she recognised that this was a logical 
approach for locating the relevant individuals.38 The four interviews were obtained through contact with 
participants on leaving provider offices. The content of these interviews is used sparingly in the thesis, 
as the qualitative data is intended only to have a supporting position in the project. Relevant quotes are 
therefore included where necessary, in manner advised by Critcher et al.: ‘Where these [qualitative 
data] are adjuncts to quantitative data, the usual strategy is to extract some quotations or case histories 
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as exemplification of numerical findings.’39 The questions used for both the participants and staff are 
included in the annex.40  
Summarily, using policy documents and quantitative research the research methodology was suitably 
equipped to construct a case study to address the primary research question of whether the FND would 
surpass the performance of legacy employment programmes.  
 
Chapter Outline  
Finally, having outlined the methodological approach of this thesis, this introduction turns to a brief 
description of each chapter to show how a staged approach to the thesis will illuminate what, why, and 
how the policy under review, the FND, emerged and whether it could match the objectives assigned to 
it by policy-makers. The thesis will address the primary research question through a staged approach. 
First, it will develop context by examining the historical development of British welfare policy, 
considering why particular unemployment related programmes have emerged and what effects these 
have on levels of unemployment. Based on this review, the thesis shows that particular policies have 
been favoured over others, considering both why this has been the case and what the implications are 
for the long-term unemployed. Third, it turns to examine policy in practice by exploring the 
performance of three schemes implemented in the UK to act as a benchmark for the national quasi-
market. Finally, it turns to the case in question, the structure and outcomes of the Flexible New Deal at 
both national and local levels, comparing the performance against both government targets, and the 
previous programmes FND was intended to replace.   
Chapter 1 positions the research question on active labour market policy by establishing the general 
causes of unemployment and the specific causes of long-term unemployment. It will proceed to 
examine the effects of unemployment on the individual, the state, and the economy, and address why 
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sustained periods of unemployment are a commonly identified policy problem. These are fundamental 
to understanding what the capabilities and limitations of any active labour market policies are, why they 
are regarded as necessary, and what types of unemployment active labour market policies are designed 
to resolve.  
Chapter 2 will introduce the concept of active labour market policies. Active labour market policies are 
defined and situated along a continuum of interventions, with the meanings of welfare-to-work and 
workfare outlined. The chapter will continue by looking at where these concepts have their origins and 
explain why active labour market policy has come to be viewed as an effective response to 
unemployment. In particular, the burgeoning popularity of their implementation is explored, with a 
detailed examination of the contextual necessity for their emergence; including the economic, social, 
and political contexts supporting their use. 
Chapter 3 is a detailed discussion of the academic literature on active labour market policies in 
developed economies, exposing the key divisions of opinion on the necessity and effects of active 
measures. It will evaluate what the apparent effects of active measures are, and will look at particular 
components commonly featured in active measures, such as conditionality, work-first and human 
capital development approaches, and the use of contracted delivery to discover whether these trends 
expose positive effects of active interventions. Explicitly, they will address the literature on whether 
contracting out will deliver higher levels of employment and lower levels of unemployment. 
Additionally, it will explore the unintended consequences that have been observed in the labour market 
that are the result of these programmes. This evaluation of the literature will provide some 
explanations and expectations of the specific active measures discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
Chapter 4 outlines the historical development of welfare-to-work programmes in the United Kingdom. 
The historical analysis of unemployment policies will begin with the arrival of the Conservative 
government under Margaret Thatcher in 1979 because it is often regarded traditionally as a turning 
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point away from post-war welfare consensus - specifically in its rejection of full employment as a core 
objective of macroeconomic policy.41 The historical analysis reaches its terminus with the last major 
welfare reform passed by the Brown government, the Flexible New Deal (FND), which at that point was 
the largest active labour market programme seen in the United Kingdom.42 The adjustments to welfare 
policy over this period are situated within the theoretical framework; which combines the policy-making 
theories of historical institutionalism with political incrementalism. The chapter shows that despite 
conflicting evidence for the efficacy of certain types of ALMP shown in Chapter 3, there is a clear path 
apparent in the types of policies that have been selected by British governments. This serves to 
understand why policies that are not proven to be demonstrably more effective than their alternatives, 
can often get locked in to policy preferences.  
Chapter 5 provides a detailed account of the comparative elements to the thesis, and alternative 
positions that the British government has pursued. The chapter examines firstly, how the Labour Party 
adjusted the social security and employment systems, and then it moves to examine three specific 
policies. The first is New Labour’s flagship active labour market policy, the New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP); the second is Labour’s measures for over 25s, the New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed 
(ND25+) and the third, Employment Zones (EZ). In each of these cases the origins, objectives and 
structures will be explained, with particular emphasis on the role of conditionality and different delivery 
models in each. It will proceed to discuss a selection of programme evaluations for each initiative, and 
provide a decade of data on programme performance in order to project the expected from the Flexible 
New Deal. As legacy programmes operated by the state and private sector on differing scales, these 
programmes supply comparable benchmarks against which the research question and case study can be 
assessed.    
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Chapter 6 deciphers the structure of the Flexible New Deal, explaining the incentives behind the 
contracting process and how, theoretically, this might influence an improvement in employment 
outcomes and efficiency. To ground the research question, Chapter 6 explores the primary objectives of 
the FND and how these were quantified for the data analysis. These quantify the explicit expectations of 
private sector programme performance that are assessed in the data analysis of Chapter 7.  
Chapter 7 is a detailed account of the methodological approach to the data analysis, and an analysis of 
the results of the data gathered. The programme data obtained from the Department of Work and 
Pensions explored and is used in conjunction with labour market data from the Nomis local labour 
market data bank to evaluate the Flexible New Deal. The chapter turns first to explain how the 
programme performed against its original targets. In order to address directly the core research 
question, it will compare the results of the Flexible New Deal against the programmes discussed in 
chapter 5 using identical outcome measures. Having address the primary research question, the chapter 
proceeds to evaluate differences in performance at the local level, and discuss the labour market 
features that account for the variance in local employment outcomes. Finally, it will account for why the 
results of the Flexible New Deal were significantly off-target.  
The conclusion returns to the original research questions and addresses a range of conclusions from the 
research project. These are both general and specific. From the general conclusions, a discussion of why 
contracting out public employment services may be a difficult approach to reverse is offered, looking 
back to the theoretical framework of path dependence and reviewing this in light of the latest Coalition 
reforms. For the specific, the conclusions identify practical uses for this research, including a discussion 
of predicting local performance targets, and considering a temporary role for counter-cyclical 
alternatives.  Last, the conclusion will identify where research could be enhanced, stressing the 
importance of difference-in-difference evaluations of the private and public employment services, 
where the literature continues to be ambiguous.  
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Conclusion 
Active labour market policies are now a core part of the UK’s labour market strategy in pursuit of lower 
levels of unemployment. The Flexible New Deal was at the cutting edge of ALMP, using private 
contractors in a deregulated environment to improve the employment outcomes beyond those 
achieved in the past. The government assigned clear targets to benchmark these achievements, and 
through data analysis, the programme performance can be established against these targets. Using 
careful comparisons of multiple programme datasets, the methodology is suited to address the primary 
research question of whether the shift to a national quasi-market in employment services resulted in a 
more effective policy than before. The methodology is also equipped to address the supplementary 
questions concerning the efficacy of work-first in different labour markets, and whether the contracting 
process is capable of identifying suitable providers for future contracts.    
The following chapter will begin to assign context to the case study, examining the definitions of 
unemployment, long-term unemployment, and the wide variety of the causes. Only with an 
understanding of what causes unemployment can the purpose, and likely impact, of active labour 
market policy, be understood.  
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CHAPTER 1  Contemporary explanations of unemployment and 
welfare-to-work   
 
The prime objective of all active labour market programmes is to move people from unemployment into 
work; it is therefore essential to understand what the government means by the term ‘unemployment’. 
Exploring this concept requires an appreciation of the primary causes of unemployment, and what if 
any, measures might be suitable for efforts to reduce the number and types of groups becoming, and 
remaining, unemployed. To begin addressing these issues this chapter will present a definition of 
unemployment and then a range of commonly recognised causes of unemployment, particularly the 
nature and causes of long-term unemployment. This will subsequently provide the context for 
understanding the proliferation and use of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) as state 
mechanisms designed to ameliorate long-term unemployment.  
The challenge facing all programmes designed to help the unemployed re-enter the labour market is 
identifying where and why the labour market is unable to integrate them. This section will outline the 
definitions of unemployment, some general principles of labour market economics and the widely held 
views of the causes of unemployment.  
What is unemployment? 
Unemployment has a variety of different meanings and measures and the International Labor 
Organisation (ILO) provides a basic definition: 
  
The "unemployed" comprise all persons above a specified age who during the reference 
period were: 
(a) "without work", i.e. were not in paid employment or self-employment; 
(b) "currently available for work", i.e. were available for paid employment or self-
employment during the reference period; 
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and 
(c) "seeking work", i.e. had taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid 
employment or self-employment.43 
 
In essence, unemployment is summarised as a status in which a person is not in paid work, but is able, 
available and actively looking for work. How unemployment is actually measured varies over time and 
location, and thus making comparisons within and between countries difficult. In the UK there are two 
measures used by governments and statisticians. The first is known as the Claimant Count, which 
calculates the number of people on work-related unemployment benefit, the Jobseeker’s Allowance, 
and does not include those claiming other benefits.44  Because it counts benefit recipients rather than 
the total number looking for work, governments often appear to prefer this measure since it leads to 
substantially lower unemployment counts. The second, consistently higher measure of unemployment 
is provided by the Labour Force Survey, which measures the number of people available, looking for, 
and willing to work but not in work. These figures include all individuals seeking work regardless of 
whether they are in receipt of JSA.   It is important to note that neither measure includes all 
economically inactive individuals, for example, those who have voluntarily retired are not considered 
unemployed, nor is anyone on the wider measure if they are deemed not to be actively seeking 
employment.   
 
Causes of Unemployment  
Just as there are a number of different definitions of unemployment, a range of causes are identified in 
the literature. These can initially be cast in two different categories, equilibrium and disequilibrium 
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unemployment. The former is (theoretically) where supply of labour matches demand for labour, and 
the latter is where supply and demand are out of step.   
Equilibrium unemployment, commonly associated with economist John Maynard Keynes, exists where 
in the long-run supply may match demand, but large scale unemployment persists.  Disequilibrium 
unemployment on the other hand can be accounted for where there is a mismatch between the 
number of vacancies in the labour market, and the number of workers available for them. It is 
important to note at this stage that in any theoretical approach, equilibrium between supply and 
demand does not mean unemployment is zero.45 The features of both types are explained in the 
following sections, as is an explanation of why zero unemployment does not exist when the labour 
market is in equilibrium.  
Different models have emerged to try to account for these two broad categories of unemployment. The 
classical approach to unemployment contains many of the features of disequilibrium unemployment. In 
the classical model, wages are the key determinant to understanding the cause of unemployment. In 
this approach, the idea of a ‘labour market’ is at its most appropriate because it treats ones labour as a 
commodity, and a commodity that will only be purchased at the correct price to the buyer. At times, or 
in places, where wages exceed what the market is willing or able to pay, unemployment will occur. This 
is a ‘natural’ consequence of firms either reducing their workforce to save on wage costs (where 
demand for their products has fallen), or where they refuse to hire more workers at the wage 
demanded. Because there will be fewer jobs available during a contraction in the labour market, 
workers will compete on wage demands until a new equilibrium is found and the natural rate of 
unemployment is re-established based on the new wage.46 Temporary disequilibrium exists, but for the 
classical model, the labour market will return to equilibrium by natural market signals.   
                                                          
45
 Borjas, G. (1996) Labor Economics McGraw-Hill, New York, p434 
46
 Mulhearn, C. and Vane, H. (1999) Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p202 
22 
 
The ‘race to the bottom’ between workers should eliminate the possibility of sustained periods of mass 
unemployment as the market naturally self-corrects. It is important to stress that according to the 
literature the model does allow for both large-scale unemployment, and sustained periods of long-term 
unemployment.  For instance, the model accepts that when the national economy moves into recession, 
consumer spending and finance shrink, sales fall, stock remains unsold and firms find that they cannot 
keep their workers at the current wage. In essence, the economy slows down and the demand for 
labour weakens if workers are not willing to reduce their wages. The evidence of this connection 
between the goods market and the labour market is shown through Okun’s Law, which suggests that for 
every 2 per cent an economy loses in GDP the unemployment rate will increase by 1 per cent.47 
The model explains why the market may not self-correct and large numbers of workers remain un-hired 
and unemployed. The situation is known as ‘real-wage unemployment’, where there are barriers that 
prevent workers competing to drive down their own wages.  For instance, it is often argued (particularly 
by those on the right of the political spectrum) that trade unions are responsible for demanding wages 
in excess of what the market is able to pay.48 Because of this, the level of unemployment is artificially 
inflated as fewer workers are hired at higher wages than the market would naturally pay. Alternatively, 
states or municipalities may set legally enforced minimum wages that are ‘too’ high, which prevent the 
labour market from being able to self-correct.4950  
 
These two aspects of disequilibrium in the labour market can function together to make unemployment 
higher than classical model should allow.  As trades unions and mandatory minimum wages resist 
pressure for workers to reduce their wage expectations at the end of the business cycle, firms may be 
forced to reduce their workforce or not rehire. These forces therefore prevent the labour market from 
                                                          
47
 Samuelson, P. and Nordhaus, W. (1995) Economics 15
th
 Edition, McGraw-Hill, USA, p559 
48
 See for example Friedman, M. (2002) Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition, Chicago Press, Chicago, pp123-
124 
49
 Sloman, J. (2003) Economics, Fifth Edition, Prentice Hall, Harlow, p406 
50
 The effect of minimum wages has been subject of an ongoing debate, rekindled in the 1990s with the publication of Card, D. 
And Krueger, D. (1995) Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, Princeton, New Jersey.  
23 
 
wage competition and returning to an equilibrium state of full employment. Full employment, in this 
model, was a natural consequence of ‘Says Law’, which argued that supply created its own demand. To 
extrapolate this to the labour market, it suggests that ‘when we produce goods, we create a demand for 
other goods; consequently there can be no overproduction of goods in general. Since there can be no 
overproduction of goods in general, there can be no unemployment in general.’51 
Marx in Kapital rejected this idea:  
‘Nothing can be more childish than the dogma, that because every sale is a purchase, and every 
purchase a sale, therefore the circulation of commodities necessarily implies equilibrium of 
sales and purchases.’52 
 A more forceful response expressed half a century later can be located in Keynes’ General Theory, 
which again refuted Say’s Law.53  He wrote that ‘There is, therefore, no ground for the belief that a 
flexible wage policy is capable of maintaining a state of continuous full employment’.54 Instead, 
according to Sloman the General Theory argued that the strength of demand in the economy can settle 
at different points of equilibrium and the economy in aggregate may not balance at the same level of 
output as a contraction, so higher unemployment may persist.55 This is widely known as a position of 
‘unemployment equilibrium.’ The position of high unemployment, even when the economy has 
rebalanced, is possible because aggregate demand falls and natural market forces alone are inadequate 
to return the labour market to a position of full employment.56 In part, this is explained because if 
wages are reduced to boost employment chances, consumer spending must also fall; as Keynes wrote ‘it 
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would, I think, be more usual to agree that the reduction in money-wages may have some effect on 
aggregate demand through its reducing the purchasing power of some of the workers.’57 
The purpose of examining this intractable debate between two competing theories has been to 
highlight a consensus that emerges in relation to two points. First, that unemployment will occur in the 
short-term when the number of vacancies is inadequate to absorb the supply of labour, and that this 
may persist in pockets where demand remains low. Second, ‘even when there are as many job 
vacancies as people unemployed – there will still be some unemployment’.58  
Taking this a little further, the two main causes of equilibrium (or natural) unemployment are frictional 
unemployment and structural unemployment, and both concern the fit between the individual and the 
job available. Frictional (or search) unemployment is a common type of unemployment across all 
economies at all times, and occurs when employees leave or are dismissed from their occupations and 
are looking for a new job. 59 This type of unemployment is common because people regularly leave work 
or firms reduce their labour forces, therefore the unemployed are left temporarily out of work. While 
evidence provided by Mattila shows that a large proportion of the working population avoid 
unemployment as they transfer from one job to the next,60 the transition to unemployment and back to 
reemployment may not be immediate for all jobseekers. This is because jobseekers’ access to vacancy 
information is imperfect, and it may take time to match or revise their skills, or reduce their wage 
expectations to an existing vacancy. Search unemployment is likely to occur to most people in their 
lifetimes and is not strictly a policy problem unless jobseekers are persistently unsuccessful in their 
searches. 
Frictional unemployment is more prominent in some sections of the population, in particular young 
adults. The younger portion of the labour market (i.e. those aged between 16 and 24) has a higher 
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propensity to frictional unemployment for a number of reasons. The first is that upon finishing formal 
education, vast numbers will enter the labour market at the same time. This is compounded by 
apparent ‘shopping around’ in the youth labour market and the freedom to relinquish their current 
employment due to the (theoretically) absence of a dependent family to support. Furthermore ‘young 
people are more likely to quit their jobs than adults, will continue to do so during recessions, and will 
therefore be disproportionately affected by recession-induced reductions in new hires’.61 Moreover, the 
skill and training levels of young people tend to be lower and therefore the costs of firing young people 
are lower than their older and more experienced employees.62 The likelihood of moving in and out of 
unemployment as young people a) decide what career to pursue, and b) the relative ease of severing 
their contracts makes frictional unemployment a common feature of the youth labour market.  
Structural unemployment is different in nature and reflects the shifting patterns in the structure of the 
economy, as demand in certain areas and industries may rise or contract.  There are two main causes of 
structural unemployment. The first is a changing pattern of demand in the economy, where certain 
goods are no longer required or can be found cheaper elsewhere, products fall out of fashion and places 
of employment close. This was evident in the United Kingdom where the coal mining industry gradually 
closed as alternative sources of fuel were found cheaper elsewhere. As certain industries are often 
concentrated in the same area, industrial decline can lead to high regional unemployment.63 This type of 
unemployment has obvious knock-on effects, and may affect entire geographic regions as 
unemployment reduces consumer spending in the area.  
The other major cause of structural unemployment pertains to technology, where ‘new techniques of 
production often allow the same level of output to be produced with fewer workers.’64 Where a robot 
can build motor vehicles at multiple times the pace of humans for the same price, but demand for 
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motors remains the same, the need to retain the same sized sentient workforce diminishes. Marx, for 
instance, feared: 
[A]portion of the working-class, thus by machinery rendered superfluous, i.e., no longer 
immediately necessary for the self-expansion of capital, either goes to the wall in the unequal 
contest of the old handicrafts and manufactures with machinery, or else floods all the more 
easily accessible branches of industry, swamps the labour-market, and sinks the price of labour-
power below its value.65 
With structural unemployment, consequent of technological development or industrial decline, 
returning demand to a given area or industry can be difficult if the market is diminishing, or the goods 
can be produced more efficiently by machines or cheaper labour elsewhere.  
The pattern of industry within a geographic area can periodically shift volumes of unemployment by 
altering the types of employment contracts they offer.  For instance, a large manufacturer may offer a 
large number of short-term contracts that are not renewed once the demand for the labour declines. 
One example of this is ‘seasonal unemployment’, where, at certain times of year, unemployment tends 
to be higher and at others significantly lower.66 Seasonal unemployment is often associated with 
agricultural production, where in times of harvest the demand for labour increased, but this type of 
periodic labour demand can also be observed in tourist destinations, and the boom in vacancies in the 
run up to the Christmas retail period. When these ‘seasons’ pass, unemployment will often rise.  
Explaining Long-Term Unemployment 
The previous section outlined that unemployment has an array of causes, and unemployment over 
short durations is a more or less common experience over one’s working life.  As such, short-term 
unemployment at the individual level is not strictly a policy problem, and as Borjas argues, ‘policy-
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makers usually worry more about some types of unemployment than about other types.’67 Long-term 
unemployment, on the other hand, is often identified as a policy problem. The logic behind this is that 
short periods out of work do not require large income transfers and the loss of income experienced 
during most short spells without work can be absorbed by the individual through unemployment 
insurance, past savings, and reduced expenditures.  
Unemployment becomes a more pressing individual and political issue when protracted. As an 
individual remains out of the labour market over a sustained period they lose most of their income, and 
often find that they are incapable of financing what are considered basic needs in a capitalist economy, 
such as the purchasing of food and paying mortgages and bills. Thus, long-term unemployment 
increases the costs to the state through income transfers while reducing its tax intake.  
The designation of someone as long-term unemployed varies between states and regulatory agencies. 
However, on average the literature tends to view an individual as being ‘long-term’ unemployed at 
around the 12-month point.68  In some of the literature, this 12-month period may have been 
accumulated over a longer period, in recognition that individuals may experience a short succession of 
repeated cycles of short-term employment and return to benefits.  This is the ‘carousel effect’ or 
‘revolving door employment’, where cumulatively individuals suffer long-term unemployment over a 
period of, for example, two years. This phenomenon is relevant to the current discussion because the 
carousel effect may be just problematic for the individual and the state as the traditional single-spell 
classification of long-term unemployment.6970 
Defining long-term unemployment raises questions because of its connection to short-term 
unemployment, and the fact that the point unemployment becomes ‘long-term’ is arbitrary. Indeed, 
traditionally the causes of long-term unemployment were not deemed distinguishable to those of 
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unemployment generally. For instance, at the aggregate level at any given point in time the lack of 
available jobs and higher levels of competition for vacancies will naturally result in longer search 
durations. This argument is simple; higher levels of unemployment create higher levels of long-term 
unemployment. A lack of demand for labour (whatever the cause) will not only increase unemployment, 
but also will extend search durations.  
Whether long-term unemployment manifests distinct characteristics is a subject of debate in the labour 
market literature. In trying to come to terms with the disagreement a good starting place is to examine 
the ‘hysteresis’ effect. ‘Hysteresis’ is an expression drawn from physics research, which refers to the 
‘failure of an object to return to its original value after being changed by an external force, even after 
that force is removed.’71 The application of this to the labour market is that ‘an increase in 
unemployment produces an increase in long-term unemployment which is simply not reversible by an 
increase in demand for labour.’72 For instance, Jackman and Layard found that after the UK recession in 
1983 the proportion of those leaving unemployment was lower amongst the long-term unemployed 
than the short-term unemployed. They hypothesized that ‘long duration [of unemployment] may 
actually reduce a given individual’s probability of leaving unemployment.’73 The authors contend that 
the extension of unemployment spells in the UK is a consequence of two factors. First, ‘a fall in the ratio 
of vacancies to unemployed [i.e. deficient demand] and [second] a higher proportion of the 
unemployed being long-term unemployed, and hence demoralised and stigmatised in the eyes of 
employers.’74 Like the Keynesian contention that after a recession, unemployment fails to return to its 
pre-shock state, ‘hysteresis’ suggests that  an upswing in the wider economy will not institute a 
reduction in the level long-term unemployment built up during the contraction, that long-term 
unemployment will be a larger proportion of total unemployment after the shock. At the individual level 
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therefore ‘the probability of finding a job is lower for the long-term unemployed’75    
 
The ‘hysteresis’ debate is a source of controversy because it suggests that the longer individuals spend 
on the unemployment register, the more unemployable they become, and the less the upswing in the 
economy matters for reversing the fortunes of the individual. The explanations for the occurrence of 
hysteresis vary from the loss of human capital, employer discrimination, and the apparent comforts of 
state dependence (e.g. see Budd, A. et al.)7677 These points require explanation. Human capital 
depreciation and discrimination will be dealt with here, while state dependence will be discussed in the 
following section. Human capital is described by Borjas as ‘a unique set of abilities and acquired skills’;78 
it is effectively the economic worth of an individual, which are a combination of their capacities, skills 
and reliability which contribute to their own (intangible) economic profile. Unemployment is said to 
affect human capital, because as people become unemployed, their familiarity with working practices 
decrease, and their skills (the core of their economic profile) may become dated. As Acemoglu argues, 
this contributes to a decline in human capital, and may result in discrimination between the short- and 
long-term unemployed, thus elongating the unemployment spell.79 As an example, he uses the Disney et 
al. study where despite large subsidies for businesses to recruit the long-term unemployed, take up by 
business was poor.80 Thus, short-term unemployment now is a contributor to future long-term 
unemployment. 
 
Nevertheless, the hysteresis explanation of long-term unemployment is not universally accepted. 
Webster re-examined the connection between short and long-term unemployment in the UK since the 
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1940s and found little evidence of ‘stickiness’ or hysteresis. Instead Webster found that the total and 
long-term unemployment data had been misinterpreted by not giving sufficient attention to the 
repeated lag in labour market recovery. Once this delay had been taken into account he argued that the 
overall level of long-term unemployment to be broadly consistent once the economy had recovered, 
and that the relationship between total and long-term unemployment was solid on both the up and 
downturn of the economy.81 The policy implications for this finding are profound; if long-term 
unemployment is directly linked to short-term unemployment, then governments need to be targeting 
policy measures towards fixing general causes of unemployment, because to fix the former would fix 
the latter. However, from the literature studied, Webster’s position appears in the minority.  
 
Voluntary and Involuntary Explanations 
It seems clear that long-term unemployment has some distinguishing features and effects. These need 
to be explored because many of the active labour market policies explored in this thesis are targeted 
explicitly at the long-term unemployed. The literature on the causes of long-term unemployment has 
been divided into involuntary and voluntary categories. 
Beginning with the involuntary factors there are a number of explanations of long-term unemployment 
that stress issues beyond the individual’s control. One important factor is deficient demand for labour at 
the local level, and there are considerable disparities in the UK of levels of long-term unemployment. 
Webster, for example, observes ‘spatially concentrated structural unemployment, with a spatial 
mismatch between the unemployed and job opportunities.82 What Webster means by this is industrial 
decline in certain parts of the UK has resulted in a dearth of employment opportunities, and that where 
there may be an aggregate degree of equivalence between the number of unemployed and total 
vacancies, the two are separated by considerable geographic distances. For the former, there is clear 
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evidence of this problem in the UK, which is visible in the ratios of unemployment benefit claimants to 
live vacancies. An analysis of claimants-to-vacancies undertaken by the Local Government Association 
found that south Wales, London and the North West had noticeably higher claimant-to-vacancy ratios 
than the rest of the country.83 Such problems are also demonstrated in detail in Chapter 7, which 
connects spatial mismatch of employment opportunities with employment programme performance. 
The first issue is connected to the second. Despite available vacancies, the unemployed are spatially 
detached from them; where labour mobility is low, long-term unemployment is likely to be high.  In one 
example, McCormick presents an analysis of labour mobility in the UK, and finds that those most prone 
to unemployment (manual workers) are, in his words, ‘spatially inflexible’, where despite job 
opportunities in distant parts of the UK, (former) manual workers find traversing the gap difficult.84 
Furthermore, the relative mobility of non-manual workers away from contracting labour markets 
exacerbates the problem of unemployment.85 There are both voluntary and involuntary forces at play 
here, but McCormick suggests that the public housing stock is one involuntary impediment to labour 
migration.86 If workers cannot relocate to where work is, periods of unemployment are likely to be 
protracted.  
Even in areas where a sufficient volume of vacancies may exist in the locality, the skills profiles of 
workers may not be appropriate. One of the principle causes of supply-side long-term unemployment is 
where the skills and qualifications of the pool of available labour do not correspond with the demand 
for it. For example, a firm seeking to recruit engineers for a new weapons factory, may find only trained 
colliers inhabit the pool of available local labour. Manacorda and Petrongolo recognise this skill 
mismatch as a significant contributor to unemployment in the United Kingdom.  The authors write:  
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‘In many OECD economies, this tendency in the evolution of relative demand for skills was not 
matched by an equal increase in relative supply [...] its magnitude was remarkable in Britain and 
the United States during the 1980s, where in fact the difference between skill-specific 
unemployment rates was rising, and wage differentials widened dramatically.87 
 
Education mismatch is also a common feature of this, and long-term unemployment disproportionately 
affects those with low educational attainment. This is because, according to Borjas, educated workers 
are less likely to lose their jobs for two reasons, either because of the training investment that they 
have received from the firm, or because educated workers are more likely to switch jobs without an 
spell of search unemployment, given they have more information about the labour market, or better 
contacts. Therefore, inadequate education is more likely to result in longer periods of search 
unemployment.88 If demand is insufficient for the jobseeker’s skills, the period of unemployment is 
likely to lengthen. In an economy increasingly requiring a skilled workforce, the unskilled will find it 
harder to locate work, and search durations will inevitably lengthen. Therefore, there are risks (often 
ignored) when comparing the number of vacancies to jobseekers.  
 
A further cause of involuntary long-term unemployment is discriminatory employer practices, where 
prejudices may make the incidence of long-term unemployment likely amongst some groups. The 
competitive market should eliminate discrimination, because the act of discriminating is costly to 
firms.89 The literature on hysteresis implied employer discrimination against those with elongated 
periods of benefit receipt, but in this case, discrimination means that long-term unemployment 
incidence is higher amongst a number of societal groups including ethnic minorities and those with 
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recognised disabilities.90 This implies that regardless of effort to locate employment, employer 
prejudices are preventing access to the labour market. Notable policy responses have been attempted 
throughout recent history to resolve this, such as affirmative action legislation in the US or anti-
discrimination laws in the United Kingdom.  
In contrast to the involuntary mechanisms of long-term unemployment discussed above there is a range 
of other (often more familiar) theories concerning long-term unemployment as a form of individual and 
collective lifestyle choice. 
In this camp, Layard argues that the levels of unemployment are correlated with the generosity of 
alternatives. He highlights that the lower levels of long-term unemployment seen in the United States is 
the natural consequence of the ungenerous nature of the American welfare system.91 This type of 
arguments falls into what Marxists refer to as the commodification of the workforce. As long as workers 
can be commoditised they will have to work for survival, however once they are decommodified (such 
as through the welfare state) they have a choice whether to accept the ‘going’ rate for their labour.  
Thus, as part of this, the more extensive and generous welfare state is to the individual the more likely it 
is to reduce their incentives to re-entering the labour market once they have left.  Katz and Meyer for 
example, find that (in the case of where benefits are time limited) when unemployment benefits are 
extended by one week the individual’s additional period in receipt of benefit extends by 0.16-0.2 weeks. 
Thus, if benefits are extended from six months to one year, the authors predict that benefit duration 
will increase by around four to five weeks.92 The existence of unemployment benefits is thus sufficient 
to extend periods of jobsearch, with the potential to extend this until the individual is classified long-
term unemployed.  
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It is argued that the decommodification effect of the welfare state induces individuals to remain 
unemployed even when a job is available by creating an artificially high reservation wage.  This occurs 
because unemployed workers are able to be more selective and reject low paying jobs because of 
welfare safety nets. With jobseekers able to be more selective over their future employment,  longer 
job search periods are anticipated, and therefore, as is an increased likelihood of long-term 
unemployment.  The greater is the decommodification, then the greater the opportunity for an 
individual to remain unemployed. Ljungdvist and Sergant claim to have identified such a relationship 
when studying patterns of European unemployment, suggesting that ‘It is well known that high income 
taxation and generous welfare benefits distort workers’ labor supply decisions.’93 Furthermore they 
contend that the impact is considerable in relation to hysteresis as: 
 
Generous unemployment compensation hinders the process of restructuring the economy. 
Laid-off workers then lack the incentives to quickly accept the transition to new jobs in which 
skills will once again have to be accumulated. Consequently, there can be a lengthy transition 
phase with long-term unemployment largely attributable to the existence of welfare 
programs.94 
 
Despite decommodification through welfare entitlement apparently slowing the search process and 
increasing frictional unemployment, entitlements are not necessarily pernicious or contrary to the 
demands of economic efficiency. Indeed, the upside of such a system is that higher reservation wages, 
while increasing frictional employment in the short term, may enable workers to find jobs most suitable 
for them, which is both good for the economy and individual. The suitability of the work found may 
result in to less frequent transitions in and out of unemployment and lower frictional unemployment in 
aggregate.  
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Before accepting that welfare providence makes sustained periods of worklessness more appealing, 
Barr warns that the literature surrounding voluntary unemployment is ‘large, complex, and 
controversial’:  
 
Though the replacement rate [of benefits over wages] has an effect, labour supply is influenced 
more by other aspects of the benefit structure, in particular the maximum duration for which a 
benefit can be received. In short, the hypothesis that unemployment benefits exert a 
substantial upward effect on the level of unemployment receives only limited empirical 
support.95  
 
Caution therefore is advised in this area, though for this thesis a working assumption is that generous 
benefit provision allows extended search periods and thus boosts short-term frictional unemployment. 
However, the question remains as to what level of generosity is sufficient to deplete jobsearch activities 
and render long-term unemployment desirable. The debate concerning benefit dependency is too large 
to be explored here, and includes a raft of sociological arguments about underclass, intergenerational 
effects, and idleness. The dependency arguments interact with the economic debate, but these are 
situated more suitably within the justifications for mandatory employment programmes.   
 
Unemployment as a policy problem  
It is important to assert that the justifications for intervention in the market rest on premises that 
unemployment, when sustained, has malign effects on the individual, society and public finances. Each 
are examined in turn as a premise for deploying active labour market programmes.  
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For the majority of individuals, spells of unemployment will have a negative impact on personal and 
family income.  Often, where unemployment is sustained over a long period, this puts people in, or at 
risk of, poverty.96 In the United States, the Urban Institute found that poverty increases with each week 
of unemployment, and that the poverty rate of the long-term unemployed in 2010 was double that of 
people who had no experienced unemployment that year. Of family types, the Urban Institute found 
that single parents were at the greatest risk of unemployment related poverty.97 In the United Kingdom, 
Tomlinson and Walker have found that unemployment puts people at ‘high risk’ of poverty in the UK, 
and at greatest risk are those in the lowest echelons of the labour market, either in manual labour jobs, 
or jobs without skills.9899  
 
 In association with the experience of individual hardship, sustained unemployment has a number of 
detrimental health effects. A study Kessler, Turner and House in the US state of Michigan found that 
unemployment led to a significant elevation of depression, anxiety and other mental health conditions 
of clinical significance; conditions that would reportedly disappear once reemployment had 
commenced.100 In a review of international literature commissioned by the UK’s Department of Work 
and Pensions, Waddall and Burton conclude that ‘there is extensive evidence that there are strong links 
between unemployment and poorer physical and mental health and mortality. A large part of this 
appears to be a cause-effect relationship,’101 Specifically the authors cite evidence of increased 
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mortality rates amongst the unemployed, including increased incidence of both accidental death and 
suicide, but with the  caveat that, in some cases, unemployment may be beneficial, actually improving 
health of certain individuals compared to their previous occupation.102  
 
Unemployment was found also to affect some groups psychologically more than others. Research by 
Furlong and Cartmel, using data from Scotland, Sweden, Finland and Spain found that while 
unemployment generally makes people unhappy, this effect was observed more among young men 
than young women.103  The above evidence identifies sustained unemployment as detrimental to both 
the health and happiness of human beings. This is one factor, amongst others, which may justify state 
intervention in the labour market. 
 
Looking beyond the individual and the family unit, unemployment is argued to have negative effects on 
wider society. Specifically unemployment thought to be associated with a number of anti-social 
behaviour and illegal activities. For instance, Stafford reports that there is a ‘strong presumption that 
unemployment among young people leads to benefit dependency, social exclusion, dysfunctional and 
antisocial behaviour, low self-esteem and even the emergence of an underclass’.104  
Research by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer also found a significant correlation between the rise in property 
crime and a rise in unemployment levels In the United States. Equally, the falling crime rates of the 
1990s are associated with declining unemployment.105 Using panel data from the UK, Witt, Clarke, and 
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Fielding found similar results; that a rise in crime is associated with a rise in male unemployment.106 The 
crimes associated with rises in unemployment tend to property related, such as theft and burglary.107 
Criminal activity of the unemployed also has apparent spill over effects. Hakim argues that adult 
unemployment has consequences on immediate family, where children of unemployed parents are 
more prone to juvenile delinquency.108 This connection penetrated the upper echelons of government, 
for example, the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared ‘I know of people in my own constituency 
whose fathers don’t work and whose grandfathers haven’t worked. Once that starts, drug abuse starts 
happening, you get family instability and a whole range of problems.’109  
Hakim also argues that unemployment, through its effects on mortality, stress in the family home, and 
associated divorce rates, could also increase the volume of single-parent families in the population, 
which in themselves were argued to lead to future social problems such as low educational attainment 
of the children growing up under these conditions.110   
 
The effect of unemployment on the fabric of society is a complicated phenomenon, and the above 
literature only scratches the surface of what has been found. Further arguments concerning the 
connection between unemployment, the welfare state, and the concept of an ‘underclass’ are explored 
below. The need to keep people from sustained unemployment is therefore, on this evidence, not 
simply important for the individual, but also is a social good.  The quicker the return to employment, the 
less likely the pernicious social effects of unemployment will emerge.   
 
The selection of individual and social consequences, such as depression, family breakdown, crime and 
delinquency create pressures on government services, such as the police forces, the justice system and 
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health agencies. This can either encourage government to increase expenditure on services, or reduce 
provision within them. It is also commonly known that a high volume of short and/or long-term 
unemployment will have a direct impact on the state of public finances. As Franco and Pench report, 
there are two elements to this. The first is an expansion of social security payments to compensate for 
lost earnings. The second is that a rise in the people out of work will result in a loss of tax revenues to 
the exchequer.111 Dilnot and Morris discuss the extent of the interaction between fiscal policy and 
unemployment in length,112 but generally large scale and/or long-term unemployment may pressure 
governments to spend surpluses, increase borrowing, retrench welfare services, or target other policy 
areas to compensate losses. Latter sections will explore how concerns, such as the functioning of the 
market economy and demographic transformation, have perhaps made these choices more stark and 
action more necessary.  
Conclusion 
The arbitrary distinction between short and long-term unemployment renders the identification of the 
causal factors of sustained benefit receipt problematic. As a starting point it is certainly true that the 
causes of short-term unemployment will contribute to the stock of the long-term unemployed, but the 
evidence presented, particularly that of hysteresis, suggests that after a time unemployment becomes 
‘sticky’ at the long-term, and it may be difficult to return to pre-recession levels of unemployment. The 
specificities of long-term unemployment reflect both the demand and supply explanations, where for 
example, economic restructuring may be manifested in a factory closure, where a section of the 
populous once worked, and their training and skills do not adequately reflect new vacancies in the area. 
  
Those that emphasise the importance demand factors, or supply factors nonetheless acknowledge the 
role of the other.  For instance, Webster  acknowledges that ‘there are people in the labour force who 
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really are less easily employable as a result of various genuine handicaps such as disabilities, illiteracy 
and criminal records, etc.’113 Similarly, Jackman and Layard recognise structural mismatch in the labour 
market as a persistent problem.114 Personal decisions clearly contribute to the stock of short and long-
term unemployment- for example the role of social security in decommodifying the workforce may 
rationally extend search periods, and diminish the will to, or search for, work.   
Recognition of the multiplicity of causes behind sustained worklessness might warrant balance in the 
policy responses, but as later chapters of this thesis will illustrate, the thrust of policy mechanisms have 
disproportionately been associated with one set of causes of long-term unemployment to the detriment 
of another. 
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CHAPTER 2  Active Labour Market Policies: Definitions and 
Development 
 
The previous chapter outlined some of the major general causes of unemployment, and the particular 
causes of long-term unemployment.  This chapter will begin linking the issues discussed in the previous 
chapter to the emergence, expansion, and embedding of strict active labour market measures into the 
social security system.  This will be complemented though a discussion outlining the main 
commonalities found in the programmes associated with the active labour market policies and what 
effects, if any, they are said to have on unemployment and length of time that an individual remains 
unemployed.  
 
Before examining active labour market programmes it is important to distinguish individual policies 
from the layers of institutions and contexts in which they operate. As defined by Baldock, a welfare 
state is ‘the institutional arrangements through which the state provides money, goods, and services to 
its citizens. 115 In the British case this usually refers to ‘the main institutions of the post-war welfare 
settlement including the National Health Service, the social security system, the state-funded education 
system, the state role in the provision and funding in housing, and state personal and social work 
services.’116 Baldock distinguishes this from the welfare system, which is more concerned with the 
machinery of welfare, specifically ‘the organisations and mechanisms primarily concerned with 
providing or guaranteeing the social welfare of citizens.’117 These mechanisms and organisations will 
include (in the UK for example) departments and agencies in charge of distributing welfare services, 
such as benefits, or charged with the task of delivering services such as Jobcentre Plus; these are the 
systems and organisations that encompass a welfare state.   
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Within this is the further distinction of policies and programmes, which may be operationalised by, or 
applied to, the new or existing parts of the welfare system. Policies are ‘plans of action formulated in 
general terms by political parties and their representatives in government, especially ministers, and 
often developed in detail by civil servants.’118 One such example in the UK context is the Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, a policy designed to accelerate the transition from unemployment benefit into work, 
operated by multiple parts of the system, including the executive agency Jobcentre Plus, with 
bureaucratic and ministerial oversight provided by the Department of Work and Pensions. Programmes 
on the other hand are often made up of multiple, interacting policies, sometimes a programme might 
include a menu of Options, such as the New Deal for Young People, which combined the policy of the 
Jobseekers Allowance within a range of other welfare-to-work policies including a training and 
education policy. The definitions of these are fluid; this is because a ‘policy is not usually expressed as a 
single decision. It tends to be defined in terms of a series of decisions, which, taken together, 
compromise a more or less common understanding of what policy is.’119 A collection of policies might 
therefore be described as either a programme, or a policy. The distinction is only of real importance 
when distinguishing between parts of programmes and the programme as a whole, and often the words 
are used interchangeably.  
 
Last are welfare regimes, which are a term for describing broad categories of welfare states at usually 
the national level, and their interaction with the market.120 Regimes describe the institutions of the 
welfare state, and the contexts in which they are operating. These have been used to imply ‘the 
existence of a certain logic of social policy provision, and specific configurations in which markets, states 
and family interact in the provision of welfare within a given country.’121 As Esping-Anderson writes,  
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‘As we survey international variations in social rights and welfare-state stratification, we will 
find qualitatively different arrangements between state, market, and family. The welfare state 
variations we find are therefore not linearly distributed, but clustered around regime types.’122  
 
The host of complexities to, and disputes with, this argument are not relevant for this thesis, but Esping-
Anderson argues that the structure of welfare states, systems and policies are based around embedded 
principles.123 Relevant here is the classification of the UK as a ‘liberal regime’ that is associated with 
‘means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers or modest social insurance plans [where] 
entitlement rules are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest.’124 
Other systems which Esping-Anderson regards within this ‘liberal regime’ type are Anglophone states 
including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland and the United States, some of whose labour market 
policies are discussed in this thesis.  The type of regime the UK is associated with has its uses in 
identifying why the UK gave preference to some measures over others is a recurring theme, but the 
prevalence and type of welfare-to-work programmes is not uniform across these similar systems.  
 
Defining Active Labour Market Policies 
 
To understand what active labour market policies are, and why they have emerged it is necessary to 
distinguish between active and ‘passive’ labour market policies. Indeed, it might be easier to define 
active labour market policies as much by what they are not, as what they are. At the extreme, passive 
measures consist of [cash or in kind] ‘benefit allocated without any conditions to show evidence of 
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seeking work or any offer of assistance in finding work.’ 125 Simply, entitlements are issued to the 
unemployed or economically inactive with few or no requirements. Passive benefits were common in 
most developed countries until the late 1970s, when according to Lodermel and Trickey ‘High levels of 
unemployment experienced by most western nations…led to high levels of public expenditure on social 
security, requiring governments to develop strategies to relieve these problems.’126127  
In response, most Western governments have been involved in transforming passive benefit 
programmes and social security systems by developing more interventionist policies, commonly these 
policies have been labelled as active labour market programmes (ALMPs). Broadly, ALMPs are defined 
by Robinson as deliberate interventions that require recipients to engage in ‘work, training, or other 
programmes designed to help the jobless move back into employment.’128 More precisely, Boone and 
Van Ours describe them as ‘programmes such as public employment services, labour market training or 
subsidized employment’ designed ‘to improve the functioning of the labour market in various ways.’129 
Bonoli, describing the ALMP as an ambiguous term, opens the definition up, suggesting that it can be 
used to describe ‘the approach developed in various English-speaking countries, which combines 
placement services with stronger work incentives, time limits on recipiency, benefit reductions, and the 
use of sanctions –so the called workfare approach.’130 This definition is perhaps too wide to serve much 
purpose, though it raises some important questions about the distinction between what is passive and 
active.   
 
As Robinson explains, the distinction between a passive benefit and an active labour market programme 
                                                          
125
 Lodemel, I and Trickey, H. (2000) An Offer You Can’t Refuse? Workfare in International perspective, Policy Press Bristol, p13 
126
 Ibid, p12 
127
 Not all countries had passive systems before this period; Robinson for example describes active measures as being  a strong 
feature of welfare models in countries such as Sweden since the end of the second world war. (Robinson, P. (2000) Active 
Labour Market Policies: A Case of Evidence-Based Policy-Making? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, v16.1, p13) 
128
 Robinson, P. (2000) Active Labour Market Policies: A Case of Evidence-Based Policy-Making? Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, v16.1, p14 
129
 Boone, J and Van Ours, J.C. (2004) Effective Active Labour Market Policies, CEPR Discussion Paper 4707, Centre for Economic 
and Social Policy, London, p2 
130
 Bonoli, G. (2010) The Political Economy of Active Labour Market Policy, Politics and Society, v38, p439 
45 
 
is rarely clear.  He recommends that distinctions are best observed ‘along a continuum’ of activity, and 
not distinct as ‘one key feature of ‘active’ programmes is that participation or non-participation in them 
increasingly plays a role in securing access to the benefits system.’131  
 
Figure 2.1 The Passive-Active Spectrum 
 
Source: Author’s Construction  
 
To the far left of the continuum, social security benefits are distributed to welfare claimants with few or 
no requirements attached to their receipt. Alongside these social security payments, services may be 
available for the long-term unemployment, but the take up is voluntary. Toward the middle of the 
spectrum are programmes that use a mixture of conditional and unconditional benefits.  Here, the 
conditions attached to welfare receipt tend to be ‘soft’, consisting of little more than a requirement that 
recipients demonstrate they are eligible for work and looking for it. Further across, some states (and/or 
programmes) expand these requirements by requiring the unemployed to carry out certain tasks in 
exchange for continued benefit receipt. These are active in as far as there are activities attached to 
benefit receipt, but these requirements are largely minimal, and checked by the benefit services rather 
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than undertaken or supervised by them. These requirements are common to most international benefit 
systems. The conditions vary widely, and generally include job-search and attendance at an interview 
with the public employment service.   
 
Further down the spectrum are the more interventionist measures, commonly called welfare-to-work 
programmes. This is a clouded part of the spectrum, because as Bonoli explains, one of the problems 
with classifying the extent of intervention of any welfare-to-work programme is that ‘the menu of 
options within these programmes is vast.’132  This range of programme components not only adds to the 
difficulty in trying to compare different welfare regimes, but differences between conditional benefit 
receipt and active labour market programmes (i.e. those regimes and programmes falling furthest to the 
right in Figure 2.1) are not always apparent.  Studies have tended to draw a distinction based on the 
level of intervention and activity required, yet these can vary within the same programme. Many 
welfare-to-work programmes tend to require less interventionist activities, which tend to be less 
intense, at the beginning of the recipient’s participation than at the end.   
 
There is considerable heterogeneity in the social security and employment services of different states; 
however, some common features are identifiable: enforced jobsearch undertaken in a supervised and 
controlled environment; attendance at workshop on interview techniques; some form of state 
sponsored or provided short-term work experience and placements; and, a number of different work 
orientated training programmes. These features are becoming increasingly common in Western welfare 
regimes; and for the mainstream unemployed groups these  exercises will often be enforced by benefit 
sanctions when recipients are not compliant.  
 
At the far end of the continuum are the strictest of the active intervention programmes, known as 
workfare. The term ‘workfare’ date back to the end of the 1960s as can be seen when Richard Nixon 
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stated: ‘We cannot talk our way out of poverty; we cannot legislate our way out of poverty, but this 
nation can work its way out of poverty. What America needs now is not more welfare, but more 
workfare’133 While some academics and politicians outside the United States have traditionally used 
‘workfare’ in a pejorative manner to attack proponents of strict labour market conditionality134, the 
term itself has come to describe a fairly fluid concept. In its simplest form, workfare is understood as 
‘making social assistance conditional on the performance of employment’135. This definition may be 
extended to any active labour market programme that makes work or training a condition of welfare 
receipt. Jones described similar demands to accept training as a condition of benefit receipt as 
‘trainingfare’,136 however this term has not found common parlance in the academic lexicon. 
 
The definitional wrangling offers constructive insight into the distinctions between degrees of 
intervention at the programme level, but in practice employment services embedded within the 
framework of the  social security system can, and often do, deploy the full spectrum of active measures.  
 
In the UK, measures tend to progress along the continuum, beginning with a relatively passive approach 
to service provision and limited conditionality in exchange for benefit receipt. As an individual’s claim 
becomes more protracted (moving from the short-term to the long-term unemployed) they have more 
and more conditions attached to their continued receipt of benefit, eventually having to participate in a 
workfare programmes (for the New Deal for Young People this was after 10 months) in order to retain 
their benefits. As such, despite the active nature of the welfare state, workfare has often been used as a 
last resort. 
 
Core to understanding the degree of activation is the composition and range of services provided within 
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the broader social security regime, and the level of compulsion upon individuals to use services or take 
work or training where available. The OECD defines active labour market policies (ALMP) as involving 
‘Activation programmes [that] differ from free public employment services in that participation is 
obligatory for relevant target groups.’137   
 
This definition opens up a number of possible understandings, and academics have identified a series of 
programme types with different components and emphases on immediate labour market attachment. 
For instance, systems may be described as ‘Soft’ when participants are presented with a variety of 
options, such as training, education, and work-related activities alongside an option to work. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum are the ‘hard’ workfare regimes, which impose a Work-First strategy to 
reintegrating the unemployed into the labour market, by stipulating that in order to receive benefits the 
client must accept work (or become disentitled).  A similar dichotomy is made by Torfing in the Danish 
experience of ALMP, which identifies a distinction between what he describes as ‘offensive’ and 
defensive’ workfare; where the former is a proactive series of activities and services which seek skills-
attainment, against the latter which is associated with rapid labour market attachment and downward 
wage-pressure.138 
 
These distinctions provide two recognised categories of interventions: one advocating human capital 
development and the other emphasising immediate labour market attachment. The dominant type of 
intervention and the time-period allowed before an individual is required return to the labour market 
serves to distinguish the two broad approaches. The ‘hard’ approach, associated with Work-First, 
advocates the notion that ‘any job is a good job’139 and explains sustained unemployment through 
unfamiliarity with the labour market, believing that work-experience will lead to work, and altering 
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attitudes towards entering the labour market, which explains the mandatory element. This approach 
seeks to minimise the transition time back to work, effectively by the shortest route and implies an 
immediate impact on frictional unemployment.140 Capital development may exist in Work-First regimes, 
however it will largely be short-term and work orientated.141 The ‘soft’ approach gives more time to 
participants returning to the labour market, seeking to invest in human capital development exercises 
such training and retraining individuals to ‘assist benefit claimants in raising their education and skills 
levels’142 The effects of these two core approaches are explored in the following chapter.  
 
The rationale for active labour market policies  
 
As Bruttel and Sols argue, the ‘practical rationale for activation programmes is that they can have a 
large impact on employment and unemployment outcomes in environments where benefits 
entitlements are of long or indefinite duration.’143 This was identified relatively early in states such as 
Germany and Sweden who introduced activation policies in the early 1950s.144 However, the wider 
proliferation was not to occur until the late 1980s and early 1990s, during what Bonoli describes as the 
‘Activation Turn’.145  This suggests that something in the intervening 40-years altered the way many 
Western policy makers began to conceive the relationship between the state and its unemployed. A 
number of possible explanations for this are explored below. 
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Economic theory justifications  
 
With the development and expansion of non-employment based social security policies the 
replacement wage was artificially raised. Part of the reason for this was that wage expectations 
amongst the unemployed appeared to grow, while simultaneously these unconditional benefits allowed 
unemployed individuals the prospect of being more selective in what job they are willing to accept. As 
the previous chapter asserted, replacement wages are arguably permissive of extended periods of 
frictional unemployment, which can foster the malignant effects of long-term unemployment. In 
essence, the welfare system is responsible for higher levels of sustained unemployment, and thus by 
tightening the parameters within which the unemployed are able to be selective, and improving 
information through centralised vacancy databases, search duration and frictional unemployment 
generally should be reduced. There are however a number of other economic justifications for moving 
away from passive regimes which have been advanced.  
 
There is wide agreement amongst economists that there is a trade off between inflation and 
unemployment; that a fall in unemployment will feed wage and price inflation, and conversely that a 
rise in unemployment will serve to reduce wage and price inflation (exemplified by the Phillips Curve). 
The concern therefore is that attempting to intervene in levels of unemployment may create its own 
economic problems. However, an important feature of the economic argument is that ALMP’s are said 
to be a method of ‘cheating the Phillips curve’.146 Calmfors, describes ALMP’s as a ‘deus ex machina’ to 
the long-term unemployment problem where it was argued that activation policies circumvent 
inflationary pressures.147 This idea of a miracle cure to a long-held concern amongst economists is best 
summarised by Robinson: 
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The long-term unemployed play no role in holding down inflation... [therefore] if employers 
used a wage subsidy to hire more of the long-term unemployed at the expense of the short-
term unemployed, or even by reducing their existing workforce, this would not matter. For a 
higher level of short-term unemployment would reduce wage inflation, so allowing for an 
expansion of real demand, so that the workers who have been substituted against will all find 
work again, and relatively quickly, before they become long-term unemployed.148  
 
Premised upon this argument, active labour market policies targeted at the long-term unemployed 
(which reduce the duration of unemployment rather than the total volume of it) will not have an impact 
on inflation, theoretically solving the Phillip’s dilemma. The argument that the long-term unemployed 
play no inflationary role has been disputed,149 but if policy-makers accept the premise that a) the trade-
off exists, and b) that reducing long-term unemployment will not affect inflation, the appeal of 
intervening in the labour market status of the long-term unemployed is enhanced.  
 
Economic context justifications  
Moving from the economic theory to the economic context, there are a number of general trends, 
which have made political intervention in the operation of the labour market necessary.  One incentive 
for ALMP emerged was the belief that ‘high wages in developed economies in the 1970s and 1980s 
were damaging economic competitiveness against rivals in the developing world, and thus increasing 
unemployment in the developed world.’150 Simply, demand for labour is, at least partly, driven by the 
price of the labour available; where the more wages a firm is required to pay to its workforce, the less 
labour the firm can afford to take on. Matthews presents a convincing argument in this regard for high 
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wages and replacement ratios in Britain as a key cause of high unemployment.151 Matthews used data 
from after the Second World War to argue that a selection of factors have prevented the (from the 
classical perspective) wage levels reducing in response to falling demand, and thus a growth in 
unemployment. In particular, he points to trade union power to negotiate wages on behalf of their 
members, minimum wage laws and principally ‘a steep rise in unemployment benefits.’152   
 
Hall, in the United States, found that wage rigidity (‘stickiness’) was caused by the wages of public, or 
what he calls the ‘non-entrepreneurial’ sectors.153 In downturns, wages in the non-entrepreneurial 
sectors did not fall as they would in the private sector. This resulted in a spillover effect, where private 
sector companies found it difficult to recruit against the more rigid (and higher) public sector salaries.154 
Layard and Nickel identified several of these factors in contributing to British unemployment during the 
1970s and early to mid-1980s. They attribute the principle cause of unemployment in Britain as 
fluctuations in demand; however, they also identify a number of ‘push’ factors that have nudged 
unemployment beyond its necessary (or macro-demand levels). Principally they refer to benefit 
levels,155 the relaxing of unemployment rules, and employment protection as causing sticky wage 
rigidities and a rise in unemployment.156   
 
Nickell and Nutziata’s report for the Bank of England identified most of these features, what they 
describe as ‘labour market institutions’ as being push factors of unemployment from the 1960s to the 
1990s amongst all OECD countries. They again stress the importance of demand shifts as a cause of 
modern unemployment, but state strongly that:  
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It is sometimes thought that the fact that unemployment is determined by aggregate demand 
factors is somehow inconsistent with the notion that unemployment is influenced by labour 
market institutions. This is wholly incorrect.157 
 
The authors identify that 55% of the long-term upward shifts in unemployment across the OECD are 
explained by changes to these labour market institutions; and that these labour market institutions are 
therefore in the long-run influential on demand. The remainder is accounted for by short run shocks  
and that these are influential on the level of demand in unemployment across the OECD.158  
 
Only some elements of these push factors hold today. For instance, a decline in trade union power has 
occurred and this is a feature identified by Nickell and Nutziata’s report for the Monetary Policy 
Committee.159 Furthermore, Petrongolo and Pissarides identify that some of the responsible labour 
market institutions have been dismantled since the deregulatory programme between 1985 and 1993, 
which coincided with both more people being unemployed quicker (inflow), but was also a time of 
falling unemployment (outflow).160  
 
Last, the introduction of tighter benefit rules and the stability of unemployment benefits over the last 
20 years imply that the ‘strong labour market institutions’ that were cited as the cause of British 
unemployment arguments are weakening.161 The shrinkage of push factors should reduce 
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unemployment, and may be part of the reason why the UK may need policy interventions less than 
other European countries. That said, there are still factors at play, which are contributing to UK 
unemployment and thus necessitate a role for active labour market policy. For instance, benefit systems 
still provide a replacement ratio sufficient to incentivise a proportion of the population to remain 
unemployed for longer, and imperfect information on vacancies, and skills mismatch still imply a role for 
ALMP. While true that the UK for the last decade maintained a lower level of unemployment than most 
European countries, this does not mean further work reductions cannot be achieved. In particular, there 
has been a colossal growth in the volume of people classified as economically inactive in the UK.162 
Nickell also identifies a growth of technical industries in the UK, which is biased in favour of the skilled 
workforce, at the cost of the unskilled. As evidence, Nickell shows that unemployment rates for men in 
the UK without qualifications have doubled between 1979 and 1993, and economic inactivity rates 
amongst the same group have risen by a factor of six between 1979 and 1998.163 If a lack of basic skills is 
an important determinant of modern UK unemployment, there is clear potential for this to be 
addressed through active labour market policies.  
 
International pressure on the UK labour market  
These push pressures on labour market demand in the UK and Europe must be considered against a 
wider backdrop. The wage problem was put into sharp relief by the phenomena of globalisation that has 
increasingly enabled businesses to shift their production and capital abroad in search of lower wages 
and costs with greater ease. The opening up of markets to the forces of globalisation has hampered 
political decision making by creating, in Friedman’s words, a ‘Golden Straightjacket.’ In order to prosper 
under the conditions of global free market capitalism, countries must adopt the some of the following 
approaches:  
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 making the private sector the primary engine of its economic growth,  
 maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability,  
 shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy,  
 maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus,  
 eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods,  
 removing restrictions on foreign investment,  
 getting rid of quotas and domestic monopolies,  
 increasing exports,  
 privatizing state-owned industries and utilities,  
 opening its industries, stock and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and 
investment, deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic competition as possible,  
 eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible.164 
 
This list of instructions for prosperity according to Barr implies that ‘Countries with expensive welfare 
states... will increasingly be at a competitive disadvantage relative to those with more parsimonious 
ones.’165 With businesses and capital less constrained by national borders, states risk rising 
unemployment if they do not combat rising labour costs.166  
 
The reason this is pertinent to the UK is because on the measure of unit labour costs (which 
demonstrate worker productivity plus the costs incurred by the exchange rate) the UK has been losing 
ground between 1995 and 2004 to core competitors such as the United States, France and Germany, 
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making British labour (relatively) more expensive.167 This naturally makes labour market rigidities more 
problematic in the face of foreign competition.  
 
With labour market institutions, wage rigidities, mismatch and a degree of decommodification still 
playing a role in pushing the natural rate of unemployment, an increasingly competitive international 
labour market can exert pressure on the UK workforce. It is therefore clear that the continuum of 
activation can serve to combat them. At the passive end of the spectrum, unemployment benefits can 
be reduced to constrict decommodifying replacement wages. Further down the scale wage expectations 
can be addressed by defining the selectivity of the unemployed, and at the furthest end of the spectrum 
workfare type programmes can explicitly coerce benefit recipients into either working for their benefits, 
or working for sub-market wage levels, thereby forcibly reducing their wage expectations. While other 
government policies also clearly have a role to play in dampening wage expectations, such as 
dismantling collective bargaining, labour market protection and minimum wage regulations, it is clear 
that active measures can contribute.  
 
Demographic Pressures for active labour market policies  
 
The proliferation of welfare-to-work is more than simply a concern with high labour costs. Reducing 
government expenditure on social security has also become a priority as states attempt to maintain 
balanced budgets, and present a perception of fiscal discipline in the era of globalisation.168 Before 
reviewing this literature, it is necessary to stress that many of the arguments (and subsequent state 
responses) have roots in neoliberal arguments that presuppose a leaner (or non-existent) welfare state. 
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One of the undeniable alterations to impact society has been a range of demographic changes. First, 
recent decades have witnessed considerable change in the social and economic structures of the family. 
This shift has had a profound impact on the welfare state. A starting point is the growth in the size of 
the workforce since the Second World War, especially since the 1960s where women have more freely 
entered the labour market thus vastly increasing the numbers available for work.169 This change brought 
both advantages and challenges for the welfare state. On the one hand, the increased number of 
individuals entering the labour market creates a larger tax base to support social services, while also a 
larger stock of labour to inhibit inflationary pressures. On the other hand, increasing the number of 
those available for work intensifies competition in the labour market170 and widens the pool of potential 
social security recipients. In addition, where both parents (in a two parent family) work, there is a 
decrease in either parents’ ability to provide informal welfare services to their immediate families.
  
Other demographic shifts have occurred to instigate a redesign of passive welfare transfers, including 
the increase in the divorce rate and the rise of single parent families.  This is a particular concern for the 
UK, which leads the European Union on proportions of failed marriages.171 Alongside the rising divorce 
rate is an increase in never married single parent families.172 Typically, lone parents tend to reside in the 
lowest part of the income distribution, making them vulnerable to poverty and dependency on state 
support programmes to supplement (part or all of) their income.173 It should be stressed that even 
amongst those working at the lowest ends of the income ladder that (despite the state’s best attempts 
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to convince otherwise) work has not lifted all out of poverty.174   
 
Another significant demographic challenge to emerge over recent decades is a dramatically ageing 
population as people live longer and have fewer children. This has increased the costs borne by the 
state for providing welfare to this ageing population.175 The proportion of the population who have 
reached retirement is creating unprecedented burdens for the pensions and healthcare systems in the 
UK. If we examine the growth in expenditure on state pensions since the middle of the 1990s the 
growth is enormous. 
 
Figure 2.2 UK Government Expenditure on Pensions since 1992 (billions £)  
 
Source: UK Public Spending Online176 
As the above chart indicates since 1992 public expenditure on pensions has tripled. The impact this has 
on the welfare state is clearer when the ‘support ratio’, is examined.  In brief, the support ratio  
calculates the number of people of working age compared to the number of people of retirement age. 
Because of a drop in the birth rate, improving healthcare and lifestyle choices, the government project 
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that the ratio will drop from 3.34:1 in 2003 to 2.57:1 by 2030.177 The problem this changing ratio 
presents is that much of the welfare state was designed in an era where people died younger and had 
more children. Today, the length of working life, and life itself are different. Glennester  summarises the 
present problem presciently, that ‘A population that is living longer and working fewer years, as ours 
have been, must either save more out of earnings, be taxed more heavily, or work longer to sustain 
income in retirement.’178179 These challenges are fully understood by government administrations but 
often dealt with only in a piecemeal fashion. At first, this may be considered as unusual given the 
enormity of pressure that retirement pensions apply to the welfare state is much greater than that of 
unemployment. For instance, the expenditure on unemployment benefit in 2010 was £3.6billion, 
whereas the expenditure on the basic state pension was £66billion.180  
 
Social security for the unemployed receives an enormous amount of attention and intervention by 
politicians and policymakers, less so the pensions system despite the sizable difference in their expense. 
The important question is, ‘why deploy active measures aimed at the long-term unemployed, rather 
than resolve the obvious problem of ballooning pension expenditure?’ Part of the answer may be found 
in public opinion. Taylor-Gooby and Hastie surveyed tax-payers to examine the popularity of additional 
taxation targeted towards specific services and benefits, the least popular of which, by a considerable 
margin, targeted increasing unemployment benefits (16% agreed, or strongly agreed to a 1p rise in 
income tax to finance this). In contrast, the support for a rise in taxation to finance retirement pensions 
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was 65% of those interviewed.181 This may go some way towards explaining why public policies have 
more consistently been focussed on the unemployed than on either pensions or welfare-to-work for 
older generations.   
 
Alternatives to ALMP 
The changing nature of Western labour markets can help explain why policymakers have been 
attempting to reform welfare state services in order to address the needs of very different economic 
and demographic contexts from that which faced the state when these services were developed. 
However, active labour market programmes are not the only solution available to policymakers.  For 
instance, in the past, most academics and politicians adhered to the conviction forwarded by John 
Maynard Keynes that high unemployment was caused by demand deficiencies in the economy, and that 
after a recession the rate of unemployment would settle at levels higher than the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment.  In order to return the labour market to full employment (i.e. only frictional/search 
unemployment) state intervention was necessary, using fiscal and/or monetary injections, and/or public 
works programmes. Such interventions would directly or indirectly increase employment and return the 
labour market to a state of, or near to, full employment.182 
 
Yet, with the emergence of the neoliberal economic paradigm during the 1970s-1980s, this approach 
shifted from the policy agenda. Neoliberal economists viewed demand interventions as waste due to 
the fact that left alone the market would naturally return to its natural equilibrium. If anything, 
Keynesians were bumping employment beyond its natural rate, causing longer-term macroeconomic 
instability. In the neoliberal analysis any unemployment that remained was more than simply 
frictional/search unemployment. Unemployment, was primarily the result of workers pricing 
themselves out of the market.  This caused a demand deficiency, or as Gregg puts it, the emphasis 
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shifted from ‘raising the demand for labour at the going rate to matching the wage to skill levels so that 
labour will be demanded.’183 Unemployment was to be seen more as the failure of the unemployed 
than the free economy. In this context, active measures could oblige individuals to enter the labour 
market at lower wages than they would otherwise expect, because the alternative was the far from 
lucrative benefits system.   
 
Sociological Justifications for Active Labour Market Programmes 
The emphasis on economic necessity, real or otherwise, is not the sole justification for introducing 
active labour market policies into the benefit system. Since the 1980s, a series social arguments have 
targeted the issue of ‘welfare dependency’, or the ‘dependency culture’. While the concept of welfare 
dependency was not new, it gained prominence amongst those championing a more active welfare 
state. The key for the following is that many of the arguments complement the decommodification 
debates. For instance, George Gilder wrote in 1981 that ‘Our welfare system creates moral hazards 
because the benefits have risen to a level higher than the ostensible returns of an unbroken home and a 
normal job.’184 In this view, the welfare state has not only extended period of frictional unemployment, 
but has made work less attractive than a life on welfare. This, according to Charles Murray, has 
manufactured its own social strata, who according to Fitzpatrick ‘alleged that over-generous benefits in 
American had led to the emergence of a significant underclass of several million people.’185 The term 
underclass itself is credited to Gunnar Myrdal, who explained that sustained unemployment had 
created ‘unemployed and, gradually, unemployable, persons and families at the bottom of society’.186 
 
Murray’s thesis goes further in alleging that the blame must be attributable to the benefits system, 
which had manufactured a class of unemployed and unemployable individuals, mainly black males and 
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single mothers who had no interest in work.187 Murray argued the existence of a ‘benefits trap’ and the 
disincentive effect of welfare ‘rights’, whereby the changing level and availability of benefits had made 
low-level labour market entry no longer attractive; this is seen as particularly the case for young people 
who have entered the labour market in a system of generous welfare benefits. He describes the 
microeconomic effect as follows:  
 
To someone who is not yet persuaded of the satisfactions of making one’s own way, there is 
something laughable about a person who doggedly keeps working at a lousy job for no tangible 
reason at all. And when working no longer provides either income or status, the last reason for 
working has truly vanished. The man who keeps working is, in fact, a chump.188  
 
Thus, according to Murray’s theoretical construction, the ‘increase’ in welfare generosity, relative to the 
gains of low-paid and low-level work, created a culture of dependence, where individuals take from 
society, which requires them to contribute nothing in return.  Because of this it is argued, that the 
benefit system led; first to a growth in unemployment and second, it facilitated lengthier 
unemployment spells. It is easy to observe the similarities between these arguments and those of 
hysteresis previously discussed; the underclass thesis simply offers a more textured narrative.  
 
In spite of the similarities between the hysteresis thesis and the underclass, it is noteworthy that 
Murray viewed the necessity for addressing unemployment amongst the poor as driven not by 
economic expediency, but a belief that remarrying the unemployed with work was the route to personal 
happiness and social salvation. This need to ‘re-moralise’ the welfare state is a common theme amongst 
neo-conservatives, who argue that the rise of state welfare ‘destroyed the moral framework within 
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which civic associations were situated.’189 The very institutions established to hold society together was 
ripping it apart. Murray’s ideas of underclass and moral degeneracy have helped frame the discussion of 
poverty and unemployment in the United States and, to a certain extent, Britain.190 According to 
Dolowitz, Murray’s seminal work, Losing Ground, had a two-step influence on British policy-makers, by 
first energizing the debate about reforming welfare in the United States, where the ostensible success 
of this was to inspire British policy makers to adopt the same rhetorical and attempt to tackle similar 
problems.191 
  
While similar, Lawrence Mead approached dependency by arguing that ‘the damage seems to be done, 
not by the benefits themselves, but by the fact that they are entitlements given regardless of the 
behaviour of clients’.192 Unlike Murray, he believed that poverty and unemployment were not caused by 
the circumstances in which the individuals found themselves, but by the individual’s choices and 
behaviour.193 The welfare system, Mead argued, could be transformed into a part of the solution. Mead 
wrote that ‘the source of bondage for today’s seriously poor is no longer social injustice but the 
disorders of their private lives. For these Americans, the way forward is no longer liberation but 
obligation’.194 According to Lewis, Mead’s arguments have been influential on the UK government, with 
its emphasis on personal responsibility representing a thread running through a selection of New 
Labour’s policies, none more obvious than the obligation to work.195 
 
                                                          
189
 O’Brien, M. and Penna, S. (1998) Theorising Welfare: Enlightenment and Modern Society, Sage, London, p98 
190
 Deacon, A. (2002) Perspectives on Welfare: Ideas, Ideologies and Policy Debates, Open University Press, Buckingham, p33 
191
 Dolowitz, D. (1998) Learning from America? Policy Transfer and the Development of the British Workfare State,  Sussex 
Academic Press, Brighton, p89-90 
192
 Mead, L. (1986) cited in White, M. eds. (1994) Unemployment and Public Policy in a Changing Labour Market, Policy Studies 
Institute, London, p57 
193
 Deacon, A. (2002) Perspectives on Welfare: Ideas, Ideologies and Policy Debates, Open University Press, Buckingham, p52 
194
 Mead, L. (eds.) (1997) From Welfare to Work: Lessons from America, Civitas, London, p15 
195
 Lewis, J. (2001) in Seldon, A. (eds.) (2001) The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997-2001, Little and Brown Company, 
London, p503  
64 
 
Frank Field can be best positioned between these two. Field balances the view that the welfare state 
has developed rational but socially pernicious behaviour alongside the belief that this has itself led to a 
pervasive culture of dependence. He writes:  
 
The underclass is as difficult to define as it is easy to recognise when confronted with it. The 
major cause is the collapse of full employment and particularly the radically transformed 
employment position of those with brawn and little developed intelligence. But welfare 
continues to play a part in both recruiting and solidifying the underclass. 196 
 
The approach mirrors characteristics of Mead’s assessment that unemployment is associated with social 
disorder, or in Field’s words a ‘yob culture’, where ‘the underclass, at its strongest point, is fed by 
unemployment, the abuse of welfare, crime and drugs.’197 Field railed at the means testing welfare 
system, but more broadly identified the need to reattach individuals to a sense of responsibility as the 
route back to social integration and the labour market.198 The influence of Field on British policy is 
perhaps more direct, as having a short ministerial brief for welfare reform between 1997 and 1998, at 
the genesis of the New Deal programmes discussed in following chapters.  
 
Murray, Mead and Field may attack dependency and poverty from slightly different perspectives but 
they find the fundamental solution to the social ills created by dependency in the same place. All three 
appear to regard the solution as the reintegration of individuals into the labour market. For Murray and 
Mead, the welfare state must change into a system which not only expects but forces work upon its 
recipients. Murray’s solution was to eliminate benefit entitlement for the majority of the unemployed, 
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leaving them little choice but to take work.199 His contribution therefore, is in contextualising the 
demand for intervention rather than the advocacy of it. Mead on the other hand was quite explicit in his 
interventionist persuasions that the fix was paternal obligation through workfare. He states ‘It is the 
mandatory, work-orientated form of welfare employment programme that clearly delivers the goods.’200 
Thus, employment is a precondition of the societal reintegration and moral recovery of the poor and 
workless and, for Mead at least, active labour market policies are the tool with which it can be 
achieved.201 Field was initially reluctant to accept the emphasis on interventionism, at first emphasising 
the idea of ‘stakeholder’ social security, which allowed individuals to control and purchase their own 
reintegration to the labour market, but later embraced tough active measures, and like Murray, time 
limited benefits.202  
 
That these arguments are insufficient to account for all of the causes of long-term unemployment 
discussed in chapter one does not matter here. What is important is that a) the arguments have become 
central in discussions of the modern welfare state, and that b) they may be a necessary precondition to 
introducing the stricter end of the passive-active spectrum. Such a point is argued by Dolowitz,  
 
 ‘without shifting the political and public debate surrounding the British welfare system 
from one of universal entitlement to one which saw the victims of poverty as being 
responsible for their own situation the Thatcher Government could not have introduced 
the workfare regime’.203 
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 Conclusion 
The causes of unemployment present a number of challenges to policy-makers of multiple economic 
outlooks. In a post-Keynesian age, where re-inflating the economy is no longer common practice, policy 
makers have to an ever greater extent looked for other methods of reducing unemployment and 
managing benefit duration. The theory, both economic and sociological, suggests that intervention at 
the micro (individual) level, will affect the aggregate level of unemployment at the macro-level.  
 
According to theory presented above, this might be possible by a number of active measures. In the 
bluntest expression, measures can attack welfare dependence through forcibly attaching individuals to 
the labour market through workfare programmes, making the ‘normal’ labour market more appealing.
  
A more subtle approach however could also yield results. For instance, the OECD have argued  that if 
the unemployed lack sufficient information detailing available vacancies, or indeed sufficient skill to 
implement jobsearch exercises, enforcing supervised jobsearch requirements may improve access to 
vacancies and bolster search activities. This could serve to match jobseekers to vacancies more quickly, 
cutting the stock of frictional unemployment, while simultaneously preventing spells becoming 
protracted and thereby protecting from the specific problems that occur when long-term 
unemployment sets it.204  
 
The role of ALMPs is not limited to reducing frictional unemployment. For example encouraging more 
people into work, or the search for it, at a faster pace can favourably alter aggregate demand in the 
economy, and thus further reduce unemployment.205 De Koning et al. explain this effect as follows: 
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In the very short-term of course the number of jobs is fixed. For example an employer may have 
a vacancy which would have gone to Mrs Y but instead the employment service induce the 
employer to take Mr X, who was hard to place. At that instant Mrs Y stays unemployed rather 
than getting a job. But by definition Mrs Y is inherently employable since she would normally 
have got the job. If she does not get it, she will look for another one. Employers will then find 
that there are more employable people in the market - they can more easily fill their vacancies. 
This will exert downwards pressure on wages, and this will then make possible a higher level of 
employment at the same level of inflationary pressure. So eventually employment will rise.206 
  
Structural and technological unemployment are more difficult to resolve because of their association 
with demand for goods and the advancement of technology. Active labour market policy can provide a 
temporary solution if the state acts as the employer of last resort; defined by Sawyer as ‘The 
government offer[ing] employment to anyone who seeks work but would otherwise be without a job.207 
The active labour market programme would serve therefore as a gateway to these created jobs. The 
economic logic is that by linking compulsory schemes to compulsory [low–paid] work is the potential to 
drive down wage expectations, and thus boosting aggregate demand.208  
 
Despite the emphasis on economic efficiency, often the pure economic rationale for mandatory active 
labour market policies can be over- pronounced. The individual and social problems that are caused by 
long spells of unemployment are often identified by governments pursuing active measures, and 
legitimized by the benefit dependency debates. These are not isolated, but are enforced public pressure 
to tackle the perceived issue of excessive welfare support where not all the unemployed are seen as 
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deserving recipients, and, whether effective or not, transforming passive welfare into interventionist 
programmes conveys an important political and social message.  
 
The objective of active measures is summarised best by Quaid, which is to ‘reduce welfare rolls, save 
money and miraculously transform welfare recipients into productive citizens.’209 The expectation that 
active labour market programmes will resolve a number of economic, social and political problems is 
premised on perceived inefficiencies within the labour market, the individual within it, and the 
distorting effects of the welfare state. The next chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of active labour 
measures in reducing unemployment, and then attempt to disentangle different interventions to 
expose which methods are the most effective across a range of objectives.  
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CHAPTER 3   Do Active Labour Market Programmes work? A review of the literature 
 
Having examined the types and causes of unemployment, this chapter will explore the literature 
evaluating active labour market policies. Specifically it will examine the impact of an array of measures, 
mechanisms and delivery methods on levels of unemployment.  
This review of the literature will begin by probing the types and components of active labour market 
programmes, and their respective evidence bases. Because the literature will expose an array of 
outcomes and consequences within particular designs and components, it will be clear that no perfect 
‘off-the-peg’ designs of active measures are available. To demonstrate this, the chapter will examine 
five pertinent questions: 
1. Do welfare-to-work programmes generally reduce unemployment and increase employment? 
2. What components are cited as ‘successful’? 
3. Is conditionality a necessary component of welfare-to-work programmes? 
4. Should components be delivered in any particular order? 
5. How should these programmes be delivered? 
 
Do welfare-to-work programmes increase employment and reduce unemployment?  
 
De Koning has conducted one of the most comprehensive appraisals of active labour market policy 
performance to date. He argues that because of market failure and distortions arising from the welfare 
state, long-term unemployment, frictional unemployment and a mismatch between supply and demand 
will exist. For De Koning, the response to these problems requires the state deploying active labour 
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market policies.210 This conclusion is based on evidence taken from 130 different studies of ALMP that 
found that sponsored active labour market measures have produced higher employment and lower 
unemployment,211 providing a cautious assessment that the likelihood of participants on these schemes 
of finding work are between five and ten percentage points higher than those excluded from the 
programme.212213 Importantly he finds that counterproductive measures are relatively rare.214  
 
Kluve and Schmidt conducted a similar meta-evaluation synthesizing the evidence from a decade of 
European ALMPs. They found them to demonstrate positive impacts on individual participants, albeit on 
a modest level.215 While the authors accept that successful treatment of the individual is one of the 
preconditions for predicting their impact at the national level, Kluve and Schmidt were not, unlike De 
Koning, prepared to offer a tentative assessment of the aggregate impact.216  Specifically, they found 
that from fifty-three different European active labour market programmes, twenty-eight reported 
finding positive outcomes from the implementation of some form of welfare-to-work policy. They also 
made clear that the performance of measures were contingent on a number of variables, in particular 
the design of the schemes, finding jobsearch and training, to be largely effective, when compared with 
direct subsidies to employers, which appeared to have the weakest effect on outcomes.217  
 
Similar findings have been reported from American studies.  In this regard, one of the most respected of 
the organizations involved in assessing welfare-to-work programmes is the non-partisan Manpower 
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Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC).  In 2002 the MDRC conducted a meta-analysis from 
studies across eleven states over a period of five years, and report that whist the majority of welfare 
recipients will eventually find work on their own, active labour market policies (compulsory or 
otherwise), appear to accelerate this transition.218 In this study, the authors found that participants 
tended to spend less time in receipt of in-kind benefits (such as food stamps), were more likely to be in 
work, and more likely to observe a growth in their earnings than a similar group not participating in the 
State’s welfare-to-work programme.219220 Both Kluve & Schmidt and the MDRC’s evaluations are 
unpacked below to examine what types of programme are worth pursuing. 
 
Adding to this literature, a study for the World Bank reviewed over 100 active labour market 
programmes. While the effects were not universal, the authors found that in general job-search 
assistance is an effective and cost-efficient method of moving people back to the labour market, and 
that training for the long-term unemployed, can be expensive, but is also effective in a growing 
economy.221  However, the authors warn that ‘labor demand is bound to be a crucial determinant of the 
success of any ALMP [and] even under the best-case scenarios, payoffs are usually modest’222  
A more recent study by Betchemen et al., examined over 150 cases, including evidence from developing 
countries. In this, Betchemen et al. reported findings similar to those above, but specified that 
‘Comprehensive packages of services, programs that are oriented to labor demand and linked to real 
workplaces, and careful targeting are good examples.’223  
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Martin and Grubb sought to be more specific, arguing that a full programme of different interventions, 
including jobsearch, monitoring and benefit eligibility tests might increase the likelihood of exiting 
unemployment by 30-50%.224  
 
The OECD in their 2005 Employment Outlook report also offered a tentative estimate of different 
welfare-to-work programmes in which they find: 
 
Individual labour market programmes quite frequently have evaluated impacts of about 15% on 
benefit caseloads. In one sense the record is held by Portland’s welfare-to-work programme in 
the United States, where the experimental treatment group had total numbers remaining on 
benefit about 30% lower than the control group from the third year onwards. Large impacts 
only exceptionally arise directly from participation in long-term programmes (e.g. training or 
job-creation), but they can arise from packages that combine employment service interventions 
with potential compulsory referral to longer-term programmes for certain subgroups or for all 
who continue to be unemployed for long periods (e.g. the Danish “active period of benefits” 
and the UK New Deals).225 
 
Peter Robinson’s synthesis study for the Institute of Public Policy Research reinforces the view that 
active measures can have positive effects on the likelihood of employment entry. However, like those 
above,  Robinson argues that there is evidence that some interventions (such as intensive job search) 
are more helpful than others (such as training and employment subsidies) for matching the unemployed 
to vacancies and accelerating labour market reintegration.226 Robinson asserts that active measures, 
while effective, should only be regarded as part of a broader labour market strategy. In keeping with the 
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evidence provided in the previous chapter, he explains in that it is important for governments to 
recognise the necessity of macro-economic management as a primary tool for reducing unemployment 
and manipulating the structural demands of the economy.227  Put another way, there is a debate over 
whether active measures perform better in stronger or weaker economies.  
 
Kluve evaluated evidence from 100 different ALMPs and found ‘surprisingly clear cut [evidence] that 
there is little systematic relationship between program effectiveness and a host of other contextual 
factors, including the country or time period it was implemented, the macroeconomic environment, and 
a variety of indicators for institutional features of the labour market.’228 For example, the study found 
that: ‘A higher unemployment rate is highly significantly associated with a higher probability of [...] 
positive treatment effects,’ and that this might be logical because ‘in times of high unemployment the 
share of better qualified individuals in the unemployment pool will be higher, so that the estimate 
might result from "cream skimming" of the potentially more successful program participants.’229 This 
argument appears to suggest that the effects might be magnified by a weaker labour market as a result 
of the ability of employment services to target their efforts towards the most job ready (‘cream 
skimming’).230  
 
Contrary to Kluve’s assessment, Dar and Tzanottos argued above that labour demand was crucial. In 
other words, the ability of programmes to reduce unemployment tended to be contingent on the 
number of jobs available in a given labour market. This belief was given empirical support with research 
by Mosely and Muller. Examining ALMP in Germany, they discovered that a 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with a 0.66% decline in the reintegration rates of the German Public 
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Employment Services.231 In more detail, they discovered that variations in programme performances 
were predominantly contingent on the capacity of the labour market to absorb the unemployed and 
characteristics of the individual (combined at around 70%). Comparatively, the variation in programme 
design (and unidentified factors) accounted for only 30% of performance variation.232 On this 
understanding, the capacity of the labour market is not only significant in determining the performance 
of active measures, but it is also an important  consideration for studies interested in establishing what 
impact the labour market is having on active measures, for overcoming the ‘deadweight’ phenomena 
and establishing net gains from ALMPs.233   
 
While different studies have emerged that have attempted to overcome the methodological problem of 
calculating ALMP benefits when individuals may have found a job regardless of programme 
participation,234 a second, harder to isolate, issue is the heterogeneity of national social security 
systems. The wide differentiation between programme design and conditions attached to benefit 
receipt make international comparisons risky, and thus weighing up outcomes from one welfare-to-
work programme against another, without a full appreciation of both the labour market and regulatory 
context may be superficial. 
 
 The consensus over the general utility of deploying active measures is less in evidence when the design, 
the mandatory emphasis or the delivery arrangements are in question. Each of these subjects are dealt 
with in turn.  
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What type of programmes should governments pursue? 
 
The simple assertion that active labour market policies can impact overall levels of unemployment and 
employment says little about how an optimal programme might be constructed as there are a selection 
of interventions available to policymakers, not all of which are consistently effective. This section 
therefore explores the complex realm of what it is about active measures that creates downward 
pressures on unemployment. At the programme level, the most basic distinction is between the human 
capital development (HCD) approach and the Work-First (labour market attachment) approach.235
  
Human Capital Development 
The Human Capital Development (HCD) approach emphases re-skilling the workforce through training 
and education programmes designed to make them more attractive to employers. The logic for 
designing active measures around this principle is addressed by Dean, who explains: ‘The justification 
for the human capital approaches is that they prevent social exclusion by ‘reinserting’ those who have 
been marginalised from the labour market: their object is to help individuals integrate themselves into 
the labour market, and thereby into society.’236 Because of the wide array of options available in the 
human capital approach, effective evaluations are complicated, but most focus on training and 
education. Often in the evaluation literature, studies have found that training fares poorly in 
comparison to other ALMP programmes, particularly when it comes to reducing unemployment and 
increasing employment.237 However, the OECD, explain that:  
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Evaluations of training programmes often find a negative or only small positive impact on 
participant outcomes for the first one or two years. However, over the past decade, a number 
of long-term follow-up studies have been conducted and it seems that impacts followed over a 
sufficiently long time period after the training can in some cases become quite strongly 
positive.238  
 
Card and Sullivan provide support for this view, arguing that after three years, the employment 
probability of participants was between 2-5% higher than non-participants.239 Furthermore, this 
increased employment probability came with a similar increase in employment retention.240  
 
These results must be treated with caution. Kluve and Schmidt explain that the lacklustre performance 
of training programmes in the academic literature stems from the fact that a significant proportion of it 
originates from the United States. Conversely, Europe’s labour market, according to the authors, 
operates in a different environment where ‘educational credentials matter considerably.’241   
 
Even if the HCD model is not effective at leading to quick employment gains, it may nevertheless be 
achieving its objective, the skilling or re-skilling of the workforce in order that they may more be easily 
attached to the labour market independently. The MDRC reported a 10% increase in the proportion of 
participants obtaining a high school diploma or a General Educational Development certificate (GED).242 
The consequences of this are important.  Research by Tyler, using GED and unemployment records, 
found that even the delayed acquisition of basic skills improved future earnings by up to 20% due to the 
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quality of post-qualification employment.243 Tyler found the improvement in earnings was principally a 
consequence of the participants improved employment chances derived from taking the GED.244 While 
training may delay jobsearch, the chances of becoming employed post-qualification improve, and the 
quality of employment at re-entry may help the trained enter and remain in the labour market more 
effectively than programmes not offering training. Entry qualifications was found to be equally 
important in the UK labour market, where programme entrants with Level 4 qualifications were three 
times more likely to enter employment against those without.245 
 
Research by Dyke et al. supported one of the secondary features of human capital model, ‘workers who 
participate in more intensive training programs experience a larger increase in earnings than workers 
who participate in programs designed to more quickly move workers back into the labor market.’246 
From the perspective of state expenditure a long view is required- the rise in incomes could ease the 
burden on social welfare service beyond simply the reducing of benefit receipt. The variety of literature 
on the efficacy of training programmes shows with respect to employment prospects that ‘off-the-peg’ 
active measures are not appropriate; because the effects of basic training may be more substantial in 
geographies where they are more relevant. In the European labour market, training programmes 
appear more effective than in the US. 
 
While capable of improving employment prospects, duration, skills and future earnings, analyses of HCD 
schemes have demonstrated that their costs tend to be considerably higher than work-first 
arrangements. As the MDRC reported, ‘The average two-year net HCD cost per sample member was 
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about double that of each LFA sample member’s cost.’247 In another MDRC evaluation drawing on 20 US 
welfare-to-work programmes it was found that the reduction of welfare expenditure in the short-run 
was less for human capital models than was the case for work-first schemes.248 These short-run 
expenditure effects should be expected given that immediate exit from welfare is not given the same 
emphasis in HCD schemes as in work-first. Although HCD supporters, such as Peck and Theodore, 
emphasise the model’s capacity to improve wages and the long-term prospects of welfare recipients 
escaping poverty and welfare dependency,249 it has struggled to escape the reputation of being both 
expensive and unproven. As explained by Peck and Theodore the popularity of the alternative model 
may be understood, as ‘policy makers have been attracted to clearly formulated, outcomes orientated 
approaches. This has tended to favour [labour market attachment] systems.’250 Unfortunately, despite 
the maturity of active labour market policies the number of 3 year + evaluations is limited (because of 
their expense and because programmes with a rapid impact are easier to measure), which inevitable 
places the human capital model at an empirical disadvantage.   
 
Making HCD-style programmes obligatory has also proven problematic. This is firstly because of the 
expense associated with operating large-scale education and training programmes outside of traditional 
school and college settings. The second problem with obligations and the large fluctuations in the 
labour market make matching demand for training and education to supply difficult for policymakers. 
This has proven particularly problematic where the private sector has been expected to provide 
mandatory training. For instance, Nicaise found that a shortfall of UK Youth Training places left young 
people not only without a training place, but also without an income as their benefit receipt was 
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conditional on training participation.251   
 
All told, the opacity of the empirical merits of training and retraining the workforce, combined with the 
larger short-term costs of implementing this approach, has arguably helped clear the way for the 
widespread adoption of work-first approaches.   
 
Work-First/Labour Market Attachment   
The Work-First model has received a considerable amount of academic attention and the literature has 
provided clearer evidence to support its effectiveness in placing individuals back into the unsubsidised 
market than that associated with HCD. In short, Work-First is a principle that advocates the idea that 
‘any job is a good job’.  The core idea behind this is that the primary reason individuals remain 
unemployed is that they have deficient employment histories and experience of workplace practices are 
the core barriers to employment. Explicitly, work-first is a style of active labour market programme that 
emphasizes labour market attachment above any other component, characterized by Finn as marked by 
the use of ‘low-cost measures aimed at immediate job search and job entry.’252 Sols and Hoogtanders 
see it as a set of ‘programmes [which] seek to move people out of welfare and into unsubsidized jobs as 
quickly as possible, and the job search itself is a central activity in these programmes’253  
 
Studies have found this approach to be effective at cutting unemployment, and in particular cutting 
benefit receipt. A prominent and leading example for work-first programming was the restructured 
California GAIN programme, which prior to reform focussed on a human capital orientation.254 
Established in 1988, GAIN was targeted at long-term benefit recipients in Los Angeles, and for the initial 
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five years of operation the programme primarily emphasised the acquisition of basic education and 
skills. Evaluation evidence reported that the HCD method was not cost effective255 and in 1993, 
policymakers began a three-year programme of reform. The new ‘Jobs-First GAIN’ system emphasised 
less education and quicker re-attachment to the labour market. This change in emphasis received 
substantial praise from its main auditors. The MDRC concluded that the switch to work-first resulted in 
higher levels of employment and lower levels of unemployment than would have been achieved under 
the previous HCD configuration. The authors asserted that the reforms had led to a nine percent 
increase in a participant’s chance of employment, and that this was more likely to be sustained than 
individual who found employment but were not in the programme.256 Their findings also pointed to a 
$1,627 expansion in earnings over two years, 257 or an additional $15 per week. Consequently, this 
resulted in substantial cost savings to the state.258 Analysis by Hotz et al. finds that GAIN was more 
effective, more quickly, than under the previous system of HCD, but that after a period of between 6-9 
years, the employment and earnings effects relative to the control groups are no different, if not 
perhaps slightly worse. 259  
 
A number of other work-first initiatives have been studied by the MDRC.  For instance, the evaluation of 
the Connecticut Jobs First programme reported similar effects to those observed in the GAIN 
programme, with additional benefits derived when a work-first approach was linked to time-limited 
benefits and measures to supplement earnings of those who entered the labour market at the low end.  
In fact, one study found a rise in employment of 9% for programme participants against the control 
group.260 Earnings were also increased within a similar region to those of the GAIN programme.261 In a 
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broad synthesis report, Greenberg et al., argued:   
 
 Rigorous research in the early 1980s demonstrated that job-search-only programs sped up the 
entry of welfare recipients into the labor market. Typically, however, the jobs were neither long 
lasting nor high paying, and they did not increase family income. Furthermore, the programs 
generally did not benefit the most disadvantaged welfare recipients.262  
 
In a similar way, Dar and Gill found that ‘Retraining programs appear to be between two and four times 
more expensive than job search programs: for example, in Buffalo, job search services cost $850 a 
participant, while retraining cost $3,300.’263 In the context of current national budgetary and political 
pressures, the appeal should be apparent; as the authors suggest ‘If, as the findings indicate, both 
programs have roughly the same success, job search assistance may be more cost-effective than 
retraining in assisting displaced workers get jobs.’264 Rarely do welfare-to-work programmes pay for 
themselves, but there have been a number of instances where work-first models have produced a net 
return on investment by substantial reductions in welfare receipt.265 
 
The combination of reduced unemployment and lower budget outlays has attracted political interest in 
work-first, but not all studies have been as positive as those discussed above. Work-First schemes have 
acquired a large number of critics, in particular with respect to the adverse consequences mentioned by 
Greenberg, that ‘the jobs were neither long-lasting nor high-paying, and they did not increase family 
income. Furthermore, the programs generally did not benefit the most disadvantaged welfare 
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recipients.’266 Peck argues that work-first has created its own internal logic for reducing unemployment 
by ‘crowding low-wage labour markets [which] engenders a downward pull on wages and regulatory 
standards’.267 Carpenter et al., regard this model as creating a ‘race to the bottom’, towards a residual 
welfare state, in which welfare recipients are forced to compete with foreign workers as a way to 
reduce the overall cost of labour.268  
 
Dean suggests that from qualitative investigation there is evidence that unintended hazardous impacts 
are significant. The effects can inhibit individual self-confidence and social interactions by accelerating 
individuals into the labour market, who do not have ownership of the pace of their own reintegration.269 
Ultimately, De Koning’s thought is the most apposite: 
 
The discussion [of flexible labour markets] assumes implicitly that the shortest route to 
employment is the best one. This assumption may not always be the right one. It is 
important for not only the person involved but also for society, that he or she finds a job 
that fits his or her skills and experience. Normally a person’s productivity will be highest in 
such a job. So the unemployment insurance system should provide unemployed persons 
with the opportunity to look for an appropriate job.270  
 
In summary, the debate over work-first and human capital models expose a difference in emphasis and 
approach toward dealing with the long-term unemployed. Work first, in stressing  the lack of immediate 
labour market experience of the unemployed as being one of the core barriers to their future 
employment, lends more to the behavioural explanations of unemployment; that attitudes and 
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inadequate search behaviour is the principle barrier to their return to the labour market. HCD on the 
other hand, takes a longer and more patient view that the structure of the economy may not adequately 
match the skills of the unemployed, and that developing qualifications may improve demand for those 
where unemployment has been traditionally high.  
 
The scope for hybrid programmes 
Pure forms of work first and HCD models exist independently of each other, but in many examples of 
active labour market programmes both are used, and frequently in a particular order. A brief description 
of the New Deal for Young People as a part of the wider Jobseeker’s Allowance regime provides a 
suitable example. For the young unemployed in the UK, a period of job search was permitted for six 
months, after this a four month intensive work-first approach was adopted, with intensive managed job 
search and heightened demands that jobs offered should be accepted. Only after this ten-month period 
did the Options Stage obligate individuals to take subsidized work, enter education or accept training. 
Only if work-first failed to remove the individual from the unemployment register was training and 
education Options active pursued.271  
 
According to The European Foundation, many of the programmes that exist in the United States adopt a 
similar approach: ‘A Work-First approach means that workers are allowed to access intensive services 
such as training only after they prove they cannot find a job without additional skills.’272 Similar 
combinations exist across Europe; for example, Denmark combines work-first with mandatory training 
for young people.273 The OECD has suggested that the most successful strategy is the mixture of HCD 
and Work-First, citing Portland, OR, as an example, which deployed a model with ‘an emphasis on 
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employment as a goal, although the most disadvantaged clients could be enrolled in education or 
training.’274 Against the control group, the programme increased employment over three years by an 
average of ten per cent275 this combination of an initial period of Work-First’, with training and more 
intensive (and therefore expensive) services second may be the most sensible and cost-effective 
approach available. By using Work-First initially it may be easier to identify those in need of the most 
support, be it through HCD methods or otherwise.276  
 
A more general point is that a combination of Work-First and HCD has the added advantage of being 
more sensitive to local labour market upswings and downturns, and the specific needs of customers.   
 
Is conditionality a necessary component?  
Irrespective of the structure of a state’s active labour market policies, most use some form of sanctions 
and incentives to ensure participants engage with the targeted activity. Put another way, to receive 
benefit, recipients are forced to perform certain tasks, and failure to do so will result in the loss, either 
partially or in full, of benefit payment. Importantly therefore, conditionality and compulsion are not 
based on physical force, but instead, manifests itself through the benefit sanctions administered by the 
public employment service and the threat of these sanctions.  
 
The obvious purpose of benefit sanctions is to act as a threat; to change the behaviour of a benefit 
recipient towards some perceived ‘appropriate’ form of behaviour. Usually this desirable behaviour is to 
actively seek work or to participate in a programme recommended by the Public or Private Employment 
Service. In this, Griggs and Evans suggest that most systems have three different stages to the 
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sanctioning regime:   
 
1. First  sanctions may have an effect at the inflow, where the prospect of sanctions may influence 
an individual’s decision to claim;  
2. Second where claimants are within the system the threat of sanctions may alter their behaviour 
while subject to the programme,  
3. Third sanctions are actually applied.277 
 
The first phase of the deterrence effect of sanctions is difficult to measure at the inflow278  but becomes 
easier to identify at various stages of the benefit claim. The reason is that sanctions are often linked to 
regular and personal activities such as intensive job search, where the failure to adhere to individual 
requirements results in a sanction. However, there is another more distinct deterrence effect 
observable with the prospect of participating in a mandatory programme.  
 
This evidence to highlight this effect is usually demonstrated using longitudinal data comparing a 
‘treatment group’ (subject to the threat affect regime) against another (who are not). The data is 
organised to indicate the behaviour of benefit recipients up to, and after, the point where conditionality 
increases, usually where mandatory participation in a particular programme is imminent. One example 
of this is shown by Black et al. utilising data from the US state of Kentucky. The authors compared one 
group of individuals who were warned of having to participate in mandatory activities against those of 
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similar characteristics not subject to the regime. The overall effects of the threat were substantial, with 
the authors observing a reduction of average benefit claims of the treatment group by 2.2 weeks.279  
 
Black et al.’s findings are supported from similar research conducted in Australia. Richardson 
investigated the effects of warning young unemployed individuals of their imminent move from job 
search activities to training or workfare arrangements. Richardson reports that based on the warning 
alone there was a small but significant impact on the probability of the individual leaving 
unemployment after the issued warning.280 Unfortunately, the researchers provided little information 
concerning the destinations of the individuals who left the programme, so the impacts on employment 
and unemployment were not determined. The problem is that the threat may reduce benefit claims, 
but may not reduce unemployment; rather the identified effect was benefit deregistration. Further 
longitudinal evidence of the threat effect was identified by Dolton and O’Neill’s study of the UK Restart 
Initiative. The study of Restart (which threatened recipients with mandatory interviews and counselling) 
sought to differentiate between the short run effects of the threat of participation and the long run 
effects of the treatment (counselling and interviews for example). They reported a statistically 
significant difference between Restart participants and the control group. Overall, benefit receipt was 
six per cent lower in the treatment group three years later than in the control group.281 Dalton and 
O’Neill’s methodology allowed them to demonstrate that while the threat worked to reduce 
unemployment in the short run greater effect in the long-term was attributable to Restart services. 282  
 
The series of studies suggest that the threat effect can have an important impact on reducing benefit 
receipt, and that this can complement programme services in reducing unemployment. King, even 
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suggests that the threat of participation and increasing conditions on the receipt of benefit have been 
used by some policymakers as a mechanism of policing the welfare system to help expose fraudulent 
claimants. He argues that the shift towards mandatory programmes is a ‘powerful mechanism with 
which to identify and exclude the alleged undeserving from the receipt of public assistance.’283  
 
The Sanctions Regime, Stages 2-3.  
One of the few studies to examine the effects of a sanctions regime on claimant behaviour (without 
sanctions having been applied) occurred in Switzerland.  In this study, Lelive et al. isolated the effect of 
the threat of a sanction from the actual imposition of that threat. The authors identified rather a rather 
dramatic impact from the threat alone, noting a 25% increase in the exit rate of the threatened as 
compared to the unthreatened control group.284  
 
Moving onto the third stage, a number of studies have shown the desired effects of sanctions moving 
individuals towards the labour market. For instance, Boockmann et al. used geographical data to 
compare German regions with tough sanctioning policies against those without sanctioning systems. 
The authors find that ‘[a] sanction increases the probability of leaving the welfare system within eight 
months after the benefit cut by about 70 percentage points. Similarly, the probability of taking up a job 
subject to social insurance contribution rises by more than 50 percentage points.’285  
 
Research by Van den Berg, et al. found similar effects on post-unemployment destinations in the Dutch 
social security regime. Like the Boockmann study, the authors found that ‘A sanction that is imposed at 
a relatively early stage in a welfare spell...has a substantial negative effect on the probability of an 
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individual becoming long-term dependent on welfare.’286 In addition to reinforcing dropout rates, the 
authors also undertook to discover the destinations of jobseekers. They found that work was the most 
common destination, and that where a sanction was imposed, the likelihood of leaving social security 
for a job increased by 140 per cent against the control group.287 Critics might point out that such an 
increase, while high, does not substantially alter their general reemployment prospects, however, it is 
nevertheless evidence of sanctions impact. Why sanctioning achieves these results is straightforward. 
The deliberate effect of sanctions in a social security system is to pull away the safety net, to plunge 
individuals into economic hardship or expose those who do not ‘need’ benefits. Lacking alternative 
sources of income to draw on, those sanctioned have little choice but to comply:   
 
To see why such a small change in benefits can have a large effect, note that welfare recipients 
have a very low income level [...] In sum, the marginal utility level of the welfare recipients may 
be very high, and this may explain a large change in behaviour when a sanction is  imposed.288
  
The findings also suggest that the more punitive the sanction (or similarly, the longer the sanction is 
imposed) the more substantial the impact. Svarer, using Danish social security data, explored this idea. 
Evaluating the difference between a sanction of up to 3 days loss of benefits against one lasting 3 
weeks, he found that the effects of the sanction is doubled, that those with longer sanctions are twice 
as likely to as those with shorter sanctions to enter work.289 This is further evidence that desired 
behaviours can be induced by economic punishment.  However, there is evidence of longer-term 
negative effects associated with benefit sanctions worth identifying.  
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Criticisms of Sanctioning and Compulsion   
Sanctioning connected with mandatory programmes forces submission to the demands of employment 
services. The effect is to reduce unemployment, but also sanctions appear to lead to a range of 
undesirable side effects. For instance, Arni et al. found the sanctions regime operating in Switzerland 
tended to produce effects that appeared to parallel those found in Work-First regimes.  Using data for 
the Swiss labour market (like Griggs and Evans); they distinguish between the warning of sanctions and 
their actual imposition. In both stages, the researchers discovered them to have an immediate negative 
effect on the post-unemployment earnings of the claimant.290 This might be a desirable outcome for a 
number of reasons: one, by threatening to, or actually moving the individual into material hardship the 
individual is induced to seek and accept any, usually lower paid, jobs in the market. The effect of threats 
and sanctions may continue for years. For instance, Arni et al found that:  
  
 [In terms of] the financial consequences, there is a trade-off between the positive effect 
of finding a job sooner rather than collecting unemployment benefits for a longer period 
of time, and the negative effect of finding a less well-paid job with a shorter duration. 
Using our estimation results, we are able to quantify this trade-off. We show that over a 
period of two years following the exit from unemployment, the net effect of benefit 
sanctions is negative. For sanctioned workers, the loss in earnings is in the order of two 
months whereas the gain from shorter unemployment duration is about one month.291  
 
Thus, after two-years the effects of benefit sanctions are equivalent to the loss of one month’s earnings. 
Predictably, this closely parallels the effects of work-first policies, and while most active labour market 
policies could exist without sanctions, work-first is rendered more effective with sanctions because it 
can be used to enforce rapid labour market attachment to existing vacancies, where appropriate 
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vacancies are in large supply. There may be less need for sanctions in other types of ALMP.   
 
The downward pressure on wages and employment quality exerted by compulsion has raised a number 
of specific concerns. Griggs and Evans at the Joseph Rowntree Foundation for example link the 
sanctioning of individual incomes to child poverty.292 The loss of income, it was argued, would filter 
down to dependent children, who suffer the consequences of sanctioning, but have no control over 
their parents’ labour market status. Further, such criticisms address the omission from the majority of 
evaluations of compulsory ALMPs of discussions concerning hidden social and economic costs. J.C. van 
Ours poses the important question of ‘whether administrators should force unemployed workers to 
attend a programme if the effectiveness of such a programme is not obvious.’293 In spite of this, van 
Ours proceeds to suggest that:  
 
The potential drawback of compulsion is that although it may reduce the duration of 
unemployment spells it could also have a negative effect on the quality of post-
employment jobs. However, recent research suggests that one shouldn’t worry too much. 
The bottom line is that ALMP have positive effects on the job finding rates thus reducing 
unemployment duration.294  
 
Van Ours’ statement represents an endorsement of active measures themselves, but fails to attribute 
this overall success rate to their mandatory nature. A very different criticism of significance is provided 
by Meager, who argues that there is ‘not convincing evidence that compulsory participation improves 
the performance of active measures.’295 While this may be true, it may miss the political purpose of 
sanctions, which exist in part, to send a message that governments are ‘tough’ on people who refuse 
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work or help to find it. Nevertheless, compulsion reinforced by sanctions can undermine the goals of 
ALMP. As discussed earlier in the chapter, mandating participation in employment programmes risks 
reducing independent job search time, elongating unemployment spells and expanding the break in the 
clients ‘real’ employment history, potentially making the client less employable. This is commonly 
known as the ‘lock-in’ effect.296 297 
 
Another issue is that mandatory participation risks wasting time and resources that might otherwise be 
targeted at more needy or willing participants. As Nicaise et al. indicate ‘when unemployed people are 
forced – by virtue of the existing rules – into an activity, it can take a lot of energy and resources to 
change their attitudes for the better.’298 Meager argues that it may even be counterproductive as 
‘compulsion may further stigmatise the long-term unemployed, with employers aware that they 
participate in a scheme simply to secure benefit entitlement rather than through positive job search 
motivation.’299  
 
Third, there are clear ethical challenges to sanctioning and mandatory participation. For instance, 
Carpenter et al. examine the human rights implications of sanctions regimes and compulsory 
participation, and highlight the psychological and social effects on participants drawn from socially and 
economically marginalised groups. Their collection of studies outline the difficulties and anxieties 
individuals face in entering the labour market, emphasising the redundancy of compulsion when 
individuals wish to work but face some form of discrimination in the labour market.300 Those facing 
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particular barriers include homosexuals, ethnic minorities, and disabled people, who frequently identify 
the discriminatory behaviour of employers as barriers to labour market entry. While there are ample 
mechanisms to force the unemployed to take work, it is obviously more difficult to force employers to 
take on workers, irrespective of the volume of anti-discrimination legislation.  
Conditionality, manifested through benefit sanctions and compulsory participation can lead to reduced 
levels of claimant unemployment. However, once the elimination of fraudulent or unwilling claimants 
has been achieved through the threat of sanctions, obliging benefit recipients to fulfil the demands of 
the employment services is only as useful as the activities themselves. For example promoting job 
search in a vacancy vacuum is as redundant as offering training courses for jobs that either do not exist, 
or are unlikely to. 
 
The delivery of active labour market policies 
Conditionality is now a common feature of most benefit systems and a cornerstone of many European 
and American benefit systems. A less evenly applied approach is the use of the market in delivering 
active labour market policies. This section explores the core questions associated with market-based 
measures, including  
 
1. What types of privatisation are available? 
2. How should the relationship between the purchaser (the state) and the provider (the private 
and/or voluntary sector) be governed? 
3. What can market-based measures hope to achieve that cannot be provided by the state?  
 
To date, little definitive is known about performance of private sector led welfare-to-work systems.  This 
is for a number of reasons. The first and most important is that is that the shift from state provided and 
managed programmes to market led provider and programmes have usually occurred in parallel with 
freeing up private employment providers from strict process requirements. In order to capture the 
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effects of private provision there needs to be an isolation of the contracting out of employment services 
from the new freedoms enjoyed by private providers. Few studies have used experimental methods to 
isolate this other than the French experiment by Behagel et al. discussed below. The other reason why 
study remains in its infancy is that the contracting process has not proliferated to the same degree as 
active labour market policy in general. The few advanced nations that have notable experience with 
these delivery mechanisms are the USA, UK, Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands, while smaller 
scale projects are underway in France and Germany. The sum of these two factors has rendered the 
contracting process results, on the question of effectiveness, inconclusive.  
 
What are markets and why use them?  
Despite the lack of existing study data, the following section will explain why it is unlikely that 
employment services will prove to be an easy fit for market forces. In brief, the logic for the 
reorganisation of traditionally state-controlled active measures builds on a range of existing activities 
involving the privatisation of public industries and services. The bluntest expression of this 
reorganisation of public services involves strict privatisation, which Grover describes as ‘ the transfer of 
activities from the public sector to the private sector market’301 This type of privatisation has occurred in 
sections of the UK welfare provision, but usually the introduction of private and third sector provision is 
more subtle and complex. Barr illustrates the depth of possibilities by outlining the variety of ways in 
which the public sector interacts with the private sector, using the example of education vouchers.  This 
is where education is provided by the private sector but financed (or part financed) by the public 
sector.302   
 
To help structure this analysis, it is useful to turn to Kay and Thompson, who provide a typology of 
public-private interaction.  First, there is denationalisation, or the outright sale of publicly owned assets.  
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Second, there is deregulation, which is the introduction of competition into statutory monopolies.  
Finally, there is contracting out, which consists of the franchising to private firms the production of 
state-financed goods and services.303 How each of these is manifested depends on the political and 
economic environment of the time.  For instance, privatisation is not simply the transfer of public sector 
operations and assets to the private sector, rather it consists of a complex range of policy instruments, 
including asset sales, deregulation, public-private finance partnerships, managerial practices, expanding 
privately provided services, or the contracting of services.   
 
The arguments for privatising labour market programmes have tended to be the same as those used to 
justify privatisation of other public organisations and assets, and are therefore intertwined with the 
political and fiscal pressures discussed in Chapter 2. In brief, the objective is for efficiency gains, 
improved quality, simplification, de-bureaucratisation and a reduction in state intervention in the 
market 304 The hope is that more can be achieved for less resources, as reflected in the primary research 
question of this thesis. As Alford and Gullo, discuss in relation to Australian labour market experiments: 
‘These reforms were justified in terms of improving efficiency and overall employment outcomes 
through the active encouragement of competition between service providers.’305 The UK Labour Party 
justified their privatisation in much the same manner, as the then Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions explained ‘we will exploit the benefits of contestability and competition to drive quality, 
performance and value for money.’306 
 
While following a similar logic to other privatisations, the particularity of benefit recipients (or service 
consumers) makes the transfer of services for the long-term unemployed more challenging.  If they 
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qualify for means tested unemployment benefits then, by definition, it will usually follow that they will 
not have the capital necessary to purchase employment services for themselves, as would usually be 
the case in a typical market. This significantly narrows the privatisation mechanisms available to policy-
makers because the state must remain the principle purchaser of services on behalf of the unemployed. 
For this reason, welfare state markets are usually quasi-markets, where as Le Grand explains, the aim is 
‘for the state to stop being both the funder and the provider of services. Instead it is to become 
primarily a funder, purchasing services from a variety of private, voluntary and public providers, all 
operating in competition with one another.’307  
 
A number of things define this quasi-market; first ‘they are ‘markets’ because they replace the 
monopolistic state providers with independent ones.’308 Within this a number of features differentiate 
them from traditional markets: ‘not-for-profit organisations competing for public contracts, sometimes 
in competition with for-profit organisations; consumer purchasing in the form of vouchers rather than 
cash; and in some cases, the consumers represented in the market by agents instead of operating by 
themselves.’309 
 
The abdication of responsibility for delivery as a necessary component of contracting does not mandate 
a loss of the state’s administrative authority.  Instead, quasi-markets can exist in both high and low-
regulation environments, as Scott explains:  
 
‘It is easy to represent privatisation as a withdrawal of the state from determining key issues 
of public service provision [but] a central paradox of privatisation is that where the policy has 
been accompanied by the creation of new regulatory apparatus, as with the utilities sectors 
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in most countries, governments may have more information about, and greater practical 
capacity for control over, privatised enterprises than it did over their public predecessors.’310 
 
In the circle of employment services however (certainly in the UK and Australia) the tendency towards 
privatisation has usually been coupled with a programme of deregulation in the market place, as 
exemplified with the contracting of the New Deal for Young People and Employment Zones  in Chapter 
5.  
Like with many other aspects of ALMP research, reforms have occurred in unison in the privatisation 
agenda that make attributing success to either competitive practices or deregulatory shifts difficult.  As 
long ago as 2005, Sol and Westerveld observed that the availability of evidence in this area was narrow, 
highlighting that ‘few results are available from the private re-integration market, and [thus] weighing 
up of the pros and cons becomes extremely difficult.’311 The following section will show that statement 
still holds largely true.    
 
 
 
Evidence of quasi-market effectiveness   
The most appropriate place to begin an appraisal of contracted employment services is Australia. 
Australia introduced performance-based contracting with private sector actors in the 1990s312  where, 
between 1994 and 1996, the government implemented a range of welfare reforms aimed at bringing in 
a greater role for the private sector for delivering employment services.313 Reforms included a series of 
measures where employment services were contracted out to providers who were paid predominantly 
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on the volumes of participants moved from unemployment into work, training or some form of 
placement lasting in excess of 13 weeks.314    
 
The main conclusion drawn from the national evaluations were that the new, contracted structured job 
search and intensive assistance were only as effective as the programmes they had replaced.315 In fact, a 
report by the DEWR a year later found that there still had been little progress on the strict measures of 
employment outcomes, and concluded ‘a significant opportunity exists for Job Network to raise the 
effectiveness of its services.’316 
 
An alternative attempt to understand the Job Network phenomena was undertaken by Considine. 
Considine evaluated national data detailing the performances of the Australian Jobs Network 
contractors and compared them to the state counter-factual, Employment Assistance Australia (the 
equivalent of UK based Jobcentre Plus).317 With a near equal division of the caseload of participants, a 
viable comparison could be made to establish the net gain of increasing competition in the employment 
services market by examining the overall effects on the performances of the actors involved. Over a 
period of two years the author found that while government operated employment services performed 
generally better at reducing unemployment than their private and voluntary sector competitors, the gap 
was narrowing since the establishment of the market towards parity.’318 Importantly, the study found 
that the net impact of the competition was that the performance distinction between public and private 
agencies had become negligible by the finishing point of the cohort.319 The results also showed that, 
once established, it takes time for markets to reach levels achieved by the state provider, but that ‘The 
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advantages of the quasi-market appear to result from allowing more providers to experiment with 
different service methods.’320 Unfortunately, the effects of deregulation and contracting out were not 
isolated, so distinguishing even limited effects is problematic. This is a common problem in quasi-
market evaluations. The evidence from the Job Network experiment did not provide a convincing 
empirical basis for contracting out.  
 
A study by Hasluck et al. examining performance-based contracting in the UK using the Employment 
Zone initiative came to a different conclusion. In the Employment Zones studied, all services were 
contracted on a payment-by-results basis and operated by a mixture of for-profits and charitable 
organisations. Partly based on the Jobs Network model, Employment Zones utilised payment by results 
for 13-week outcomes, multiple provider areas, and a deregulated environment to encourage 
innovation and competition.  The researchers found that on average the private enterprise suppliers 
were more effective than the services delivered by the state.  Importantly these findings suggested that 
the scheme led to better outcomes in relatively weak labour markets than similar state programmes.  
Specifically, Hasluck et al. found Employment Zone customers to be 14% more likely to exit 
unemployment than the control group of state-operated programme participants.321 It is necessary to 
stress that problems persist with equating this higher performance to the participation of the private 
and voluntary providers. As Bruttel notes, Employment Zones are a predominantly work-first policy322 
distinct from the other programmes running in parallel, where these models are likely to yield faster 
reductions in unemployment than alternatives (see section 2 of this chapter)  
 
Given this challenge, attributing success solely to the introduction of quasi-markets is hazardous. For 
instance, research undertaken in Sweden deployed an experimental model using 5000 jobseekers 
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randomly divided between the public employment services (PES) and a number of private sector 
organisations. The subjects were hard to help client groups, such as migrants or the disabled. The 
interventions (i.e. intensive job search) were the same, but the incentives were different; private sector 
organisations were incentivised through outcome payments, while the Public Employment Service was 
not.323 The results of the random assignment found no difference between the employment outcomes 
of the private sector and the PES.324 This result is even more surprising given that the reported intensity 
of job search and interview attendance was higher amongst those attending the private sector delivery 
organisations, and thus we might expect job finding rates to be higher as a consequence.325 
 
A similar experimental model was developed by researchers in France, where the French government 
has expanded the role of both public and private sectors in delivering intensive job-search and 
counselling since 2005. Using data from 200,000 individuals subject to treatment by public or private 
agencies, Behaghel et al. found the introduction of intensive job search and counselling produced 
improved results across the board, but that public sector organisations achieved considerably better 
outcomes than the private sector over the first six months of treatment.326 The explanations for this are 
cautious, but have been repeated across a number of studies, where the authors argued that ‘it took 
some time for the private providers to be operational, recruit and train the counsellors, whereas the 
public service could allocate some of its experienced case workers to the intensive scheme.’327  
 
Finally, a report by Bernhard and Wolff reviewed the intensive job search programme in Germany. 
Again, it found no significant difference between the success of treating hard-to-help claimants by the 
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PES or private sector.328 However, the study did note that the limited impact of the private sector could 
be the result of a performance time lag. This was explained by the authors as being a ‘lock-in’ effect, 
where the private sector would need to take time to familiarise themselves with the client group, 
against the already familiar public sector workers.329   
 
That the results of private and public sector would reach parity eventually in three of these studies 
indicate that stronger evidence one way or another may be available in the future.  Fay, who observed 
the development of the Australian Jobs Network, appears to take this view, finding that ‘initiatives to 
increase contestability, such as contracting out, will be subject to a learning curve before operating 
effectively.’330 How long evaluators should expect to wait until the private sector reaches optimal 
performance levels sufficient for comparisons with state provision is not clear. Fay also highlights that 
the establishment of markets in welfare is likely to be initially expensive due to significant transaction 
costs and the aforementioned learning curve.331 Until more data emerges on this strategy assessing 
relative gains against the public employment service is going to be difficult, particularly because the 
public and private sector have traditionally, and often still, operate in with different regulatory 
environments.  
 
Other Effects 
 
Evidence with respect to efficacy and efficiency may be inconclusive, but these two criteria are not the 
only disputed effects of quasi-markets. Of the more intriguing findings common to the literature is that 
clients prefer attending private sector delivered programmes even amongst clients who experience of 
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both. Wright’s synthesis of evidence from Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany is worth 
quoting at length:   
 
Although objective measures of efficiency and effectiveness show little clear benefit of 
contracting out employment services, there is some evidence that unemployed people are 
relatively satisfied with services provided by non-government agencies. It seems that private 
providers in particular may have access to resources that allow the creation of a comfortable 
environment for jobseekers. Along with this, private companies seem to use methods of dealing 
with jobseekers that make people feel respected and confident that the provider is making 
serious efforts to assist in finding a suitable job.332  
 
Griffiths and Durkin echoed these findings in the UK, explaining that young people tended to prefer the 
services they were receiving from private contractors and that this was due to the intensified attention 
they received, combined with a greater emphasis on their own aspirations.333 Swedish research also 
found a preference for private providers, who on average spent more time with their personal advisors 
and experienced more intensive job search.334 If participants are more comfortable at private offices 
and less resistant to services, and the job search activity is more intense, the evidence of work-first 
programmes might suggest that superior employment outcomes might be expected. The lack of 
convincing evidence on effectiveness is thus more surprising.   
 
In spite of a general view that customers preferred private to public employment services, there is 
evidence of inequitable assistance among certain client groups. This is a likely corollary of performance-
based contracting, and payment by results systems, which in looking either to maximise profitability or 
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the chance of winning future contracts, the easiest to help customers will be targeted for assistance 
(creaming) and the hardest to help will be left without adequate assistance (parking).335 Most systems 
have been designed to avoid such practices, but in reality, it is difficult to avoid. For example, in the 
Dutch system, a number of private providers suggested that the targeting of resources toward the ‘job 
ready’ might be the only way to remain competitive and survive in the marketplace.336 Considine’s 
investigation of the Job Network finds similar evidence of ‘parking’ in Australia, where it appeared 
disadvantaged groups such as those with mental or physical health problems were less likely to receive 
adequate support than the mainstream unemployed.337 These effects are an obvious cause for concern 
for policy-makers, but they can be ameliorated with a variety of mechanisms such as differential pricing, 
or customer choice, and it is important to stress that this is not just a symptom found in the private 
sector. Dockery and Stromback suggest such practices have occurred equally in the public sector 
employment services.338 
 
The Cost of Contracting Delivery 
While there appears to be little to support the notion that contracting out of services will lead to higher 
employment outcomes, if services are delivered at a lower cost to the public purse, privative providers 
may triumph on efficiency measures. It is assumed that driven by the profit motive, private sector 
providers are likely to have greater motivation than the Public Employment Service (PES) to produce 
results at a lower cost.339 Support for this assumption is offered by Crowling and Mitchell’s study of the 
Australian Jobs Network privatisation programme.  Specifically, they found that non-state providers 
were able to cut cost on individual reintegration from approximately A$12,100 to A$5,440, reducing 
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short-term expenditure by almost 55 per cent.340 The authors explain that the dramatic reduction in 
costs was due to efficiency savings, not accelerated transitions from benefits to employment.341 Finn 
stressed that the costs did not come down automatically, but were driven down as the payment 
rewards for outcomes were cut by the Australian government.342  The Netherlands, another leader in 
market-based reintegration programmes, has also demonstrated the delivery of more cost efficient 
unemployment exits since integrating the private sector.  Finn found that while at the initial stages of 
privatisation costs appeared to rise from €3,500 to €4,700 between 1998 and 2002; however once the 
market had been embedded with a stronger emphasis on payment-by-results was applied, prices were 
cut and the costs fell to around €2,500-€3,000 by 2007.343 The embedding of the market facilitates a 
greater emphasis on payment by results, because in all cases it seems apparent that the state must 
offer initially high prices to tempt private providers, but can subsequently reduce these costs once the 
market has matured. The efficiency of contracting also appears to be contingent on the processes 
mandated. So, if the state is paying purely for process rather than outcomes, costs do not appear to fall.  
 
Supporting this is evidence from the UK. When the New Deal for Young People was implemented a 
number of private sector-led areas were established to deliver an identical programme. Even with an 
effective experimental environment established, researchers had trouble in discerning accurate costs of 
either model, because neither the expenditure of Public Employment Service (PES) nor the contracted 
providers were transparent. However, contrary to other studies, data has emerged that appears to 
suggest that the private sector led (PSL) contracts can be more expensive.344 For instance, the House of 
Commons Work and Pensions Committee issued a report stating that PSL New Deal for Young People 
units of delivery was on average £600 more expensive than the PES comparator areas. The pattern was 
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the same for the core programme aimed at older jobseekers, the New Deal 25+, where the gross costs 
per job entry were £3,532 for the PES against PSL area costs of £4,625.345 In support of the previous 
argument the original New Deals operated payments for the delivery of strict processes, with little 
emphasis on performance related financing.  
 
Even in cases where privately operated programmes based on outcomes payments are found to be 
more effective than PES operated programmes, expenditure can still rise. In the UK, Employment Zones 
for Young People cost over £1,200 (a work-first, payment by results regime) per head more than New 
Deal for Young People.346 Griffiths and Durkin found that for all Employment Zones (EZs) advances, they 
‘cost significantly more and offer less value for money than their New Deal comparators’ adding that 
‘the better EZs perform, the less fiscally cost-effective they become and the poorer value for money 
they achieve.’347 NDYP were clearly process driven against EZ’s outcomes emphasis, but it is worth 
noting that the Employment Zones experiment was partially concerned with building up a private sector 
market in the UK, which was in its infancy. As such, the Department of Work and Pensions may have 
seen fit to offer generous initial incentives to tempt entrants into the market, and then to reduce them 
later once the market is established. 348 
Summarily, evidence from the Netherlands and the UK appear to support Fay’s contention above, that 
private delivery models take time to bed down, and that once the market has reached a degree of 
maturity the costs of reintegration may be driven down by the contracting state.   
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Writing in 2008, Bredgaard and Larsen offer the best summation of the performance of contracting out 
active labour market programmes:  
 
There is still little valid and systematic knowledge on the outcomes and effects of shifting to 
quasi-markets in employment policy. This makes it difficult to conclude whether quasi-markets 
are indeed ‘better and cheaper’ than the old public system. There can be no doubt, however, 
that contracting out results in a fundamentally different employment services system.349  
 
This conclusion remains applicable. Without a larger volume of rigorous experimental evidence 
measuring the efficacy of contracting out, it is difficult to conclude on its own terms of costs and 
improved outcomes that it has been successful. Too few like-for-like studies are available to offer an 
indication of possible net gains, and what are often aired as savings made through the introduction of 
quasi-markets might equally be attributed to the often simultaneous regulatory restructuring, which 
employment services have undergone, and might be causing (in some cases) similar, and more cost-
effective results.    
 
 
 
Conclusion  
To date, evidence indicates that active labour market policies can, and do, have an impact on levels of 
unemployment. Generally they do so through a two-pronged approach, the first is to make 
unemployment appeal less to benefit recipients, and the second is to make the unemployed more 
appealing to employers. Passive systems, as they were characterised in the previous chapter, were 
permissive of long-term unemployment spells because they did not offer assistance such as intensive 
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job search, which might accelerate their attachment to the labour market, or training and qualifications, 
which could improve their appeal to employers. The increased use of sanctions has served to reinforce 
these types of assistance, principally because it forces individuals to take up these options, or available 
labour market opportunities. The ‘help-and-hassle’ approach is proven to reduce a fundamental cause 
of supply-side unemployment, by reducing search periods (or frictional unemployment), and reducing 
the plausibility of voluntary worklessness.  
 
The literature provides no simple answers or ‘off-the-peg’ reform strategies; rather the selection of 
works offered in this chapter present a complex series of choices for policy-makers and politicians. This 
is a problem compounded by the increasing complexity of the active labour market policies, which often 
combine a complex series of components simultaneously. This makes the task of understanding which 
ALMP elements are effective increasingly difficult. Where components are staggered,   experimental are 
easier to design, but understanding the interaction of components in a series of combinations is 
problematic. For example, training programmes might be productive in the long-run, but mandating 
participation in them may not. Making public policies usually requires recognition both of objectives and 
of what is possible. The objective of reducing unemployment is obvious in ALMP, but it is the causes of 
unemployment that present the policy problem. If, for example, policy-makers confront a benefit 
caseload of skilled but ill-motivated individuals, the obvious advice would be the deployment of 
mandatory intensive job-search. Alternatively, if the caseload had insufficient skills, it would be logical 
to advise the use of targeted training programmes. Circumstance also has a role in determining which 
components are practical, as opposed to desirable. For example, policy-makers may desire a large-scale 
training programme, or the state to be an employer of last-resort, but have only the funds to implement 
a cheaper, work-first style alternative.  
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A further complication is the state of the economy. Introducing most of the active labour market 
policies detailed above may bear limited fruit when the labour market is weak; for instance, Work-First 
is only effective if vacancies are available. Equally, training a workforce in a recession is risky if it is not 
clear that relevant vacancies will exist in future to absorb trainees once the labour market has cleared. 
Consequently, few options in a downturn may be effective, state-financed workfare style programmes 
may provide temporary occupation for claimants and boost economic activity, but it is expensive and is 
arguably most necessary at a time when the state can least afford it. 
 
In sum, it is about suitability. The methods deployed to remedy the labour market deficiencies of the 
caseload must bear some recognition of the characteristics of those in receipt of these services. The 
literature displayed a wide series of components that policymakers might adopt and in spite of the array 
of choices available, two things are clear. The first is that there is an international consensus over 
pursuing some form of activation programmes, and second, that patterns are emerging in the types of 
strategies adopted. Previous data gathered by the OECD indicated that the majority of active labour 
market programmes focus on the supply of labour in a given labour market through methods such as 
intensive job search, counselling, benefit sanctions and training. These methods make up the majority 
of provisions for ALMPs in 18 OECD countries evaluated by De Koning, where micro-interventions into 
the demand for labour such as direct job creation and employment subsidies represent under a quarter 
of labour market provision.350 More up to date information from the OECD exposes patterns in the 
narrowing emphasis of supply-side measures showing that since 1998 there has been a decrease in 
public funding for training by one quarter, but an increase in placement related services by one third.351 
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In parallel to this narrowing of the supply-side interventions the data also exposes that the level of 
micro-interventions into labour demand is decreasing - for instance showing expenditure on direct job 
creation falling from 0.13 per cent of GDP across developed states to just 0.07 per cent within a decade, 
a fall of nearly 50 per cent.352 The trend is more apparent in the liberal Anglo-Saxon economies of the 
UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where expenditure on training is falling more rapidly than in for 
example, the Nordic countries.353354 One explanation for this is offered by Peck who, following the 
model of Esping-Anderson, believes that these welfare programme types emerge out of their cultural 
and institutional contexts, which shape which type of programme design, or strategy national 
governments are likely to invoke.355 In this respect, the choice of policy will hinge on not only predicted 
outcomes and policy objectives, but also the social and historical context of welfare states.   
 
Viewed through a wider lens, the trend towards cutting micro-demand interventions (such as direct job 
creation) and the narrowing of supply-side measures (towards basic job search and employment 
counselling methods) provides an indication that governments are focussing more narrowly on the 
causes of unemployment and are committing a greater proportion of (albeit small) resources towards 
labour market attachment methods. The explanation as to why these public expenditure and policy-
making decisions are being made in the United Kingdom will be examined in the theoretical framework, 
which will take into account the institutional, social and economic pressures towards this recalibration 
of active labour market programming.   
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CHAPTER 4  Locating British employment policy within an Incremental Model of Historical 
Institutionalism   
 
The previous chapters explored the rationale for, and empirical basis of, active labour market policies. 
This chapter will carry this forward by outlining the development of active labour market programmes 
in the UK since 1979. This will demonstrate that there has been a coherent pattern to policy-making in 
the United Kingdom. Specifically, it will outline the tendency of labour market strategy to be focussed 
on increasing the responsibility levelled at the individual claimant for his or her unemployment, while 
simultaneously reducing the direct role of the state as both a) responsible for delivering full 
employment, and b) responsible for the direct delivery of employment services.  To help explain this 
occurrence, the theoretical framework situates the development of successive governments’ 
approaches within the public policy theory of historic institutionalism.  
 
‘Old’ Institutionalism and its critics 
Traditional institutional models of the policymaking process have focussed on de jure accounts of how 
public policies are made. These institutional accounts of the policy-making process tended to focus on 
how the formal legislative process led to a given policy, and neglect the role of ideas, discourse and 
individual agency. For instance, a formal inspection of the Westminster standard legislative process is 
relatively straightforward – cabinet agrees policy; (often) a green paper is issued for consultation; 
legislation is drafted; it is subject to readings, scrutiny by committee, then votes by both chambers and 
finally royal assent.356 Within this formal system was the ideal-typical bureaucratic machine, the 
‘Whitehall Model’, where policy decided by politicians was to be formulated and implemented in an 
orderly fashion by professional, neutral civil servants and government agencies.357   
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Here, it is the formal executive and legislative institutions at the top of the system that decide policy; 
the bureaucracy and executive agencies exist to flesh out and implement them. The power of each of 
these branches of government is salient in institutional analysis because it serves to indicate what 
coalitions are necessary in legislating for and implementing public policies. In strong unitary systems 
with single party dominance, policy preferences are likely to reflect manifesto commitments; in systems 
that fragment power between branches of government, or political parties, policy outputs are likely to 
reflect greater levels of compromise. In a simplified form, the structure of government determines 
policy outputs, and the consequence according to Peters was that ‘if an analyst could identify the salient 
actors or structure, he or she could ‘predict’ the behaviour of the system.’358  
 
Traditional expressions of institutionalism are thus concerned with the study of formal institutional 
arrangements as explanatory of the policy process, and these remain of profound importance today; it 
would be impossible to discuss the US policy process without understanding the formal constitutional 
structure of the United States. It is due to the dispersion of power between the President, Congress, and 
the Supreme Court that helps to make sense of the fact that it is a considerably slower policy-making 
process than the unitary model of the Westminster system. The problem that emerged with this narrow 
focus on the rules and procedures found in the ‘brick-and-mortar’ institutions of the state was that 
insufficient attention was directed at the informal factors and structures involved in the policy-making 
process.  For example, the perspectives of Lukes359 and Lindblom360 found that democratic institutions 
were producing policy-outcomes in the interests of particular individuals and groups able to express 
power outside the ‘brick-and-mortar’ of the standard institutional models.  
 
This left ’old’ institutionalism open to challenge, such as Steinmo’s belief that classic institutional 
models were ‘often normative, and the little comparative “analysis” then existing largely entailed 
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juxtaposing descriptions of different institutional configurations in different countries, comparing and 
contrasting.’361 The limitations of the largely formal/structural approach were exposed by the 
behavioural revolution of the 1950s that found that ‘the formal laws, rules and administrative structures 
did not explain actual political behaviour or policy outcomes.’362 Traditional institutionalism lacked 
sufficient depth or nuance to appreciate fully the sophisticated explanations as to how, why and when 
public policies occur. 
 
The New Institutionalism   
The intellectual reaction to these deficiencies is commonly known as ‘new institutionalism’. This ‘new 
institutionalism’ was not to be a rejection of the traditional models, but instead ‘reflects many features 
of the older version [...] to understanding politics, but also [to] advancing the study of politics in a 
number of new theoretical and empirical directions.’363   
 
While the new institutional school has a number of sub-schools, there are commonalities among them.  
For this thesis the most important is that new institutionalists sought to move beyond the formal 
descriptions of institutional behaviour by ‘looking at the actual, observable beliefs and behaviours of 
groups and individuals [within the policy making process].’364 There are two premises behind this 
renewed interest in the individual, the first that the study of structure, with limited attention to agency, 
could not fully explain policy output. The second point is that the advent of the behavioural revolution 
had apparently opened up new possibilities for rigorously understanding the actions and decisions of 
people within institutions. The behavioural revolution was associated with a new focus on individual 
behaviour, and in particular the testing of theories of individual behaviour with empirical 
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observations.365  While ‘new institutionalism’ was not a wholesale endorsement of the behaviourist 
approach to policy analysis, common to its general approach is the emphasis on both the institutional 
characteristics, and the effects that these might have on driving the behaviour of the individuals 
involved in policymaking. Howlett and Ramesh summarise this position: ‘Individuals, groups and classes 
participating in the policy making process no doubt have their own interests, but how they interpret and 
pursue their interests and the outcomes of their efforts are shaped by institutional factors.’366 This point 
represents the most fundamental tenet of this balancing act; that institutional mechanics still matter to 
the policymaking process, but individuals with their own particular behaviours and interests cannot be 
overlooked. The central contention of new institutionalism is that the institutions in which individuals 
operate are influential on their behaviour, and thus as are they on policy-outputs derived from the 
process. Summarily the new institutionalism is, according to Thelen and Steinmo, an attempt to balance 
the ‘old’ of institutions against the ‘new’ interest in rigorously explaining human behaviour.367 
 
Within the broad group of new institutionalists are a number of sub-schools, which Hall and Taylor 
classify into historical institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism.368 This thesis will focus on historical institutionalism as the best explanatory tool for 
understanding why the Flexible New Deal policy came into being, and why policies similar in nature are 
likely to be pursued in future welfare reforms.  
 
Historical Institutionalism  
Historical institutionalism argues that the character of policy is determined by informal as well as formal 
institutional structures. For Hall and Taylor the institutions are defined as ‘by and large...the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the 
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polity or political economy.’369 These arrangements are deemed to affect individuals as : ‘Institutions 
provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation or action. The individual is seen as an entity 
deeply imbedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide 
filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is 
constructed.’370  
 
For historical institutionalism, individuals remain an important factor in the decision making process and 
the emergence of a particular policy, but these individuals’ decisions and worldviews are shaped by the 
institutions in which they operate, which are in themselves a construct of particular social and historical 
factors which prevailed at their genesis. Peters’ explanation of this core concept is as follows: ‘The basic, 
and deceptively simple, idea is that the policy choices made when an institution is being formed or 
when a policy is initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinant influence over the policy far 
into the future.’371 Here, the policy preferences are influenced by social and ‘contextual features of a 
given situation often inherited from the past.’372   
 
Within historic institutionalism, the core explanatory device for policy succession and transformation is 
known as ‘path dependence’. The definition of path dependence is contested,373 but Page provides a 
cautious offering: ‘In common interpretations, path dependence means that current and future states, 
actions, or decisions depend on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions. Of late, path 
dependence has become a popular conveyor of the looser idea that history matters.’374  
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With the definition it is possible to deduce that, from a given identifiable starting point, policies travel 
along a broad trajectory that is determined by the past; in simplified terms in order to get to Policy C, 
Policies A and B must have been implemented previously, and that C is a product of A and B 
respectively. History is therefore an important influence on future policymaking institutions, in this 
particular case, the institutions governing the welfare state. Thus, policy in this structure also represents 
a degree of continuity from a given past. At a specific moment, the original policy will have emerged 
from a single or series of political choices within the institution, and the policies thereafter will be a 
reflection of, and perhaps an evolution from that original policy and original institutional calibration. 
These choices may reflect a number of things, for example fiscal constraints, previous policy decisions, 
or a particular political ideology. For historical institutionalism, there is a strong emphasis on ideas as 
influencing institutional arrangements and the consequent policies. As Peters illustrates:  
 
Ideas do matter. King (1995) and King and Rothstein (1993) have illustrated this point with 
respect to labor market employment services and benefit offices, a fact which provides some 
support for the path dependency arguments; in this context, the decision of the British 
government to integrate these two arms of welfare policy demonstrates a revival of nineteenth-
century assumptions about poverty.375 
 
A path is relatively easy to demonstrate by noting consistency in policy development, but critical to 
identifying it is the origin of the policy path. Historical institutionalists argue that there is a flow of 
continuity in institutions and fields of public policy, which are ‘punctuated by “critical junctures”, i.e. 
moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from 
which historical development moves on to a new path [or a new policy].’376 The path along which the 
policy is dependent is determined by the historical and sociological context of the critical juncture as 
                                                          
375
 Peters, G. et al. (2005) The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism, Journal of Politics 
v67.4, p1291 
376
 Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies, v.XLIV, p942 
115 
 
well as the actors and structure of the institutions. While these critical junctures may represent political, 
economic or military crises, they may also manifest themselves in the ascent to hegemony of an 
ideological force, and the landslide victory of a political party. Desmond King presents the ideological 
force of the New Right through the electoral victories of Thatcher’s Conservative parties during the 
unemployment crisis of 1980s as one such turning point.377378  
 
Over a sustained period, the process may be cyclical and critical junctures will repeat and expose a 
pattern known as punctuated equilibrium. The origins of this principle are located in Stephen Krasner’s 
work, which simply explains that institutions ‘are characterized by rapid change during periods of crisis 
followed by consolidation and stasis.’379 Institutional and root direction are thus open to rapid change, 
but then settle down into branch like patterns until the next crisis. The ideological hegemony of 
Keynesianism in the aftermath of the Second World War may is one example of such equilibrium, 
punctuated by the OPEC oil crisis and stagflation of the 1970s, and replaced with King’s assertion of 
New Right hegemony.  
 
The basic approach of path dependence provides a retrospective insight into how policy C may have 
derived from A and B, but it does not explain how, and why a policy might develop beyond these points. 
In this format therefore, it remains a historical descriptor rather than predictive theory. In order to be 
predictive it needs further elements to encapsulate why diverging from the path will continue to be 
problematic. To solve this problem, path dependence authors have incorporated the idea of ‘increasing 
returns’. This is summarised by Pierson: ‘In an increasing returns process, the probability of further 
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steps along the same path increases with each move down that path. This is because the relative 
benefits of the current activity compared with the other possible options increase over time.’380  
Thus it either becomes increasingly profitable to maintain the path, or increasingly expensive to deviate 
from it. Costs may be manifested literally, through for example, the attributed costs of  training 
Jobcentre advisors rather than outsourcing employment services, or costs may be manifested in terms 
of less tangible resources, such as the effort required to develop a more sensible system. The resources 
required to change institutional attitudes and ideas might therefore be prohibitive to developing new 
approaches. From a political perspective, Bardach explains that ‘it is easier politically to modify 
something already in place than to set out on a new course even if the new course is believed 
technically superior.’381 The corollary is that the best policy solutions to perceived problems may not be 
implemented despite their merits. Peters, Pierre and King for instance explain that public policies can 
often outlive their utility, but persist due to the sometimes ‘extreme efforts of individuals deeply 
entrenched in the old paradigm to defend the dominant theory of the time.’382 The ideas behind the 
policy may be defunct, but patterns in policy-making can persist. For example, Peck’s expression of 
‘Zombie Neoliberalism’ argues that ‘The brain has apparently long since ceased functioning, but the 
limbs are still moving, and many of the defensive reflexes seem to be working too.’383  
 
Peck’s assertion also brings to light another explanatory feature of path dependence where not only do 
ideas become entrenched, but so do actors. Institutions ‘lock-in’ certain actors and institutional norms, 
to the exclusion of others; reformers and critics may be ‘locked-out’.  The classic example of lock-in and 
lock-out were so-called ‘iron triangles’, found in policy areas such as defence and agriculture.  In the 
American political system a military-industrial complex was said to lock in certain policies and ideas, and 
prove fiercely resistant to external pressure. In the British system, governments have sought to exclude 
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would-be obstacles to policies; Rhodes and Marsh recall that under the Conservatives ‘The trade unions 
were deemed the enemy within, the educational professions were ‘handbagged’ and both were 
excluded from the gestation and development of youth training and vocational education.’384 
 
The addition of increasing returns to the historical institutionalist approach allows for some predictive 
capacity only if the source of these increasing returns can be identified. There are a number of obvious 
sources of increasing returns present in the series of welfare reforms explored below.  
 
Consequences of Historical Institutionalism  
Policymaking under a system contingent on the dominant ideas at the institutional or policy genesis 
(and therefore is pursuant of a particular, perhaps logical path) means that particular policy preferences 
and objectives become entrenched. With this model, policies not only follow a particular path, but 
create an environment for policy that requires ‘significant effort to divert them on to another course.’385 
This point is explored by Peters, Pierre and King who argue that  ‘Deeply embedded in the historical 
institutional literature lies an assumption that policy making systems tend to be conservative and find 
ways of defending existing patterns of policy.’386 The cultural explanation of individual behaviour makes 
the process inherently conservative according to Hall and Taylor because ‘Institutions are resistant to 
redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to 
make.’387 Fundamentally the authors suggest that examples such as the welfare state and Keynesianism 
can be ‘understood as the institutionalisation of a set of persuasive ideas about social and political 
reality that have been successful in describing reality over long periods of time, as well as prescribing 
                                                          
384
 Rhodes, R. and Marsh, D. (1992) New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks, European Journal of Political Research, v21, 
p194 (pp181-205) 
385
 Greener, I. (2005) The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies, Politics, v25.1, p62 
386
 Peters, B, et al.  (2005) The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism, Journal of Politics 
v67.4, p1276 
387
 Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies, v.XLIV, p940 
118 
 
means of solving problems within that reality.’388   
 
One particular factor that the historical model emphasises in opposition to sociological and rational 
choice models concerns the concentration on power, in particular the presence of ‘asymmetric power 
relations as well as the impact of long-term institutional legacies.’389 The concentration of power both 
inside and outside the institutions has an important bearing on policy-making in maintaining the 
broader path dependence. Where an obvious power imbalance exists in favour of the status quo the 
policy-process will naturally progress along a similar path or at a slower pace. Therefore, who takes part 
in the process matters, and who takes part may be consequent of both the structure of the institutions, 
and the range of actors participating at the critical juncture. The second part of this chapter will show 
how asymmetries of power within the policy making process explain the introduction of the conditional, 
market-driven Flexible New Deal.   
 
Making Policy in Increments  
Policymaking differs between political systems and policy areas, and this is contingent on their context, 
structure and actors inside and outside the system. As such, no homogenous policymaking method 
exists. Indeed historic institutionalism has been accused of not being concerned with occurrences on 
the ground, so long as the evidence of path dependency is actually occurring. For example Peters 
suggests that:  
 
Historical institutionalists are not particularly concerned with how individuals relate to the 
institutions within which they function. There appears to be an implicit assumption of the 
approach that when individuals choose to participate in an institution they will accept the 
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constraints imposed by that institution... indeed there is a sense of deus ex machina in the 
historical institutionalist approach, with decisions taken at one time appearing to endure on 
auto-pilot, within individual behaviour being shaped by the decisions made by members of an 
institution some years earlier.390 
 
There is merit in this critique, which seldom focussed on history’s effects at the individual level. It 
appears to imply that the institutional arrangements brought about by ideas prevalent at the time 
carried along zombie-like decision makers through successive reforms. Taken to its extreme, it would  
reinforce what Christopher Hollis once suggested that ‘politics as politicians well know is largely a 
matter of giving names to what is happening anyway and persuading people to vote for it.’391 This, 
Pierson argues, would be to misrepresent historical institutionalism because, contesting that 
‘individuals choose, but the conditions that frame their decisions provide strong inducements to make 
particular choices.’392 
  
Historical institutionalism, with its associated path dependence and lock-in effects can explain why 
policies occur, insofar as a critical juncture can be identified. The general method of policymaking 
however needs to be detailed to appreciate the incentives and parameters that frame choices. The 
typical rational policy-making models can quickly be discounted, because the following section will show 
that first principles, and policy options, are rarely considered on their merits alone; policymaking does 
not display a randomness that should be associated with policy outcomes in the rational models. 
Equally, several counter-rational models, such as the garbage can approach393 and policy streams are 
discarded for the same reason- there is little evidence of randomness in the selection and direction of 
policy choices in UK welfare reform. Instead, as the following section will show, welfare reform in the 
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UK bears the hallmarks of incrementalism.   
 
Incrementalism narrows the explanation of how individuals operate on departmental or institutional 
levels, and in particular the logic of pursuing and extending policy from past decisions. As outlined 
above, the work of Pierson provides a number of insights into these matters through ‘increasing 
returns’. Here the literature begins to focus on the policy-making process itself within the broader 
context of historical institutionalism, and the ties between the two are obvious. Pierson suggests that 
once an initial policy choice has been made policy tangents ‘lock in’ because as a policy moves down a 
particular path, ‘the costs of switching to a previously plausible alternative rise.’394 Under 
incrementalism, defined as ‘political change by small steps’,395 similar processes are apparent. The 
definition warrants expansion, because incrementalism is of greater use in explaining why policies might 
develop in increments.  
 
Traditionally applied as a tool for explaining budgetary reform, incrementalism is more appropriately 
defined in analytical terms, as ‘Analysis that is limited to consideration of alternative policies, all of 
which are only incrementally different from the status quo.’396 Describing what he calls ‘strategic 
analysis’ Lindblom suggests that policy analysis is ‘limited to any calculated or thoughtfully chosen set of 
stratagems to simplify complex policy problems, that is, to short-cut the conventionally comprehensive 
‘scientific’ analysis’,397 also commonly known as ‘successive limited comparisons’. This method of 
policymaking is pursued due to the illogic of returning to first principles each time a new policy is 
considered. A classic example of incrementalism is the American budgetary process, where to start from 
scratch each year, rather than building from the existing base, was proven too enormous a task.398 
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Lindblom argued it was sensible for policy administrators to continually build out from the current set of 
policy parameters, and do so in small steps.399  The reasons for this include limited human problem 
solving capabilities, time and resource constraints, inadequate information and the costs of analysis.400 
Another, perhaps equally powerful explanation for the use of incrementalism is as a tool for political 
strategy. Lindblom contends that incremental policymaking can be more effective than ‘root’ methods 
because being small implies being (relatively) uncontroversial, rather than the risks associated with 
more drastic change.401 Therefore not only does incrementalism serve a purpose to develop policies, 
but also to have them approved by legislators.  
 
The cost, effort, and intellectual resources required for returning to square one each time are 
considerable and inhibit an overhaul of policy. The clear connection with historical institutionalism’s 
path dependence and ‘lock-in’ should therefore be apparent. For Peters, incremental decision-making 
‘does not involve examining sweeping alternatives to the status quo and then making a decision about 
the optimal use of resources. Rather incremental decision-making involves ‘successive limited 
comparisons’ about whether to make marginal changes to the status quo and decisions about whether 
to make those marginal adjustments to current policies.’402 The temptation to depart from the policy 
path is limited because incrementalism tendency to favour the status quo, or only minor departures, 
and thus supporting path-dependency’s notion of punctuated equilibrium. As explained below, this is 
evident in the development of employment-related conditionality, where successive governments have 
built upon existing conditions of social security, and have repeatedly amended the Jobseeker’s Act 
rather than attempt to rewrite it. The scope for positive feedback is also enhanced by incremental 
decision making, in particular because administrators are conceived as capable of understanding the 
effects of incremental changes along a broader policy path, or to finding out ‘what works’ rather than 
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attempting to anticipate and test the effectiveness of a complete policy overhaul. 403 The consequences 
are that first, incremental decisions making will have a tendency to preserve existing structures due to 
the effort and complexity of overhauling them. Second, the departure to alternative, perhaps better 
public policies is muted, where Lindblom argues that ‘it may lead the decision-maker to overlook 
excellent policies for no other reason than that they are not suggested by the chain of successive policy 
steps leading up to the present. Hence, it ought to be said that under this method [...] policies will 
continue to be as foolish as they are wise.’404 Lindblom’s warning is resonant to the findings of this 
thesis, because policy-makers in the UK continue to proceed with market driven work-first programmes, 
despite evidence that they are no more effective than other arrangements.  
The preceding sections have exposed a number of key elements to historical institutionalism, the first 
that history and institutions matter. History matters because (as a result of a number of factors) it 
influences the policies of the future. The institutions matter because they have a clear effect on how the 
history of a set of policies is manifested, as it combines with the ideas and policies, which continue 
through changes of administration and context. Once established the development of policies in this set 
of institutions will normally be conservative in nature and incremental in their evolution due to the 
disincentives of diverting, until a critical juncture promulgates a radical overhaul of institutions and 
policy objectives. Both theories apply to the development of active labour market programmes in the 
United Kingdom, which are traced back to the 1980s reform programmes of the Conservative 
governments and their successor Labour governments. 
 
Applying Theory to Reality 
To demonstrate that the historical institutionalist theory applies in successive welfare reforms   it has to 
be substantiated that A) institutions have had an effect on consecutive welfare reforms, and B) there is 
a distinct path of welfare reform that has occurred since a critical juncture (where policy X leads to 
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policies Y and Z). While the focus of the thesis is active labour market policies after 1997, the nature of 
path dependence requires that the study looks further into the past in pursuit of institutional influences 
on Labour Party policy.  
 
Formal institutional arrangements have a clear impact on the structure and outcomes of welfare 
policies in the United Kingdom. At the summit of the British political system Clasen explains that the 
‘neoliberal policy agenda in the UK was supported by institutional capacities, such as the first-past-the-
post electoral system, single-party governments, and strong central control in the House of Commons 
especially after the elections of 1983 and 1997.’405 At the political level Clasen contends that during the 
1980s once the ‘Wets’ had been marginalised ‘almost all policy changes affecting unemployment 
benefit claimants brought about retrenchment.’ 406 The British institutional arrangements enabled the 
critical juncture to occur and policies markedly to shift, but also the limited veto points within the 
institutional arrangements of the Westminster model facilitate an environment where policies can be 
entrenched (and welfare retrenched).  
 
At the departmental level institutional reorganisations occurred which would facilitate the continuation 
of this path. Tonge highlights two such events:  
 
The merger of the Departments for Education and Employment followed shifts in the policy 
making arena which included the increasing application of neoliberal principles to the training 
of the unemployed, based upon the creation of an employer-dominated system of training. The 
establishment of a national system of training and enterprise councils by 1990 provided the 
institutional means for change.407  
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Further institutional shifts have consolidated the link between conditional benefits and active labour 
market programmes, for instance the merger of the Benefits Agency and Employment Service into the 
Jobcentre Plus.408 This connection of two previously separate agencies serve to institutionalise the link 
between labour market participation and benefit receipt, and conditions those within these institutional 
arrangements that this is the norm. As Brewer, Clarke and Wakefield argue, these institutional changes 
continue ‘the steady trend throughout [Labour’s] first parliament to increase the responsibilities of 
unemployed and inactive out-of-work benefit claimants, and introduce a consistent work-focus to all 
benefits.’409  
 
The informal structure of participation is also an important factor in path entrenchment, in particular 
where there is an asymmetry of power within institutions in favour of the status quo. The presence of 
policy-networks and communities within British institutions has had an important impact on the policy 
path. Dolowitz notes an example, that during the development of UK active labour market policies 
during the 1980s, the involvement of the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) in promoting American 
style workfare schemes offered the relevant departments new sets of ideas to correspond with the 
overall shift in ideological hegemony.410 In complement was the conspicuous absence of influential left-
wing policy networks. King reports ‘It is commonplace that the Labour Party has lacked innovative 
proposals since the 1970s despite establishing its own think tank.’411 The dominance of one set of actors 
over another reflects the asymmetry of power in policy development requisite of path dependence. An 
example is apparent with training and employment policies, which were dominated by employers rather 
than employee groups such as trades unions, where employers were capable of locking in interests, and 
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employees increasingly locked out. In particular, the abolition of the Manpower Services Commission 
made steps towards removing trades union participation in training delivery. In addition, Tonge argues 
that their role in the wider policy making network was declining, stating that: ‘With the introduction of 
the New Deal, the Labour government has consolidated the neo-liberal employment policy framework. 
The employment policy network excludes opponents of moves towards workfare in that the remaining 
‘role’ for the trade unions is a very minor position on the boards of TECs’.412 Thus, marginalising 
potential dissenting forces within the existing institutional arrangements facilitated the overall 
objectives and destination of active labour market policies.  
 
Equally, incrementalism’s propensity of ‘successive limited comparisons’ is encouraged because 
isolating potential opponents facilitates a smaller range of policies designs and objectives to be 
considered. Recently, the escalation of marketization in welfare-to-work has led to private sector 
delivery companies organising into a pressure group, the ‘Employment Related Services Association’, 
who has according to Finn, ‘played a significant part in the debate on the future direction of the British 
welfare market.’413 Their part, according to Davies, was to overstate the limited evidence for 
contracting-out in favour of their members.414 This point about external actors increasingly being 
involved in the policymaking process at the institutional level is not trivial. If, as some had characterised, 
the Whitehall bureaucracy posed as the monopoly provider of neutral advice to ministers,415 it is 
difficult to argue that this still holds. For instance, in the financial year 2010-11 the Department for 
Work and Pensions spent £110 million on external consultancy.416   
 
If institutional history is relevant in the policy making process it is critical to establish what history is 
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important. In the case of welfare reform in Britain it follows the well-established narrative of the effects 
of Thatcherism on parties and institutions at the time, and the residual effects these have had on 
successive rounds of welfare reform. The election of Thatcher is seen by a Kavanagh as a critical 
juncture, who writes that 1979 observed a ‘significant agenda shift’.417 In the particulars of welfare 
reform, according to Fowler by 1983 this begun, ‘a fundamental reshaping of the system.’418 As Swank 
reports, this agenda shift was not only Anglo-centric:  
 
Since the mid-1970s, governments of advanced capitalist democracies have in varying degrees 
attempt to retrench the welfare state. In many nations, policy makers have reduced the 
generosity of benefits and tightened programme eligibility and they have also imposed 
mechanisms for cost control in service delivery, privatised some social services, and increased 
targeting of benefits.419 
 
The United Kingdom and the United States were nonetheless at the forefront of this trend of 
retrenching welfare entitlements and means testing. The explanatory factor behind trend is the ‘critical 
juncture’, where one ideological paradigm gave way to another. The ideological shift from Keynesianism 
to neoliberalism had a clear and specific impact on successive governments’ labour market strategies. 
As Plant summarises: 
 
By the 1970s it appeared Keynesian policies had run into the sand... in place of the demand-
led view of the way out of unemployment both academic ...and political monetarists in 
Britain ... argued that inflation, at least in the longer term is the central cause of 
unemployment and that inflation is largely a monetary phenomenon, which is precisely the 
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result of governments adopting Keynesian assumptions that it was possible for governments 
to spend their way out of recession.420 
 
This ideological shift from traditional methods of resolving unemployment created space for a new 
approach, which focussed on the individual as the principle cause of worklessness, an emphasis that, 
through the merging of key relevant departments and agencies, gained an institutional foothold. The 
behavioural arguments such as those provided by Murray and Mead entered this new discursive space, 
and provided a new intellectual foundation to support the individual focus as the primary cause of long-
term unemployment.  Or, as Thatcher observed ‘Welfare benefits, distributed with little or no 
consideration of their effects on behaviour, encouraged illegitimacy, facilitated the breakdown of 
families, and replaced incentives favouring work and self-reliance with perverse encouragement for 
idleness and cheating.’421   
 
This rhetoric in conjunction with neoliberal economic arguments concerning individualism and the 
primacy of the market mechanism served to legitimate the adaptation of welfare policy, creating 
initially a new critical juncture, and in the medium term facilitating the entrenchment of this new path. 
The rhetoric appeared successful. Research conducted by Richardson and Moon shows that in the first 
four years of Thatcher’s administration, despite rising unemployment, the Conservatives managed to 
make significant inroads into deflecting the blame for it.422 Evidence of this is identified in the British 
Social Attitudes Survey, which asked: “How much do you agree or disagree that if welfare benefits 
weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet?” The responses over the past 
three decades show the perception of benefit dependency has moved from a position where 58% of 
people asked either disagreed, or disagreed strongly with that statement, to a position where 70% now 
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either agree or strongly agree.423 Similar trends are visible when the public are asked whether 
governments should spend more or less on benefits, predictable attitudes have shifted away from 
more, towards a majority favouring less.424 Pierson suggests that where social welfare programmes are 
popular, a greater level of coalition within public institutions is sought in order to legitimize policy 
change.425 The declining popularity of social security systems supplies the informal institutional context 
for continued welfare retrenchment, and explains why, over a 30-year period, considerable but largely 
stable change has occurred in the UK benefits policy with relative ease.   
 
Pierson also identifies a reciprocal relationship between external influences (e.g. the public) and the 
welfare institutions (which facilitate retrenchment), in suggesting that the institutionalisation of means-
testing benefits is capable of reducing the numbers benefitting from the welfare state, and therefore 
reducing the levels of support for the institution itself.426 This is a key positive feedback mechanism, 
where restricting eligibility will reduce the defences of provident social security systems, and thus 
fostering a supportive environment for further tightening.427 The significant shift in public opinion may 
go some way to neutralising Hall’s critique of historical institutionalism at least within the parameters of 
British welfare reform. Hall writes that ‘While we are used to thinking of institutions as factors of inertia 
tending to produce regularities in politics, some kinds of institutional configurations may be biased in 
favour of change. The combination of the responsible cabinet government and a two-party political 
system that we find in Britain may be precisely such a configuration.’428  The competitive system offers 
incentives for parties to develop policies to critique the incumbent and innovate to provide a realistic 
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alternative.429 Nevertheless, in the face of such public opposition to provident social security policies the 
incentive for parties to compete within the institutional framework may be weak. Public opinion may 
also reinforce the path at the Whitehall level. Without public support for generous welfare system and 
growing cross-party consensus about welfare retrenchment and conditionality, there are clear 
incentives for those charged with developing and implementing policies at the bureaucratic level to 
limit their fields of analysis and policy options within realistic parameters.  
 
Finally, it is an important caveat that party competition is muted not to the whole welfare system in 
Britain, but to specific parts in reflection of public and political support. For instance, public support for 
the National Health Service and associated public expenditure remain strong, and with it political 
support. The fact that the NHS has over 1.7 million employees may be an important factor, as this is 
equivalent to just fewer than 6% of the total UK employed workforce.430 In straightened times the 
pressure to maintain expenditure on popular services applies pressure on departments in charge of 
unpopular ones.431  
 
’Winning the argument’ over welfare dependency, rearranging institutions to directly connect benefit 
receipt with employment, and isolating potential opponents in the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements appear capable of institutionalising an ideology in a competitive political system such as 
the UK. Indeed, in spite of the inherent temptation of opposition parties to oppose core lines of policy, 
this seems contingent on the area of policy itself, where the exogenous context of public attitudes and 
caricatures of welfare recipients have clearly influenced opposition policies. Germane to this thesis is 
the hegemony of Conservative thinking on welfare, in particular the individualising of responsibility for 
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unemployment. On this matter, the Labour party clearly decided it could not, or would not compete 
with direct alternatives.  
 
The Path to Welfare to Work  
The path taken since the critical juncture is largely reflective of Conservative thinking on social security 
and labour market policy. The common core to these changes is the general emphasis on individualising 
the unemployment problem with a specific emphasis on reattaching the unemployed with the labour 
market by decreasing the impetus to continue receiving benefits (retrenchment). Evidence of 
successive, incremental reform of the social security system is provided below using Botchel et al.’s list 
of Conservative reforms:  
 1980 Benefits uprated by prices index rather than earnings index 
 1981 Derek Reyners review recommends reintegration of job placement and benefit 
administration 
 1982 Abolition of compulsory registration for employment at jobcentres. Abolition of earnings-
related supplements to unemployment benefits. 
 1986-88 Fowler Review leading to Social Security Act 1986 which in 1988 resulted in the 
replacement of Supplementary Benefit by Income Support and introduction of Family Credit, an 
in-work benefit for those with children working in excess of 24 hours per week. 
 1986 Restart Interviews: beginning of period review of benefit entitlement. Compulsory Restart 
courses for the long-term unemployed.  Wage councils abolished. 
 1987 Reintegration of Jobcentres and unemployment benefit offices announced. 
 1988 Social Security Act requiring young peoples’ participation in Youth Training Scheme with 
refusal resulting in benefit loss. Employment Act disqualified unemployed from received benefit 
if they withdrew from training without good cause.  
 1989 Social Security Act introduces the ‘actively seeking work requirement’  
131 
 
 1996 Social Security Act replacing Unemployment Benefit and Income Support for the 
unemployed with Jobseeker’s Allowance, a single benefit with very similar rates whether 
eligible through contributory or means-tested route. Contributory entitlements cut from 12 to 6 
months.432  
 
Over the 18 years of governing, the Conservative approach shown above was marked by retrenchment 
and activation for both ideological and fiscal reasons.433 The Thatcher government, particularly through 
rhetoric and incremental reforms can be seen to have laid the foundations for Major’s tougher 
Jobseeker’s regime and experiments with stricter incarnations of welfare to work.   
 
New Labour, New Juncture?  
Using Hall’s analysis, after the Conservatives defeat in May 1997 the Labour government would have 
had a significant opportunity to recast the institutional and policy arrangements left by their 
predecessors.434 Despite this opportunity, evidence suggests that the era is best represented as being 
one of continuity, particularly in relation to activation and conditionality.435 For Clasen, the transition 
from Conservatives for Labour was almost seamless. Rather than deviating from this prescribed route: 
‘After Labour’s victory in the 1997 general election, the new government maintained its predecessor’s 
policy course and accelerated it’.436 Powell voices a similar view, stating that ‘clear trends of policy 
convergence with the Conservatives can be noted, particularly in the areas of [....] the mixed economy 
for welfare, and welfare-to-work.437 The opportunity to forge a new ‘critical juncture’ was not, in this 
policy area at least, taken.  Walker and Wiseman argue that the similar politics of the two main political 
parties account for this continuity.  The authors argue that Labour and the Conservatives broadly agreed 
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over several core perceived problems, including: ‘The financial cost associated with claimant numbers 
that had not fallen in line with employment growth, concern about dependency, crime and the risk of 
social unrest especially among young unemployed people, and success stories about US welfare reform 
that were actively promoted in London.’438  
 
The political consensus argument supplies an explanation why the policy path was continued, but there 
are those who argue that the trajectory would have been difficult to alter regardless of mutual consent. 
Lodemel and Trickey offer the following assessment that: ‘In spite of the high political profile 
surrounding the introduction of New Deal in the UK, and the fact that its introduction involves a 
departure from the key characteristics of pre-workfare social assistance, our evidence still suggests that 
policy inheritance, rather than politics, may offer a better explanation for the strategies pursued in 
workfare programmes.’439 The authors argue this position on grounds that ‘the existing structure of 
laws, programmes and established administrative divisions of responsibility represents the ‘glue’ of the 
welfare state, often limiting the scope of possible options for change.’440 On this account, ideological 
preferences are secondary to existing legal and administrative structure the Labour government 
inherited. The subsequent evidence illustrated that Labour appeared to follow this pre-determined 
path.  
 
Upon arrival, and throughout their term of office, the Labour government continued to implement 
active labour market and social security policies along the pre-existing parameters of individual 
responsibility and ungenerous cash entitlements. This convergence is visible through their continued 
commitment to the principles of the Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) and its use as a broader legal 
framework of conditionality in their key welfare to work programmes of the New Deal programmes and 
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Employment Zones. The New Deals (examined in the following chapter) were essentially an expansion 
of their predecessor’s ‘structurally similar’ Project Work programme,441 which provided intensive ‘work-
first’ conditional support, with a range of mandatory options after an individual was unemployed at 
length.  
 
In parallel to the New Deals, the government piloted a smaller scale experiment with a purer form of 
‘work-first’ entitled Employment Zones (EZs). Neither programme were a marked departure from 
existing arrangements in structure but an extension and expansion of them, where intensive job search 
and assistance would be offered throughout. For instance, EZs and the New Deals operated within the 
existing Jobseeker’s Allowance framework introduced by their predecessors, and throughout the 
lifetime of both of these programmes, small adjustments were made to tighten conditionality and 
strengthen the emphasis on labour market attachment.    
 
The New Deals and Employment Zones were also subject to a number of experiments involving the 
private sector, whose involvement in active labour market policies was present in their predecessor’s 
experiments with Training and Enterprise Councils. Here, again, the development of welfare-to-work 
under the Labour government is a continuation of past policies. Finn recalls that ‘In 1987/88 the delivery 
of training programmes for the unemployed was transferred to private sector led Training and 
Enterprise Councils.’442 The participation of non-state actors in employment and training programmes 
grew over the next decade up to 1996, to the extent where Finn suggests that the Public Employment 
Service had:  
 
Withdrawn from most direct programme provision and, through its Regional Offices, contracted 
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out its schemes via competitive tendering and performance related contracts to a diverse range 
of private providers, voluntary sector organisations, colleges, Local Authorities and religious 
groups.’443    
 
Gradually, the Labour government embarked on a similar strategy. Their flagship welfare-to-work 
policy, the New Deal for Young People (NYDP), was increasingly contracted out in local areas to private 
sector organisations over the programmes’ lifetime. Employment Zones on the other hand were 
delivered by private and third-sector organisations from the outset and their role and remit in 
Employment Zones and other contracts continued to expand incrementally throughout Labour’s time in 
office.  
 
The increased role of the private and voluntary sectors in the implementation of these programmes 
creates its own institutional lock-in effects. The more capacity for public service delivery passed to the 
private sector, the corresponding need for parallel state provision declines. As governments remove 
themselves from delivering public services, their capacity to reassume this role in the future becomes 
more difficult and expensive. The agencies of state will lose personnel, expertise, and assets to the 
private and voluntary section, and the costs associated with re-establishing state power become ever 
higher. Pierson provides an apposite summary of this problem, that: 
 
Recapturing ground in previously institutionalized fields of activity...will often be quite difficult. 
Actors do not inherit a blank slate that they can remake at will when their preferences change 
or the balance of power shifts. Instead, they find that the dead weight of previous institutional 
choices seriously limits their room to manoeuvre.444  
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The path of individual responsibility and marketization continued with the government’s commissioning 
of the Freud report. The outcomes of this document were particularly indicative of both path 
dependency, and an explicit example of incrementalism’s tendency towards ‘successive limited 
comparisons’ (‘limiting of the number of alternatives considered to those that differ in small degrees 
from existing policies’.445). In 2006 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, John Hutton, requested 
that the investment banker David Freud conduct a review of the UK’s social security and employment 
programme regime. Freud was invited to evaluate the efficacy of the existing welfare arrangements 
within a number of core parameters, which were:  
 
a)  What scope is there to accelerate conditionality and   
b)  What scope is there to localise and privatize parts of the Public Employment Service?  446 
 
Hutton’s parameters were partly recycled from previous ministers’ proposals. These particular ideas had 
been circulating in Department of Work and Pensions for a while. Hutton’s predecessor, Andrew Smith, 
in 2004 released Building on the New Deal: Local Solutions Meeting Individual Needs, a paper that 
advocated near identical ideas.447 Either Secretary of State could alternatively have requested an 
investigation into exploring greater central control in active labour market programmes, expanding the 
role of the state as the employer of last resort, increased employer subsidies or tax breaks, or 
demanded an exploration of demand interventions, but neither did. Instead, they provided a narrow 
remit along the existing route.  
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According to the government’s own advisory committee, Freud’s review was partial in its analysis,448 but 
arguments contrary to the dependent path are often pushed aside, and the core proposals of the review 
were endorsed by the Blair government in 2007 and continued when Gordon Brown became Prime 
Minister. Freud’s core proposals were two fold, firstly to broaden the already existing emphasis on 
‘work-first’, which facilitates conditional and rapid labour attachment. The report claimed that ‘A “work 
first” approach, alongside the New Deal for those with longer durations, has worked for the mainstream 
unemployed’449 whilst also stating that ‘In return for more support in obtaining employment, it would 
seem appropriate for the state to expect more work-related activity from those on benefit.’450 In 
recognition of the importance of their predecessor’s input the Labour government responded in their 
white paper with ‘welfare-to-work support, backed by a framework of conditionality
 
built up over the 
last 15 years...has proved effective in moving people back to work. These policies must be kept in place 
to make sure that we do not, as in the last two recessions, condemn tens of thousands of people to 
virtually permanent inactivity.451 Paradoxically, the ‘work-first’ approach of the Flexible New Deal does 
not imply greater levels of support, but does nonetheless require greater levels of responsibility on the 
individual claimant.  
 
The second core feature of the Freud report was that ‘this report recommends that once claimants have 
been supported by Jobcentre Plus for a period of time, back-to-work support should be delivered 
through outcome-based, contracted support.’452 In some length, the report describes the benefits and 
creation of a private sector market for the delivery of traditionally state-controlled services, using 
previous government measures such as Employment Zones to reinforce its case. Using the Employment 
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Zones model, the government sought to homogenise the existing welfare arrangements and continue 
along the path of escalating conditionality and marketization, despite evidence that neither was 
particularly effective at ameliorating long-term unemployment as indicated in the earlier review of the 
literature. Perhaps the most important feature of Freud’s recommendations germane to this framework 
was the advocacy of a national system of outcomes-based contracts, or payment-by-results. This model 
had already been used under Employment Zones, but on a national level the prospect for positive 
feedback and path entrenchment are considerable. In particular, payment-by-results theoretically 
means that states pay less for failing policies, and therefore the risk of inefficiency is partly transferred 
from the state to the provider of services. If Freud’s proposals did not work, the state, (in theory) would 
not pay for that failure.  
 
The forthcoming chapter on the Flexible New Deal (FND) will detail the government implemented these 
two proposals in full, continuing the trend of previous Labour government policies, and in part, 
Conservative government policies of the previous decades. To complement the expansion of market 
forces there has been a visible withdrawal of the state from direct service delivery, as evidenced by the 
rationalisation of the relatively new Jobcentre Plus network, where between 2007 and 2008 around 
10% of Jobcentre premises were closed.453 The continued rollout of a market for a perpetually 
increasing proportion of the unemployed persons has rendered the reestablishment of state control 
more difficult. The establishment of a quasi-market is expensive because of the costs of incentivising 
companies to join the market place. Having spent considerable amounts of public funds to build a 
market, obvious incentives exist to maintain the built capacity. The lock-in occurs because the state has 
transferred personnel and resources to the private and voluntary sectors, and re-establishing state 
capacity, such as building up assets such as Jobcentres and training staff, becomes expensive itself.  
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The path dependence of UK unemployment policies is apparent in the evolution of institutional 
arrangements, which have locked in the private and voluntary sector actors into programme. That this 
has been incremental in nature is a consequence of the difficulty of establishing a competitive market in 
employment programmes from scratch.  
 
Incrementalism in practice 
In 1959, Charles Lindblom wrote that ‘Democracies change their policies almost entirely through 
incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds’.454 While some, such as Jensen, 
treat path-dependency and incrementalism as interchangeable ideas,455 public policies in the 
incremental framework do not strictly need to adhere to prescribed path. For example, a series of 
incremental changes could dramatically alter the past direction of policy. However, path-dependency 
and incrementalism in the case of the development of active labour market policy in the UK are 
complimentary. 
  
The most convincing explanation for incrementalism in the reform of employment services in the UK is 
one of political necessity. Simply, incrementalism is required to facilitate the desired path, serving 
politically to prepare the ground for further policy reforms. Even in a system of alternating single-party 
government as in the UK, incrementalism provides a relatively safe method of proceeding along a 
particular policy path, and is therefore a politically expedient approach. Where policy-makers have an 
ultimate goal in mind, say policy C, in order to be successful it may be necessary to implement policies A 
and B first. In political environments, as Lindblom indicates ‘Incremental steps can be made quickly 
because they are only incremental. They do not rock the boat, do not stir up great antagonisms and 
paralyzing schisms as do proposals for more drastic changes.’456  To begin at the end, the conditional 
welfare-to-work arrangements that exist today would have been difficult to introduce during the 
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Thatcher and Major years simply because of the historically high levels of unemployment at the time 
and the scale of opposition these reforms could have provoked. Pierson explains how the Conservatives 
were able to apply this delicate approach: ‘Britain’s highly centralised political system made it possible 
for the Thatcher government to implement carefully designed incremental cutbacks that eventually 
weakened these programs considerably. On the other hand, every effort at radical reform of the means-
tested programs ran into major obstacles.’457 
 
The gradualism continued through the two administrations of John Major, for whom the ultimate 
achievement was the Jobseeker’s Act in 1996. Such was the fanfare of the Jobseeker’s Allowance, all 
previous benefits changes and conditionality expansions appeared to build up towards this single policy. 
However, the Jobseeker’s Act was no radical departure; rather it is best seen as an adjustment and 
homogenisation of the existing arrangements. For Novak the significance of the policy was that it 
demonstrated a continuation of a trend that began in the 1980s, which sought to regulate the 
behaviour of the claimant unemployed and retrench cash entitlements.458 The gradualism of the 
Conservatives also provided cover for the Labour Party leadership’s objectives. Novak identifies the lack 
of opposition from the Labour Party to the Jobseeker’s Act as enabling the slow procession of welfare 
‘dismantling’ to continue.459 As Peck explains, the introduction of the JSA provided sufficient political 
cover for their advances of conditionality:   
The debate- or rather lack of it – around the Jobseeker’s Allowance laid the foundations for 
Britain’s workfare consensus. The Labour leadership clearly saw an activized benefit system of 
this kind as an important component of its welfare-to-work proposals, and may even have been 
relieved that the legislative initiative in this sensitive area had been taken by the Conservatives. 
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This would allow Labour to focus on its more ‘positive’ programs, around which it might build 
support for welfare reform across the wider party.460 
 
The reversal of the Labour Party’s opposition to conditionality was not inevitable, but conditioned by 
the electoral defeats of 1983 and 1987 after which they underwent their own gradual internal 
restructuring in a manner more fitting with Thatcher’s individualist and free market agenda. History was 
obviously having an important impact on institutionalising the path dependence. For both political 
parties, incremental policymaking was strategic, utilised as ‘the path of least resistance’. Consequently, 
the political foundations that the Thatcher and Major governments laid moved the welfare debate on, 
where Keegan states that ‘Fifteen years ago the very idea of ‘workfare’ was anathema to the Labour 
party. Now the principle has been accepted. The argument is about the detail.’461 Indeed, once the 
broader principles of workfare had been accepted, Labour sought to continue where their predecessors 
had left off. 
 
It is a similar case for the introduction of market forces. The following chapter will show that Labour’s 
national employment programme, the New Deal for Young People gradually expanded the role of 
private sector delivery organisations, and introduced in parallel the Employment Zones initiative; a 
purer example of a quasi-market in a limited number of deprived areas. Employment Zones are a useful 
case in point for incrementalism; as they were the embryonic demonstration of a fully-fledged welfare 
market. As Finn recalls, ‘commentators, especially in the public sector, suspect that the strategy with 
Employment Zones represents a stepping stone, creating the ground from which a full-scale 
privatisation could be launched.’462 Haughton et al. were one of the groups suspicious that small steps 
would lead to bigger changes, regarding Employment Zones ‘a Trojan Horse for privatism and enforced 
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individual responsibilities, acting initially as a seemingly benign policy regime, behind which more 
regressive policies could be introduced.’463  
 
The overwhelming majorities in the House of Commons enjoyed by the Labour Party in their first two 
terms, coupled with the exogenous institutional influence of public backing for stronger welfare to work 
policies, meant that they might have been expected to pursue the rapid advancement of conditionality 
and market reforms. This favourable environment to pursue stronger conditionality and market 
mechanisms raises the question of why policymaking occurred in increments during this period.  The 
answer would appear to be that an incremental approach was a logical method of staving off internal 
rebellion. After all, opposition to conditional, market-based policies was more likely to come from 
within the ranks of the Labour party than elsewhere in the House of Commons. Such an eventuality was 
not impossible – for instance, King and Wickham-Jones recall that ‘Welfare to Work ... was not discussed 
by the Shadow Cabinet before its launch. There was immediate concern within the Party over the 
adoption of such measures.’464 This argument can explain one of a number of reasons why incremental 
changes have taken place in welfare reform, but incrementalism has further elements creditable to it 
that appear active during this process. 
 
There is also evidence under New Labour of incrementalism at the policy analysis and development 
level.  In this domain, incrementalism is understood as the ‘limitation of analysis to a few somewhat 
familiar policy alternatives, of which one possible form is simple incremental analysis: consideration of 
alternative policies differing only marginally from the status quo.’465 The inevitable corollary is a ‘greater 
analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be sought’ and within this ‘A 
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sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials.’466 During the first two terms, both the New Deal and 
Employment Zones initiatives were subjected to repeated testing and adaptation because of perceived 
deficiencies in the design. On the one hand, this is a sensible approach to adopt – the finding out of 
what works, where and when - nevertheless the path dependence of incremental changes appeared 
exposed in the tweaking of Employment Zones, where Haughton et al. explain that their development 
‘represent[s] a highly selective and possibly pre-emptive learning process from the experience of 
prototypes.’467 Perhaps more problematic is that incremental analysis and pre-emption implies tunnel 
vision, whereby other possible, and possibly more successful solutions, are isolated from policy debate, 
as Lindblom warned.468  
 
Conclusion 
Looking back over two decades of welfare policy in the UK has underlined the necessity of this project’s 
research question; having established a clear direction of travel towards market driven work-first it is 
sensible to consider whether this direction correlates with evidence.  
 
Summarily, incremental policy-making framed within historical institutionalism offers two insights into 
this broader thesis on active labour market policy in Britain. Firstly, it has identified a path in active 
labour market policy where the individual accrues greater levels of responsibility for his/her labour 
market status, while simultaneously the agencies of the state reduce their direct involvement in 
executing employment services and social security through the reduction in value of cash entitlements 
and the marketization of employment service delivery.  
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The foundations for this approach are located predominantly with the New Right emphasis on 
individualism and the primacy of the market, which emerged during the 1980s and has since 
consolidated. For a number of reasons these ideas have embedded themselves in the institutional 
arrangements and policy-making communities in order to ‘lock-in’ the path. Despite the institutional 
capacity for change in the Westminster model, the degree of consensus amongst the three major 
parties over the political costs of reverting to a more provident, passive welfare system may be too 
high. Few areas receive as little support for public expenditure as social security for the unemployed, 
and this looks unlikely to change.  
 
Reinforcing path lock-in is the absence of opposing actors in the policy-making process; which, in 
Britain, has been devoid of any substantial and influential group or coalition capable of representing the 
explicit interests of the long-term unemployed. As such, active labour market policy development has 
been dominated by elites, networks and business interests with a relatively consistent view of the 
welfare state and the effects this has on individual behaviour.   
 
Fiscal pressures must play a part where public spending constraints make expansions in expenditure, or 
relaxation of means testing unlikely. The political, financial, and institutional environment make the 
‘work first’ approach a likely permanent feature of the British active labour market approach for the 
foreseeable future, given its relatively low cost nature and emphasis on quick exits from benefit receipt.  
 
The same path dependence applies to the presence of a quasi-market. Successive governments have 
gradually expanded the role of the market in delivering active labour market programmes, and the 
practicality and cost associated with reintroducing the state as the dominant provider of welfare-to-
work services for the long term unemployed render a significant revision of this approach unlikely. In 
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complement, many of the participants in the market are now embedded in the consultation and policy 
design process, which serve to reinforce the status quo.  
 
At a general level, there is ideological symmetry between relying on the market to solve unemployment, 
and creating a market to help the long-term unemployed back into employment that may have 
permeated institutional thinking. Welfare ‘reform’ is therefore bound to remain encased within such 
parameters until some future critical juncture, which will revise both the general the hegemonic 
approach to economic policy, and also the specific attitudes towards unemployment and its perceived 
causes, which have served to reinforce it.   
 
The preceding discussion has portrayed a gradual shift away from state responsibility, and an increasing 
reliance on the market and the individual to solve the unemployment problem. In spite of the increasing 
marginalisation of the public employment service, its remains a major player in the delivery of both 
employment programmes and benefit administration. This resilience is a reflection of difficult realities 
of unemployment. The first is that in the absence of a market in privately owned unemployment 
insurance, the state will continue to monopolise social security payments. There consequently remains 
a role for the state in policing the benefits system for the unemployed. This fact also explains why 
wholesale privatisation cannot be achieved, because without an income the long-term unemployed 
cannot afford to purchase reintegration services from a market; therefore, the state remains necessarily 
a purchaser of these services. At present, the British authorities believe the private and voluntary sector 
capable of delivering employment services, and thus the future of the public employment service is 
contingent on whether governments believe these sectors can be also trusted with the administration 
of cash benefits.  
  
Summarily, the path and policymaking method are clear: since the 1980s, the UK has gradually adopted 
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a stronger emphasis on labour market attachment and made greater use of market forces in the 
delivery of employment services. The question remains, especially in light of the evidence provided in 
Chapter 1, 2 and 3, whether this is going to result in a more effective system for moving people from 
benefits into employment. The following chapter highlights the continuation of this trend, showing the 
specific performances of different types of ALMP, and the adjustments to them rendering them more 
work-first and market orientated. These will flesh out context for the case study, and provide 
performance benchmarks.  
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CHAPTER 5 New Labour’s Welfare and Work Policies: Continuity or Change? 
 
Heralding the introduction of the Flexible New Deal the Labour government demanded the following: 
‘We expect the Flexible New Deal to deliver a step change in performance from existing DWP 
employment programmes, in terms of the numbers of customers entering and sustaining 
employment.’469 This chapter will explore the forerunners to FND because a) they offer an opportunity 
to identify the performances of the welfare-to-work programmes that the FND was intended to surpass, 
and b) they reflect the continuation of the trend towards greater employment-related conditionality and 
marketization. Specifically it will cover the existing literature on the programmes with an updated 
analysis of the core employment outcomes data. These outcomes will serve as an invaluable benchmark 
to assess the expectations and performance of FND. 
 
The three key programmes covered in this section have been examined in the chronological order of 
their implementation. These programmes are the New Deal for Young People (NDYP), The New Deal for 
the Long-Term Unemployed (ND25+) and Employment Zones (EZs). These three programmes of NDYP, 
ND25+ and EZs are selected for several reasons, most importantly because they were the programmes 
FND directly replaced. In complementing the theoretical framework, over their lifetime the programmes 
show a gradual shift in government thinking with the deepening of conditionality and the widening role 
of the private sector employment services, and lastly because features of each were incorporated into 
the Flexible New Deal.    
 
New Labour and Active Labour Market Policy in Context  
The Labour Party during the 1980s had shown hostility to conditional welfare-to-work programmes, in 
particular the Conservative government’s employment experiments. By the 1990s, the party’s position 
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on welfare-to-work was shifting. Initially this occurred under Kinnock and Smith but this gave Tony 
Blair’s eventual leadership the political space to endorse tougher welfare-to-work strategies. Once in 
office, the Labour Party both entrenched the Conservatives’ Jobseeeker’s Allowance, and surpassed 
Conservatives’ employment programmes by implementing active labour market programmes stricter 
than Major’s Project Work   
 
It is important to recognise that political considerations were important to the New Labour project. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, welfare regimes have emerged out of their different social, 
economic, and political contexts and the development of welfare-to-work within the Labour Party 
serves to reinforce this notion. According to Peck and Theodore, the adoption of conditionality must 
also be placed in the context of the wider transformation, or ‘modernisation’ process occurring in the 
Labour Party at the time.470 The reputation of the welfare state the Labour Party had helped establish 
after the Second World War had deteriorated. Amid concerns of ‘scroungers’, which had emerged since 
the 1980s (partly through the language fostered by the Conservative administrations and their American 
counterparts) Labour was particularly concerned at looking ‘soft’ on welfare.471 Trickey and Walker 
pointed to the previous administration’s efforts at transforming the political lexicon, which exposed the 
difficulty the Labour leadership faced in changing the overall direction of welfare policy. According to 
their account:  
Secretary of State for Social Security during the late 1980s, John Moore had introduced 
the term ‘welfare dependency’ into the British political lexicon and began to give the 
term ‘welfare’ negative rather than positive connotations. Subsequently Peter Lilly, 
Secretary of State until the 1997 election, succeeded in securing media consensus that 
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expenditure on benefits was too high and that social security fraud was a major 
problem even if one confined to the activities of a minority of claimants.472  
 
Because of public and media pressure, the Labour leadership were keen to press home the language of 
the reform as much as reform itself. In 1997, Blair stated ‘There will be no option of a life permanently 
on full benefit. Where there is a suitable offer, people will be expected to take this up.’473 Indeed Walker 
remarked that the leadership had accepted several of the key workfare philosophies that ‘welfare has 
become the problem rather than the solution, destroying the work ethic and other family values.’474 
 
To suggest the leadership’s approach to workfare and stronger conditionality was merely opportunism 
is misleading. Blair characteristically endorsed the previous administration’s strategy on Labour terms, 
stating that in order to ensure the enduring legitimacy of the welfare state, the nature of it had to 
change; ‘We have reached the limits of the public’s willingness simply to fund an unreconstructed 
welfare system through ever higher taxes and spending.’475 The remark highlights the fine balancing act 
as the party attempted to appeal to middle class voters while maintaining the support of both its core 
vote and its backbenches. In Taylor’s view ‘Blair was always keen to identify himself with the purposes 
of the New Deal, which reflected his own instinctive conviction that nobody should be able to claim 
something for nothing.’476 
 
The ideological underpinnings for Labour’s endorsement of conditionality were grounded in the ‘Third 
Way’; delivering public services via a system of mutual obligation between the rights and responsibilities 
                                                          
472
 Trickey, H. and Walker, R. (2000) An Offer You Can’t Refuse? Workfare in an International Perspective, Policy Press, Bristol, 
p186-187 
473
 Blair, T. (1997) cited in Dale, I. (1997) The Blair Necessities, Robson Books, London p67 
474
 Peck, J. and Theodore, N (2001) Exporting Workfare/Importing Welfare-to-Work: Exploring the Politics of Third Way Policy 
Transfer, , Political Geography, v20.4, p438 
475
 Blair, T. (1997) cited in Peck, J. (2001) Workfare States, Guildford Press, London, p301 
476
 Taylor, R. (2007) in Seldon, A. (eds) (2007) Blair’s Britain: 1997-2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p221 
149 
 
shared by government and the individual.477 Through emphasising welfare rights as well as 
responsibilities, it was felt that the party could appeal to a wider base. This new ‘social contract’ was to 
be fixed directly into the new welfare system. For example, under the new welfare-to-work regime, the 
unemployed individual would be guaranteed their benefits and assistance in finding a job, in exchange 
for their obligated participation government-run programmes. A failure to meet these obligations would 
result in the government withdrawing cash benefits; tough language was to be mirrored in the policies 
themselves. This did however represent a rhetorical divergence from the previous Conservative 
strategy, which had proven particularly adept at emphasising the duties of benefit recipients without 
offering much language concerning welfare rights.   
 
Looking beyond the rhetoric, the practical position on welfare-to-work might best be summarised by 
Carpenter as being ‘mid-Atlantic’ because although sharing some of the key ideas of European countries  
such as an emphasis on human capital investment,  over time Labour gradually embraced a US style 
work-first strategy.478 The idea of a mid-Atlantic approach might reflect the ‘third way’ project’s ideas, 
but to Wiseman the trajectory was increasingly towards to an Americanisation of welfare policy. He 
wrote ‘Policy-makers in Britain and the US do indeed operate in very different cultural, political and 
institutional contexts, but that they are seeking to achieve similar objectives and draw upon a similar 
range of policy in order to do so.’479 In practice, this implied that benefit receipt should be contingent on 
taking the quickest route back to the labour market.480 
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Labour’s social and economic justifications for welfare to work correlate with those outlined in Chapter 
2. The inner circle of the Labour Party were convinced that work was a route out of poverty, as 
McKnight explains ‘the programme [NDYP] was not seen as simply a welfare-to-work programme but as 
an investment programme that would lead to improved longer-term outcomes for [these] young 
people.’481  The economic argument was grounded on the work of Richard Layard, who was charged 
with managing the detail of AMLP development. Layard’s argument reinforced the new economic 
rationale occurring in welfare states that Western labour had priced itself out of the competitive global 
labour market and the way to combating this could be achieved through welfare-to-work policies: 
 
Most opposition to active labour market measures is based on fears of displacement and 
substitution. In their extreme form, these derive from the ‘lump-of-labour fallacy’: there is 
only a certain number of jobs so if we enable X to get one of them, some other person goes 
without work. It is easily to see how the confusion arises. In the most immediate sense the 
proposition is true. If an employer has a vacancy and, due to a job subsidy, X gets it rather 
than Y, then Y remains temporarily unemployed. But by definition Y is inherently 
employable. If he does not get this job he will offer himself for others. Employers will find 
there are more employable people in the market and that they can more easily fill their 
vacancies. This increases downward pressure on wage rises, making possible a higher level 
of employment at the same level of inflationary pressure. Active labour market policy 
increases the number of employable workers and thus reduces the unemployment needed 
to control inflation.482 
 
The implication of the above is that increasing labour supply creates its own demand. ALMPs achieve 
this in two ways through forcing down wages by either subsidy or compulsion.  Explicitly ALMPs can 
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reduce wage costs on the part of employers by allowing the state to subsidize employees income or 
training costs, while also depressing wage expectations  of unemployed through requiring the workforce 
to take jobs at rates which they would not otherwise do so. Theoretically, this twin approach 
institutionalises cheaper labour, creating employment opportunities as companies see their labour costs 
decrease.  
 
The economic rational was partly a result of self-inflicted constraints. In 1995, Shadow Chancellor 
Gordon Brown ‘explicitly rejected the use of direct job creation or Keynesian demand management to 
stimulate economic growth.’483 Given this clear rejection of demand-side pump priming, the party’s 
labour market options would be very limited without a clear supply-side policy. The new supply-side 
approach, according to Finn was to ‘aim to tackle unemployment by improving the ‘employability’ of the 
unemployed.’484  
 
In a summary reflection, the ideological shift that occurred in the upper echelons of the Labour Party 
were an important determinant of future of welfare-to-work in the UK by institutionalising broad 
consensus around welfare-to-work  across the two traditional parties of government. Keegan had stated 
that ‘Fifteen years ago the very idea of ‘workfare’ was anathema to the Labour party. Now the principle 
has been accepted. The argument is about the detail.’485 In the case of welfare-to-work at least, it 
appears that ideologically the Labour Party have given ground to the Conservatives. As Powell suggests, 
the Third Way appears to be at least ‘leaning to the right.’486 The cornerstone of Labour’s approach to 
welfare-to-work was the New Deal for Young People, explored below.  
  
 
                                                          
483
 Finn, D. (2000) From Full Employment to Employability: A New Deal for Britain’s Unemployed? International Journal of 
Manpower, v.21.5, p386 
484
 Ibid,  p386 
485
 Keegan, V. (1998) cited in Powell, M. (1999) New Labour, New Welfare State? The ‘third way’ in British Social Policy, The 
Policy Press, Bristol, p278 
486
 Powell, M. (2000) New Labour and the Third Way in the British Welfare State, Critical Social Policy, v20.1 p39 
152 
 
The New Deal for Young People 
The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was a welfare-to-work programme implemented in 1998. 
Understanding it is essential to this thesis because its introduction to the statute books represented the 
starting phase of New Labour’s continuous welfare reform programme, ultimately ending in the policy 
case study, the Flexible New Deal. In addition, NDYP outcomes will act as one of the multiple benchmark 
programmes against which the FND will be judged; principally because FND was to replace all 
mainstream active labour market policies by 2010. One of a number of New Deal Programmes, the 
NDYP is arguably the most important. As Labour’s flagship welfare policy, it was their most expensive 
welfare programme delivered in office and consequently much political capital was invested in the 
scheme. The system differed from the Conservatives’ Project Work experiment in two key respects: the 
first was that participation in the system was frontloaded for young people in that participation was 
brought forward from 2 years (under Project Work) to six months; second, young people were given a 
range of options alternative to work experience. The more subtle differences will become clear in the 
finer detail of the programme.  
 
The objectives of the New Deal for Young People were consistent with most existing active European 
active labour market programmes – principally to prepare (young) benefit claimants for, and move them 
into work. Stafford adds that the NDYP ‘aims both to remove barriers to immediate employment so 
participants move as quickly as possible into work, and to enhance longer-term employability through 
provision of advice/support and training.’487 The implication is of a hybrid of ‘work-first’ and human 
capital models, and the following exploration of programme mechanics highlights elements of both. For 
an explicit and measurable headline target, the Labour party promised in the first term of government 
that the NDYP would help to deliver a reduction in youth unemployment by 250,000.488489  
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NDYP Structure 
The New Deal for Young People was intended for jobseekers aged between 18 up to and including 24 
years of age. Participants in the New Deal for Young People were usually JSA recipients who had been 
claiming for at least six months. 490 After this period, the programme divided into the two core parts 
shown in Figure 5.1.   
Figure 5.1: Path Mechanics in the New Deal for Young People 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s construction 
Figure 5.1 depicts the path experience of most clients participating in the New Deal for Young People. 
Eligible participants are initially subject to the (relatively) lightly regimented Jobseekers regime, which 
mandates regular meetings with Jobcentre Plus advisors, and evidence of job-search must be proven in 
order to continue benefit receipt. Participants are therefore subject to the generic activities of the 
mainstream unemployed on the JSA; the only difference is they are given less time to find work than 
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older client groups (such as those subject to the New Deal for Long Term Unemployed), before activities 
intensify.  The explanation for this is connected to several of the arguments regarding the specificities of 
youth unemployment, but also, as its flagship programme it echoes the view held by the government’s 
chief labour economist, Richard Layard, who felt that extended periods of jobsearch, particularly when 
the labour market is contracting or undergoing substantial change, were ‘a subsidy to idleness.’491 
 
The NDYP begins after six months in receipt of JSA for those who have been unable to find employment 
with that timeframe. At the six-month point, clients are obliged to attend the stage 1 of the NDYP, the 
‘Gateway’. The Gateway phase was an intensified form of the JSA, with clients obliged to attend more 
frequent interviews and courses to address the barriers they faced in their attempts to join the labour 
market. Failure to submit to reasonable demands made by their individual Jobcentre Case Worker or a 
rejection of a reasonable employment opportunity could lead to benefit sanctions.   
 
This ‘Gateway’ style of programme (of intensive jobsearch, CV building and interview techniques) was a 
simple and cost effective method for improving the employability of clients. The logic behind small-scale 
interventions was derived from surveys of employers who constantly picked up on the inadequate 
personal skills of clients, including the basics of communicating ones abilities with a prospective 
employer.492 Research into the international deployment of these techniques has found them to be very 
effective at reconnecting the unemployed with the labour market.493494  Part of the effect of the 
Gateway may be attributed to the ‘threat effect’ where participants are likely to accelerate their 
                                                          
491
 Layard, R. (1996) in Finn, D. (2000) From Full Employment to Employability: A New Deal for Britain’s Unemployed? 
International Journal of Manpower, v.21.5, p386 
492
 Robinson, P. (2000) Active Labour Market Policies: A Case of Evidence-Based Policy-Making? Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, v16.1, p22 
493
 De Koning, J. (eds) (2007) The Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies: Measures, Public Private Partnerships and 
Benchmarking, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, p43 
494
  This perhaps counterbalances the argument that the long-term unemployed are some distance away from the labour 
market. 
155 
 
employment efforts in appreciation of the alternative, namely participation in a mandatory work or 
training regime.495 
 
If clients did not obtain employment after a further four months Walsh notes that 25% of clients were in 
the process for five, or even six months)496 they would progress to the ‘Options stage’. This section of 
the programme is valuable, as it is the part that has been subject to fundamental reform, where the 
gateway stage in the replacement programmes was largely maintained. In the ‘Options’, clients are 
obliged to take part in an option, which was felt to facilitate their employability. These options were as 
follows: 
 Subsidised Employment 
 Full Time Education and Training 
 Voluntary Sector Placement 
 Environmental Task Force 
Participation in the Options stage was mandatory; however, participants were offered a degree of 
freedom to select which of the four main options they wanted to participate in. Nevertheless, this stage 
signified the unequivocal introduction of workfare in the UK. As an advisor to the department for 
Education and Employment remarked ‘workfare is rarely implemented in its harshest, strictest form of 
work and you get cash. It’s normally a portfolio of options.’497 The selection of an Option was mandatory 
and in part aimed at finding something that suited the client’s needs, capabilities and career 
preferences. In practice, Jobcentre staff and other personal advisors ‘played a key role in determining 
the Option and placement allocated to individual participants.’498  
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As Woodfield et al. found, such a matter is not trivial;  ‘The amount of time given to the Option 
allocation process and the extent to which individuals felt they had been fully involved in that process 
was of vital importance to their overall satisfaction with the eventual choice made.’499 In part technical 
necessity required a series of Options to allow a degree of systemic flexibility to address ‘perceived 
failings of previous, nationally operated, ‘one-size-fits-all’ programmes, that were insensitive to the 
needs of clients or localities.’500 As with the Conservatives’ Youth Training Scheme, availability was 
spatially uneven with certain Options not optional at all in a number of geographical locations.501 That 
said, with a menu of Options, at least some degree of service could be guaranteed. 
The four options were comprised as follows: First, the subsidized employment option (SEO) is a job with 
the private sector. This job is usually full time, but with one day set aside for accredited training.  The 
government spent considerable time persuading employers to contribute placements for the SEO,502 
and to encourage them the government intervened on the demand-side, through paying £60 per week 
subsidy towards the client’s wages, and a substantial contribution to training costs. This demand 
intervention was minor however, as the National Audit Office discovered only half of employers who 
took on clients at this stage were motivated by the subsidy.503 This option typified the ‘work-first’ 
approach, designed to facilitate rapid labour market attachment in the belief that the client’s 
fundamental problem is the absence of recent, or any, work experience. As the most ‘welfare-to-work’ 
orientated option, this was to be the government’s preferred option for clients because, as Cebulla 
comments, ‘New Labour was advised, and believed, that moving away from large scale training 
programmes towards welfare-to-work programmes would be more effective and less costly to public 
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finances.’504 The SEO was clearly intended for those clients closest to the labour market, and 
consequently these individuals were often gently nudged towards selecting the SEO if their advisors 
believed them to be ready.   
 
In the second option, Full Time Education and Training (FTET), clients were directed towards labour 
market specific education qualifications and participants could continue to claim their benefits with an 
extra £10 on top for a maximum of twelve months. With this option as an alternative to the SEO, the 
government could point out to its critics that the NDYP was not simply a workfare, or even work-first 
regime, and that they were influenced by the human capital model. Four weeks’ work experience were 
required while participating in this Option, pressing the government’s emphasis on some form of work 
experience. As Stafford points out, the balance struck between work-first and human capital 
development appears to have changed over time, with the need for clients to obtain paid work 
increasingly being stressed.505 This changing emphasis may well have been propelled by findings that 
the FTET produced a relatively low labour market attachment rate,506 though this outcome is tempered 
because the FTET was targeted however at some of the least job-ready of clients, who suffered from 
marked literacy and numeracy failings.507  
 
The third, the Voluntary Sector Option (VSO), paid the same as the FTET and clients were placed with 
various voluntary sector organisations and charities for up to six months, providing effectively free 
labour to voluntary agencies. As with other options, the VSO included at least one days’ training per 
week towards an approved qualification, but was targeted towards clients who were not considered 
‘job-ready’ but did possess some basic qualifications.  
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The final and least preferred option (at least on the part of the government) was the Environmental 
Task Force (ETF). The ETF comprises a range of localised projects where clients worked cleaning streets, 
planting shrubberies and initiating energy saving strategies, with time available for obtaining 
qualifications. Its classification as workfare is complicated because EFT clients could either be paid a 
wage or have their benefits topped up, but this depended on the supplier of the local ETF scheme. Like 
the SEO and VSO, this option also included one day per week accredited training.  
 
The Options Stage was a clear example of a  hybrid programme, combining elements of work-first and 
human capital development, but the individual’s experience will usually be of one or the other. Of 
significance is Stafford’s indication of a gradual change in emphasis in the Options stage from human 
capital development to work-first during the programmes lifespan, as Options became more work-
orientated. The shifting emphasis was a clear indication of the direction Labour’s welfare reforms were 
set to take, following the path set by their predecessors. 508 
 
Compulsion 
The use of the JSA framework shows continuity with the previous Conservative government; however, 
NDYP was a manifestly stronger intervention because it accelerated participation in mandatory work or 
activity after only 10 months, whereas previous schemes only mandated such activities after 2 years.509 
The mandatory Options were workfare in its purest form administered in the UK.  Operating within the 
JSA framework, claimants were required to sign a Jobseekers Agreement from day one registering for 
the JSA, which put into a contractual format their commitment to seek work. A breach of this ‘provides 
prima facie evidence that the young person is not actively seeking work and [is] grounds for the 
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temporary removal of benefit.’510 It was this Agreement which provided the conditionality parameters 
for the Gateway stage for young unemployed people, and the Agreement continued to hold effect 
throughout the Options stage where refusal to participate could lead to a termination of benefit for up 
to 26 weeks, hence former Prime Minister Blair’s popular mantra of ‘no fifth option of a life on 
benefit.’511 
 
Sanctioning noncompliant recipients was an important mechanism for the government’s active labour 
market policies. Whether sanctioning is generally effective was discussed in Chapter 3, but evidence 
shows that under NDYP they were widely deployed to enforce behaviour. According to data up to 2004 
around 831,000 individuals had participated in the New Deal for Young People512 and within that period 
83,505 benefit sanctions had been issued to NDYP participants.513514 Research by Peters and Joyce found 
that New Deal for Young People participants were particularly likely to receive sanctions relative to 
other UK ALMP participants, and that this was principally a consequence of refusing to participate in a 
mandated Option.515 With no access to hardship payments or mitigating income, the NDYP people were 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of sanctions, possibly rendering the programme more effective in 
facilitating compliance.516 One ethical question concerning sanctioning of the Options is that it may only 
legitimately avoid accusations of punishing clients if the ‘rights’ are of actual assistance, rather than an 
expensive distraction from other employment related activities such as job search. In the case of some 
of the Options (discussed below) the benefits of participating were not obvious.  
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The continuation and expansion of mandatory participation reinforced by benefit sanctions is one area 
of continuity in the development of welfare-to-work, another is in experimentation with private sector 
delivery.  
 
Programme Delivery – New Labour’s First Attempt at Private Sector Administration  
Initially the delivery of the programme remained predominantly in the hands of public agents, in spite of 
the government arriving in power announcing that they were ‘wholeheartedly committed to 
competition as the principle spur to greater efficiency.’517  The early stages of NDYP reflected the ‘old’ 
Labour values of state management, representing what was fundamentally a ‘traditionalist policy, top 
down, nationally defined.’518 In its early stages the New Deal for Young People was delivered almost 
entirely by the Benefits Agency and Employment Service, which from 2002 were merged to form the 
Jobcentre Plus (an important step in Labour’s alignment of benefit receipt to work).  
Separated out into units of delivery (UoDs), the NDYP was established in 144 areas covering Great 
Britain. The rationale of the UoDs was to allow the tailoring of services to local labour markets. 
Nevertheless, UoDs designed and delivered the NDYP under the New Deal framework, and flexibility of 
this framework was limited.519 New Labour decided early on however to experiment with different 
methods of service delivery, cautiously offering two of the 144 areas out to private tender. Despite early 
reports that private sector service delivery yielded relatively underwhelming  results520 by 2002 private 
sector delivery had expanded to 10 out of 142 UoDs521 and by 2005 private sector delivery of the New 
Deal had reached some 10% of total service delivery.522  
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The result of the experiments was a growth in confidence at Department of Work and Pensions in 
contracting employment services, where subsequently there emerged three modes of delivery for the 
NDYP. In type 1, the system would be controlled by the public sector through the Employment Service 
(or Jobcentre Plus), where public sector agencies were in charge of Gateway delivery and orchestrated 
external partnerships with agents to deliver the Options stage. Under Type 2, the system would be 
delivered by the private sector, with for-profit companies managing the Gateway phases and developing 
their own partnerships to deliver the Options. Type 3, what Stafford calls a ‘consortia led approach’ was 
a hybrid, where public, private and voluntary sectors worked together to provide the Options stage 
while allowing the Employment Service to deliver the Gateway.523524 To the government’s 
disappointment, this structured framework did not yield results that maximised the potential of the 
private sector. Too often ‘contracts were small scale, had a multiplicity of requirements and start and 
finish dates, and were too short, discouraging providers from marking the investment necessary to 
improve performance.’525 Furthermore, evidence also points to the fact that operating costs of private 
sector led areas were higher than those of the PES.526 Such a rigid structure on such a small scale 
however may not have been appropriate to harness the power of large and unregulated private 
companies.  
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New Deal for Young People Outcomes 
The most important concern for this thesis is the utility of active labour market policy. The New Deal for 
Young People, Robinson argued, was a clear example of ‘evidence based policy’, with strong evidence 
behind the Gateway and somewhat more mixed evidence behind the individual Options.527 Of all of the 
UK programmes discussed in this thesis, the NDYP has probably received the greatest volume of 
academic attention from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. To begin with the former, there 
are two major quantitative evaluations from the National Audit Office and the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research (henceforth NAO and NIESR). Both attempt to isolate the deadweight 
effect (the volume of individuals who would have found employment without the programme). Riley 
and Young at the NIESR looked to establish the net gain on employment and unemployment by 
comparing the NDYP ‘treatment’ group to older ‘untreated’ welfare recipients between the introduction 
of the programme and February 2000. The report suggests that the overall effect during the 16-month 
period of analysis was a reduction in long-term youth unemployment of 35,000 and an increase in youth 
employment of 15,000.528 Jones et al. at the National Audit Office advocated caution on these 
predictions and criticized the study’s results as ‘not being very robust.’529 The NAO, adapting the NIESR 
model, suggested that the gains for youth employment might be somewhere in the range of 8-20,000 
and the youth unemployment gains to be within the range of 25-45,000.530 These wider projections still 
suggest that the NIESR results are possible, and largely central. As Stafford correctly indicates, these 
reductions in long term youth unemployment must be qualified in that the NDYP is estimated to 
increase short-term youth unemployment by 10,000 due to the diversionary effect  of scheme 
participation on overall jobsearch time which have the potential to delay employment entry.531 
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Since these reports, little quantitative research has been published. Of the few, Beale et al. analysed the 
longer-term impact of programme participation with a study focusing on a cohort over a four-year 
period.  In this they found that benefit receipt amongst NDYP participants was 12% lower over that 
period that other comparable groups.532 In spite of general success, the programme appeared not to 
benefit all candidates. For example, research has found that a third of New Deal clients have been 
through the programme at least twice,533 producing a ‘carousel effect’ where participants cycle between 
periods of short term employment and programme participation. As should be anticipated, the 
individual options yielded different results. Beale et al. found that the Employment Option was the most 
effective at reducing future benefit receipt, where against other Options Employment Option 
participants spent 7% longer in employment than FTET, and longer still against the ETF and VSO.534  
 
Such findings are supported by those of Lissenburgh, who found from surveying Scottish clients that just 
under three quarters of SEO participants had left the Jobseekers Allowance by 2001, whereas for the 
FTET and VS Options this figure was narrowly above two-thirds. The figure dropped to under three-fifths 
for those on the ETF,535 bolstering the government’s view that this New Deal Option was the least ideal 
for clients. Nevertheless, as Lissenburgh rightly clarifies, ‘these figures take no account of the 
differences in characteristics between participants in each option’,536and Option performance may be 
distorted by the selections of particular Options on the basis of individual ‘job readiness’ of clients. 
Furthermore, Lissenburgh found that not only was the SEO best for moving clients from unemployment, 
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but also subjection to the SEO is more likely to keep individuals from returning to the Jobseekers 
Allowance.537  
 
Interestingly, a survey-based report for the Employment Service yielded different results, finding that 
the propensity to move into unsubsidized employment was strongest amongst those who had 
undertaken the SEO Option, while the FTET had moved to the bottom of the ranked Options.538 This was 
apparently because it encourages participants to pursue further qualifications, which is seen as 
distracting the individual from an active engagement with their jobsearch.539 SEO also outperformed all 
other options in Northern Ireland. Data from Northern Ireland reveal that the chances of moving into 
unsubsidized work are more than triple those of VSO and ETF options, and SEO clients are two-thirds 
less likely to return to benefits than those on the other options,540 but again, this may relate to the 
characteristics of clients. This is implied using evidence from Dorsett, who reported that  male clients on 
the SEO tend on average to have signed on to the JSA less than their counterparts on other options and 
tend to have a shorter claim history.541 In a similar way, research undertaken for the employment 
service found that client characteristics were important determinants of the performance of each 
Option. Bonjour et al. found that those participating in the SEO would have fared fine on the other 
Options (excluding the FTET) finding work at the end of the programme,  whereas those participating on 
the other Options would have had better chances of finding work had they participated in the SEO.542  
Finally, at the general level, McVicar found that NDYP may  have had a stronger impact on employment 
entry for the most ‘job ready’ clients,543 indicating at the very least that the NDYP produces an 
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accelerant effect on clients (not dissimilar to the studies in the Restart scheme).   
 
Summarily the NDYP evaluation literature found a modest, but positive impact on levels of youth 
employment. The stronger effect was identified on the unemployment side where participation 
encouraged deregistration for benefits on a larger scale than employment entry. The literature also 
identified that the NDYP Options were not equal – the preferred Option was the SEO, and this 
performed well in all evaluations, with more mixed outcomes for education and training, and weaker 
outcomes for voluntary and environmental placements. It was also evident that the programme 
benefitted those closest to the labour market, while the less successful were likely to experience 
repeated cycles of programme participation and short-term employment.  
 
The studies discussed above are now dated and miss important trends in programme performance. 
Using data from across the programme it can be observed that there was a noticeable decline in the 
numbers entering the Employment Option, and by the final years of the programme, the other three 
Options had significantly more participants, despite the government’s preference towards the 
Employment Options.544 Indeed, a downturn in programme performance can be observed using data 
over the lifetime of the programme which might explain the impetus for reform. Not only were the 
numbers entering SEO declining but also the number of those finding any work through the programme 
also declined in later years. 
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Figure 5.2 Job Entry Rate of New Deal for Young People Participants 
 
Source: Adapted using data from DWP Statistics Hub545 
 
Using data gathered from DWP databank, Figure 5.2 was assembled to assess the performance of the 
key objective of NDYP (employment entry). The initial peak between the years 1998 and 1999 shows the 
strong start with a noticeable opening burst of employment outcomes. The years following however 
show a general downward trend of the proportion of those entering the programme leaving for 
employment, this in spite of more individuals starting the programme in 2008 than in 2001. A number of 
explanations are possible, including the labour market, and the quality of programme participants in 
later years. The explanations for decline and reform are dealt with in the following chapter.  
Coupled with falling job entry are the sustainment figures. According to DWP criteria a job is sustained if 
it lasts for a period of at least thirteen weeks, but is unsustained if within that limit. Using DWP data 
gathered on type of employment gained, Figure 5.3 shows NDYP suffering similar trends to Figure 5.2, 
showing a gradual decline of sustained employment.  
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Figure 5.3 New Deal for Young People Proportion of Jobs Sustained for 13-weeks 
 
Source: Source: DWP Statistics Hub546 
 
The issue of sustainability was raised by the House of Commons Committee on Employment and 
Education as early as 2000 but was dismissed by the government. The official response was that ‘The 
experience [of unsustained employment] may still transform their confidence, their ability to work, and 
their prospects of getting another job with recent work experience to show to their next employer.’547 
The obvious effect of a lower proportion of the stock of unemployed is that it hampers the 
government’s other principle goal of moving young people off benefits. However, the more extreme is 
evident in the job entry measure than in sustainment, which could suggest that the bigger challenge to 
the programme was finding jobs for participants rather than keeping them there.  
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The New Deal for Long Term Unemployed People (ND25+) 
 
As the under 25s are not the only group of longer term unemployed, the government also introduced a 
group for older ages, the New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed (NTLTU/ND25+). There is significant 
duplication of NDYP in the ND25+ framework, so the programme only warrants a brief discussion.  First, 
the New Deal for the Long-term Unemployed was for those over the age of 25, who had usually been 
unemployed for a period of two or more years. Like with NDYP, participants would be subject to the 
Jobseekers Allowance framework, and the generic obligations expected of those in receipt of that 
benefit, such as the requirement to be available, and looking for work. It also included two of the 
‘Options’ from the NDYP, which were subsidized employment, and full time education and training.548  
  
The ND25+ has received limited academic attention, possibly because of the following factors. First, 
much of the NDYP is replicated in the ND25+ framework. Second, less funding, fanfare, and client 
volumes, has meant that there is markedly less literature on ND25+ than its sister programme for 
younger participants. Third, the programme has undergone several rounds of reform in its first five 
years, making methodological design highly problematic. Because of these reforms, even less of the 
studies are of relevance to the analysis of the ND25+ as few provide up to date information on its latest 
state. Notwithstanding this problem, the following will explore programme transformations; focussing 
predominantly on its final format by looking at a number of studies to identify what impact, if any, it 
had on its client group. 
 
Structure Pre-2001: the National Programme  
Originally the ND25+ was for JSA recipients over the age of 25 who had usually been claiming 
Jobseekers Allowance for two or more years. Like with NDYP, participants would be subject to the 
Jobseekers Agreement, and the generic obligations expected of those in receipt of unemployment 
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benefit, such as the requirement to be available, and looking for work. At first, the New Deal for the 
Long-term Unemployed operated two simultaneous models of delivery, the first was the National 
provision, and the second were a series of pilot projects, known as the November Pilots.  
 
The National provision required that after 2-years of JSA receipt, participants would have to attend a 
series of interviews at the Jobcentre, similar to the Restart process under the previous Conservative 
administration. According to the Tavistock Institute this is ‘intended to be a period of advice, guidance 
and counselling with a Personal Adviser involving between 5 and 7 interviews over 3-6 months. During 
this period the intention is to: 
• help clients into unsubsidized work through supporting and refocusing job search activities; 
• enable clients to reassess their skills and abilities in the context of the local labour market; 
• identify any barriers to employment; 
• consider how existing provision from ES and TECs/LECs may overcome those barriers; and 
• decide whether additional New Deal opportunities are appropriate.’549 
 
Participation in the interview process was mandatory as non-compliance or non-attendance would 
result in a sanction. As with the NDYP Gateway stage, intensive activity and greater support was offered 
to assist independent job search. If this 3-6 month period did not lead to employment, participants 
would be subject to one of two opportunities, similar to those offered in the NDYP: the first, entry to 
some form of subsidized employment, and the second, entry into full time education and training.550 
Specifically these were either: A subsidized job with a job voucher - £75 for full time employment (over 
30 hours) provided the wages are equal to this amount and £50 for a part time post (16-30 hours); Or 
entering the Education and Training Option (ETO), which offered a range of courses as long as the 
course is job focused and usually up to NVQ level 3. The course can last up to 12 months and is college 
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based.551 In effect, these were the same options as the SEO and FTET from the New Deal for Young 
People, but the notable distinction was that these options were not mandatory. Rather the only 
mandatory stage of the National Provision was the attendance at interviews.  
 
The November Pilots  
The November Pilots operated a different model, which appeared to have the objective of 
understanding whether a similar model to the NDYP would be appropriate for those over the age of 25. 
The Tavistock Institute recall the following objectives:  
•  the focus is on getting people back to work as soon as possible and helping them stay in work; 
•  recognising existing skills and experiences and building upon them, while offering greater 
opportunities for those with greater training needs; 
•  a range of help which matches the needs of the client group; 
•  offering the widest scope for tailoring to individual need; 
•  learning from the New Deal for 18-24 year olds incorporating a Gateway and a follow through; 
and 
•  no option for eligible clients to continue on benefits without taking steps to improve their 
employability.552  
 
The main difference between the national and piloted provision was the degree of compulsion and 
stricter focus on labour market attachment in the pilots. This was implemented by bringing forward 
participation in some areas to 12 months continuous JSA receipt, and in others 18 months.553 This was 
to be followed by an Intensive Activity Period rather than simply the two Options; this was a menu of 
employment related activities (explored below), which were mandatory. Finally, a mandatory follow 
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through period would occur if the Intensive Activity Period did not result in employment. The effect of 
these requirements was to enforce the final objective outlined about, that there would be ‘no option for 
eligible clients to continue on benefits without taking steps to improve their employability’, not 
dissimilar to the NDYP mantra of ‘no fifth option of a life on benefits.’ The similarities of the piloted 
areas to NDYP are apparent, and the intensified emphasis on reemployment and mandatory 
participation were adopted in the reforms at the turn of the century.  
 
ND25+ After 2001 Reforms 
The ND25+ underwent a series of incremental adjustments, and by 2001 the national programme had 
changed in substance. The rationale for amending the character of the ND25+ so swiftly after its 
introduction was outlined by Evans, who showed how over the first two years the movement from the 
Advisory Interview Process into jobs had halved and the proportion of programme participants 
returning directly to benefits was up to 56%.554 Consequently the reforms embraced the same 
mandatory Gateway model lasting for the same time period (16 weeks) as the New Deal for Young 
People. This was partly a re-branding of the interview processes, but there were some alterations such 
as increased interaction with personal advisors and a more structured focus on the skills barriers which 
faced clients.555  
 
The second change was the frontloading of the programme, where participation in the Gateway stage 
was mandatory for all customers after a period of 18 months JSA receipt, and, unlike the previous 
model, participation in activities after the Gateway was also made mandatory for all participants 
between the ages of 25 and 49. The consequences of these changes, according to Wilkinson were that: 
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The re-engineered programme introduced in April 2001 addressed some of the identified 
problems with the earlier programmes creating an individually tailored package of provision for 
participants and greater flexibility for Advisers. The change to mandatory programme 
participation after the Gateway meant that many more participants took an active role in the 
programme. 556 
 
In its final form, ND25+ participants would join the programme usually after 18 months of JSA receipt. 
After this period they would enter the Gateway Phase, which at the start would focus on diagnosing the 
barriers the participant faced to immediate employment. The “Gateway”, lasts up to 16 weeks and 
focuses on helping the individual in their job search by providing advice and regular meetings with a 
personal adviser. During the middle of the Gateway stage, participants would be sent on short courses 
of CV building, job search training and interview skills. If they remained unemployed by the end of the 
Gateway, focus would shift towards the impending Intensive Activity Period (IAP). The Intensive Activity 
Period is an intensive form of the Gateway stage, which according to Hasluck: ‘Is designed to give 
people the skills and experience needed to obtain employment by offering tailored, full-time, intensive 
provision. Such provision includes Basic Employability Training (BET), work placements, work-focused 
training and help with motivation and ‘soft’ skills.’557The IAP lasted a further 13 weeks, where, following 
discussion with the personal adviser, the participant was offered a selection of support activities. These 
included training, help with soft skills, and work experience placements. For those aged 25-59 
participation in the IAP is mandatory; for those aged over 60 it is voluntary (although participation in the 
Gateway period is compulsory). The IAP offered a number of options that were available on the NDYP, 
including full time education and training, subsidized employment, and work experience.558As with the 
Gateway, this stage of the ND25+ is mandatory and supported by sanctions. The last stage, “follow-
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through”, for those who have not found work at the end of the IAP, lasts up to six weeks and offers 
extra help and support to those still unemployed.559  
 
Finally, a key feature of the reengineered ND25+ was the increased ‘work-first’ tone of the programme. 
Wilson explains that: ‘The re-engineered ND25 plus programme is much more job outcome oriented 
than its predecessor. The client’s needs are to be assessed in terms of what they need to obtain a job as 
quickly as possible, rather than what they would like to do regardless of feasibility.’560 
 
The two main differences between the NDYP and ND25+ were the extra year for  those over 25 before 
entering the Gateway, and the limited equivalent of  an ‘Options’ stage at the end through IAP. The IAP 
opportunities however did not include an equivalent of the NDYP’s Environmental Task Force where the 
state would act as the employer of last resort. 
All told, over the course of several fundamental reforms, the ND25+ came to share a similar structure 
with the NDYP for older clients to join 12 months later, albeit with a stronger work-first emphasis.  
 
Performance of the New Deal for the Long Term Unemployed  
Against programme objectives, the literature reveals the ND25+ as a general success. First, Hasluck 
refers to qualitative evidence from ND25+ staff that that the programme had become intensified and 
job-focused, as was intended by the reform programme.561 More importantly, homogenizing reforms 
have delivered improved outcomes on the preceding schemes. The effects of reform were evaluated by 
two major pieces of research.  Hasluck provides data, which shows the probability of leaving the 
programme under the original system and under the reformed system. The data appears to indicate 
that after 6 months the number of people to leave the reformed ND25+ was 10% higher than under the 
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original system.562 Consequently the mean time spent on NTLTU was less than under the original 
system.563 The overall net effects of the New Deal for the Long-term Unemployed amongst men were 
around 4% percent above the deadweight – or the non-intervention rate; this translates as men 
entering the programme were 4 percent less likely to be unemployed after participating in the 
programme than non-participants.564 The impact amongst women was apparently negligible, but 
explanations for this were not forthcoming in the report.565 
 
The reformed programme had yielded improved job outcomes than its earlier design phases, but 
despite sharing some similar characteristics to the New Deal for Young People, the New Deal for Long-
term Unemployed was found to be less effective. This was explained by the participation lag however 
rather than programme design, where: ‘25+ year olds enter the programme after 18 months claiming 
unemployment-related benefits, whereas 18-24 year olds enter after only 6 months. These generally 
longer spells on benefits are likely, in and of themselves, to impact negatively on the chances of 25+ 
year olds entering employment.’566 There is also marked difference in the programmes achievements 
over its lifetime. As Figure 5.4 indicates, the outcomes of the ND25+ over time, where outlined below is 
the number of participants, finding and sustaining employment for at least 13 weeks, which was the key 
objective of the piloted and reengineered provision.   
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Figure 5.4 Proportion of Starts Entering Employment Lasting 13+ weeks 
 
Source: Adapted from DWP Statistics Hub567  
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates that throughout the major reforms of the ND25+ the proportion of jobs sustained 
for 13-weeks or longer grew until 2004, after which, it began to decline. The acceleration after the 2001 
reforms can partially be explained by the fact that participants were entering the programme earlier.568 
However, explaining the substantial decline after 2004 is a bit more difficult. PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
offer the suggestion that the client group has become more difficult to manage, as those easy to help 
are moved quickly into work, those remaining in the programme represented a hard-core group that 
had multiple barriers to employment making them more difficult to place in the regular job market.569 In 
addition, they suggest that encouraging employers to accept participants had become more difficult, 
citing increasing insurance costs and a rising administrative burden dissuading employers from 
participating in the scheme.570  
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The decline after 2008 can perhaps be explained by the recession, and that specific decline is common 
amongst each of the programmes studied in this chapter. Before this point however, in the context of 
an expanding labour market, the decline in outcomes is more difficult to explain.   
 
ND25+ Summary  
The New Deal for the Long-term Unemployed received limited academic attention and the research 
investigating its effects, pertained largely to the programme before it underwent its reform. These 
reforms had the effect of adopting a stronger ‘work-first’ emphasis, where immediate labour market 
attachment was emphasized through a series of focused and compulsory work related activities and an 
escalation of participant expectations earlier in the unemployment spell. The reforms also served to 
homogenize the system, where the differences between services aimed at those above the age of 25 
and those below became increasingly blurred.   
 
The impact of the programme on the stock of starts appears smaller than the New Deal for Young 
People. This could be explained by a number of factors. First, despite reforms, the Gateway did not 
begin until 18 months of JSA receipt, a whole year later than the NDYP. Older groups of jobseekers were 
therefore given more time to seek work independently, and as chapters 1 and 2 explained, those out of 
work for longer periods of time are more difficult to assist than those of shorter unemployment spells. 
Second, the programme for older workers included no option where the state would act as employer of 
last resort, which serves to reduce the possible destinations of those exiting the programme.  
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Employment Zones – Market driven work-first 
 
Almost as soon as the New Deals were introduced, the government began experimenting with 
alternative employment programme delivery mechanisms. With the New Deals, the private delivery 
models were largely unsuccessful in surpassing the Jobcentre Plus’s performances, but as delivery 
organisations were paid on delivering processes rather than outcomes, it was difficult for the state to 
incentivise improved performance. The approach to Employment Zones was quite the opposite.  
Despite operating in only 15 areas in the UK,571 Employment Zones are important to this project 
because they share many similarities to the Flexible New Deal, including a quasi-market driven by 
outcome-based payments, a ‘black box’ approach with a strong incentive to deliver ‘work-first’ style 
employment services. The New Deals and EZ worked with different claimant groups, with Employment 
Zones being targeted at a wider variety of unemployed participants, including single parents (through 
voluntary participation), young people who had been through the NDYP and failed to gain employment, 
as well as the mainstream unemployed. An exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of EZs should 
highlight two things. First, assessing the outcomes EZs should provide some indication of likely FND 
performance and second, identifying key differences between EZs and FND will provide insight into 
where the source of effectiveness and efficiency gains lies in replacing one with the other.  
 
Employment Zones were special employment programmes designed to target communities with 
disproportionately high levels of unemployment compared to the rest of the UK. Fundamentally, they 
were a pilot project, an experiment to test the utility of deploying market forces through private sector 
delivery and competition as a means of boosting the pace of transition from welfare to work. Initially, 
the first phase of Employment Zones was ‘characterized by voluntary jobseeker participation, a strong 
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focus on local partnership and the involvement of community based organisations.’572 However, the 
emphasis quickly changed to mandatory participation for certain client groups and rapidly evolved into 
a market driven ‘work first’ regime, largely as a result of the schemes initial expense.573 The mandatory 
Employment Zones were the longest running system, were researched more thoroughly, and relevant 
to this thesis because of their similarities with FND. Under EZs, the DWP began experimenting with 
contracting welfare-to-work to test whether a) a market existed amongst the ‘for-profit’ sector, and b) 
how to implement a system of payment-by-results. In line with international evidence, the DWP learned 
that ‘reintegration services are marketable [and] the knowledge of reintegration is available in the 
private market or can at least be developed.’574  
The development of a quasi-market involved several mechanisms. The first utilised single contract areas 
(one provider per location) to deliver DWP targets with payments by results. The areas would be 
operated by either private or voluntary sector by companies, such as Serco. Interestingly, at this stage 
the state had also entered the market, with the DWP creating an arms-length delivery organisation to 
compete with existing private sector companies, a public-private partnership under the name of 
Working Links, who subsequently won the majority of EZ contracts.  
 
The participation and further interest expressed from private sector companies spurred on the DWP to 
initiate phase three of Employment Zones, which continued to develop the quasi-market. From April 
2004 the DWP introduced direct competition between delivery organisations in ‘Multiple Provider 
Zones’.575 Multiple Provider Zones were introduced to the largest six of the 15 EZ areas.576 In these six, 
usually two (but up to three) providers would directly compete on delivering fast and effective labour-
market reintegration services. Each provider would be given a fixed market share and clients in most 
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cases would be automatically allocated to them through the ‘Random Assignment Tool’,577 a system 
carried through to Flexible New Deal.  
 
In the initial stages, a fixed market share may limit the element of direct competition; nevertheless it 
was in the providers’ interests to surpass competitor’s outcomes with a view to obtaining future DWP 
contracts or expanding their coverage in Employment Zone areas. For the DWP fixing allocation 
numbers was a safe and steady way of building and testing a competitive private sector market without 
running the high risk of providers exiting the market, or the market failing (though this did occur with 
several providers). The random allocation of a fixed number of participants was also done for evaluation 
purposes because the DWP believed that distributing a similar quality and quantity of participants 
would simplify the process of identifying which provider performed best.578   
 
The design of provider services remained largely under the provider’s control. This approach is premised 
on the idea that transferring process-managed employment services to the private and voluntary 
sectors was unlikely to make any difference but, by releasing non-state delivery organisations from both 
bureaucratic obligations and state control, services could actually improve the chances of clients finding 
work.579 In effect, this was deregulating employment services. The DWP saw fit to restrain their 
regulatory capacity with the aim of fostering innovation and delivering private-sector practices to 
employment services. This approach of regulation permissive of significant provider autonomy is 
commonly called the ‘black box’ method.580   Not all are impressed by this approach, for example, 
Crighton et al. describe the ‘black box’ strategy as signified by a lack of any strategy at all.581  The ‘black 
box’ approach to regulation has been adopted in most welfare to work programmes in the UK today 
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therefore this criticism needs to be addressed. First, the ‘black box’ approach principally applies to the 
contract tendering stage, where contractors will outline in detail the processes they will adopt to deliver 
on government targets, including job-search, any minimal training provisions, details of subcontractor 
arrangements for specific client groups and their approaches to imposing conditionality through benefit 
sanctions. These plans are then approved (or rejected) by those charged with tendering at the DWP.  As 
such, while at the tendering stage it may appear that the government will permit schemes where 
anything (or nothing) goes, this is obviously not the case. Rather the government ask for a range of 
different approaches from private contractors and approve them according to appropriateness. At the 
implementation stage, the DWP assumes to know what is going on ‘on the ground’ because it has had 
the processes outline to them.  
 
Logically having emphasised freeing up the private and voluntary sectors to use their own methods to 
maximise productivity through the ‘profit motive’, service payments, which traditionally went towards 
financing processes, were to be limited.  The payment system for EZs was complex, but in essence, 
contractors were given an upfront service fee of 20% of anticipated full payment per customer, and the 
rest was to be paid on the basis of outcomes.582 There was considerable experimentation with financing 
of EZ providers throughout the lifetime of the programme, but, befitting the general marketization of 
employment services, upfront payments were gradually curtailed in terms of both monetary value and 
percentage of reward. This demonstrates over time that there was a slow transfer of responsibility and 
risk from the public sector to the private.  
 
One of the more innovative payment structures to emerge from Employment Zones was the passing of 
the equivalent of half of the client’s annual benefit entitlement, (26 weeks) to the private sector to 
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administer. The logic was that the quicker they could move participants into work and keep them there, 
the larger amount that the provider could retain.583 However, this incentivising of outcomes appears to 
create perverse incentives for the provider and the client. The literature review referred to two of 
these, creaming and parking, which is the cherry picking of the easiest to help, and ignoring the hardest. 
The DWP attempted to dis-incentivize cherry picking by mandating that any benefits saved  this 21-26 
week period could be kept by the provider, but if the participant remained unemployed after this 
period, the provider would have to cover the cost of the participant’s continued benefit 
entitlement.584Nevertheless, the majority of the financial reward was to be obtained through the bonus 
payments of achieving job outcomes and sustaining these employment periods for thirteen weeks.  
Having the money attached to individual customers, rather than the delivery process as a whole, was 
part of the wider strategy of personalising the service, in order to treat clients as units rather than as 
cohorts. Similar payment structures and incentives were carried forward to the FND.  
 
 Further elements of EZ’s were adopted for FND. Under EZs customer choice was introduced  for a small 
section of the clientele, namely single parents, who attended EZs on a voluntary basis. From April 2007  
this was extended to mandatory groups in Multiple Provider Zones.  The introduction of choice for 
mandatory clients enhanced the direct competition between providers. Now, providers were directly 
competing for client custom, with the previous system of fixed market share disappearing to be 
replaced with a fluctuating supply of clients based on who their preferred provider.  In doing so the 
DWP had progressed to its next stage in mimicking competitive markets through their having providers 
directly  compete for custom. This change led to considerable fluctuations in provider caseloads, which 
according to one provider lead to market share shifts of up to 35%.585 The delivery organisations that 
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could attract clients saw their businesses expand, where those who failed to do so were forced to scale 
down their businesses and make redundancies. 
 
Summarily, compared to the New Deals the distinctive features of the Employment Zones experiment 
were ‘payment by results, minimum regulation, operational and financial flexibilities, provider 
competition and customer choice.’586 Every one of those features were adopted with the programme to 
replace both EZs and all of the New Deals, the Flexible New Deal. While a few technical differences exist, 
the successor programme, FND, is an uploading of EZs into the national unemployment strategy.  
Employment Zone Performance  
Given the noted similarities shared by EZs and FND, the performance of the former is of great interest. 
Many of the EZ evaluations have compared the employment outcomes to programmes with similar 
client groups such as the New Deal for Lone Parents and the New Deal for 25+. The comparisons do not 
match perfectly, because EZs are dealing with slightly different client groups in areas with unusually 
high levels of unemployment. The geographic and demographic differences should suppose weaker EZ 
results because of the harder task the providers face.  
The studies tend to agree that against comparator New Deal programmes, Employment Zones deliver 
more sustained employment outcomes. Compared to the public employment service, EZ providers were 
found to deliver 6% more job starts for clients.587 In terms of the sustainability of employment 
outcomes, EZ contractors were around 10% more effective in producing these 13 week outcomes than 
their comparators.588 The second achievement has an important qualification, as this target was 
explicitly linked to a payment structure that was not applied in the other New Deal programmes. For 
instance, without that specific objective New Deal providers were expected to find subsidized 
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employment lasting at least 6 months, and therefore may have been more selective in the employment 
opportunities found for participants. The EZ emphasis on quick outcomes was identified by Griffiths and 
Durkin who indicate that that the jobs obtained were of relatively poor quality, and that the 13-week 
target was not perhaps challenging enough.589 This advice appears to have been noted for the FND 
design, as payment structures were revised to incentivise 26 weeks’ work. 
The third phase expansion from single contract areas to Multiple Provider Zones does not appear to 
have produced manifestly different outcomes or services, but as Griffiths and Durkin argued that having 
been introduced only in 2007 it had yet to be subjected to proper quantitative evaluation.590  
Internal DWP evidence was particularly insightful when it came to comparisons between EZs and the 
state run New Deal for Young People, and found that purely in terms of outcomes the Employment 
Zones posted significantly better results with the same client group (which in this case were NDYP 
‘retreads’), Griffiths and Durkin phrase its success in the following manner:  
‘If we imagine 100 young people starting on EZ and 100 starting on New Deal, around 10 to 15 
more people will be placed into work in the EZ than in New Deal comparator areas, and roughly 
ten or more EZ starters will get a sustained job’.591  
This is consistent with the literature presented in Chapter 3 that shows this would be predicted; as a 
pure work-first programme, Employment Zones were explicitly more work orientated than the New 
Deals, with the education and training options had elements of human capital development within it, 
and mandatory workfare to distract participants from full-time jobsearch activities. The context of the 
outcomes is also impressive as the results were achieved in tougher labour market conditions than the 
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New Deals. Predictably, however, the quality of post-participation jobs was of a lower standard, often 
temporary and poorly paid.592 
Bringing the outcomes up to the point of FND implementation, between the years 2000 and 2009, 
Employment Zones worked with over 220,000 participants and moved around 58% of them into work, 
with a starts-to-13 week outcomes percentage of 37.5%.593 However, as with the other two ALMPs 
discussed, the results of the Employment Zones weakened over time. The following graph shows a 
familiar pattern where the proportion of programme starters achieving outcomes lasting 13 weeks or 
more fell, in this case, quite dramatically. 
Figure 5.5 Employment Zones 13-Week Outcomes as a Proportion of Participants 
 
Source: Adapted from DWP Statistics Hub data 594 
As the active labour market policy with the most in common with the Flexible New Deal, with its strong 
emphasis on  work-first rather than training, education and subsidized work, , and its administration by 
the private and voluntary sectors incentivised by outcome payments, the performance of Employment 
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Zones is perhaps the most appropriate indicator of Flexible New Deal performance. This is a view shared 
by the DWP. However, judging by Figure 5.5, the decline in sustained job outcomes is not an 
encouraging sign for the incoming programme.   
Looking beyond the numbers, evidence showed that participants, particularly those who had already 
experience the NDYP, were generally positive about the more personalised support available in the 
Employment Zones (in spite of this also being an important component in the NDYP).595 Griffiths and 
Durkin also point to what appears to be ‘programme fatigue’, where those of low skills and experience 
who had experienced NDYP perhaps had a ‘greater acceptance of low wages [making] them attractive 
recruits.’596 Exhausting customers into accepting lower wages may increase their chances of 
employment, but as indicated above, the chances of this employment being of a quality capable of 
sustaining the customer’s interest or providing for their financial security raises questions about this 
method’s efficacy in resolving the carousel effect of cycling between short-term jobs and benefit 
receipt. 
The higher employment outcomes and more popular services came at a price. The report to the DWP 
states that ‘Though EZs may be more customer focused and achieve better results than comparative 
New Deals, these benefits come at a price... EZs cost significantly more and offer less value for money 
than their New Deal comparators.’597 This assertion was disputed by Freud, whose unreferenced 
comparison of the EZs and their main comparator finds for sustained outcomes EZs are better value for 
money, and describes them as being only ‘somewhat more expensive than comparator areas.’598  
In summary, the results of the privatised delivery of the Employment Zones initiative were to prove a 
surprise in light of the disappointing performance of private sector led New Deals. For policy-makers in 
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the Department of Work and Pensions, their experiment with a ‘black box’ approach showed that it was 
more effective to offer private companies freedom to operate, rather than having them duplicate 
services. This black box approach led to a more individualised service for the client compared to the 
centrally mandated NDYP and was therefore more sensitive to local labour market conditions and the 
specific requirements of benefit recipients.  
Employment Zones were not however the finished product. The temporary nature of  the jobs 
participants acquired meant that they often reverted back to benefit receipt at the termination of the 
contract. As concerning was the evidence from Finn that in order to deliver profits, private sector 
companies had in some cases reduced services for those furthest from the labour market and resources 
focussed on the easiest to help.599 This may partly have been a natural response to the profit motive in 
light of the contract structure, which did not significantly discriminate between types of client within 
given age categories, nor stipulate sufficiently ambitious sustained employment targets. 
Legacy Employment Programmes Compared  
If we look at each of the legacy programmes together over the years running up to the Flexible New 
Deal, it is possible to gauge expectations from future programmes. The following table shows the starts 
to outcome proportions for the three programmes against two measures, 13 Week Employment 
Outcomes (Short Job Outcomes/SJO) and 26 Week Employment Outcomes (Sustained Job 
Outcome/LJO) – these are essential because the Flexible New Deal was measured against these 
benchmarks. The conversion rate of 13 week to 26 week outcomes is also included to indicate what 
proportion of Short Job Outcomes might be converted into Sustained (26 week) Outcomes (LJO).  
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Table 5.1 13 and 26 Week Job Outcomes by Programme 
ALMP Starts Obtaining 2006-2007 (% 
of starts) 
2007-2008 
(% of starts) 
EZ25+ SJO 24.0 23.5 
EZ25+ LJO 18.0 15.0 
  Conversion Rate 75.0 63.8 
ND25+ SJO 25.7 26.2 
ND25+ LJO 12.0 12.0 
  Conversion Rate 46.7 45.8 
NDYP SJO 42.1 33.1 
NDYP LJO 17.0 17.0 
  Conversion Rate 40.4 51.4 
 
Source: Adapted from DWP Statistics Hub data600 
The programmes with the most in common with the Flexible New Deal, ND25+ and EZ25+were both 
achieving Starts-13 Week Outcomes of around 25% before the onset of the recession at the end of 
2008. The New Deal for Young People, with its 6-month employment subsidy, was achieving outcomes 
noticeably higher, but this would be expected given the additional incentives and early participation 
dates.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
The chapter has explored the designs and outcomes of the three primary welfare-to-work programmes 
established under the Labour government. Each programme began with very different structures, 
however through reforms and changes in emphasis work-first gained more prominence in both latter 
stages of NDYP and reforms of the New Deal for Long Term Unemployed. Both of these programmes 
also underwent contracting experiments, where all or part of the programme was delivered by private 
and voluntary sector organisations, both features common to the later incarnations of Employment 
Zones.  
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Evidence from all three programmes showed each enjoying a strong start but gradually the employment 
outcomes tailed off. The perceived reasons for this, and hence the systemic reform are explored in the 
next chapter, where the official justifications for reform are provided.   
 
The New Deal for Young People was a large scale and costly labour market intervention, under which 
the state held the capacity to eliminate long-term youth unemployment by acting as the employer of 
last resort in the Options Stage. However, while it might technically have eliminated the  youth 
unemployment problem, many found themselves returning to benefits after a short stint in work. 
Broken but repeated benefit claim is as much a problem for the government as any technical 
measurement of long-term unemployment.    
 
The New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed went through various waves of reform, and achieved 
outcomes similar to Employment Zones, with a similar client base. By the end of its 12 year lifespan 
ND25+ had adopted the Gateway element, and several of the mandatory activities present in the 
Options stage. However, it had also adopted the strong work-first emphasis present in Employment 
Zones. Both programmes over time saw private-sector organisations take some or all delivery 
responsibilities in a number of areas of the UK.  
Employment Zones underwent a similar, albeit more rapid evolution, and quickly became a testing 
ground for the DWP to experiment with contracting out employment services, to test cost-efficiency 
and build up a market for employment services in the future. In doing so they allowed for  contractors 
to experiment with tailored support for the long-term unemployed by deploying a ‘black box’ approach, 
rather than the highly regulated delivery expected of the NDYP. The development of each of these 
policies during their lifetime showed evidence of incrementalism, where programmes were tested, 
evaluated and adapted gradually to involve more market forces, and a greater emphasis on labour 
market attachment reinforced by strong and escalating conditionality. Yet, despite these changes, the 
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slow decline of each AMLP’s delivery of sustained employment outcomes signalled a need for reform. 
The more marked decline of EZ’s would point to the continuation of NDYP/ND25+ style programme, but 
instead, and in fitting with path dependence, reform followed the Employment Zone model.   
The following chapter will examine these reforms, outlining the design of the Flexible New Deal, and 
showing how many of the features of existing programmes have been adopted to build the programme. 
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CHAPTER 6  The Flexible New Deal: features and outcome potential 
 
The previous chapter explored and analysed the Labour Party’s flagship active labour market 
programmes.  This chapter now turns to the final round of welfare reform introduced during their last 
term in office. Specifically, this section will explain the link between past initiatives and the introduction 
of the Flexible New Deal (FND). As the prime focus of this thesis the logic for and structure of, the 
Flexible New Deal are examined in detail. The chapter will discuss the arguments for welfare reform, the 
nature of the reforms as an evolution from past welfare programmes, and the estimated advantages, 
potential outcomes and risks of this type of active measure. These will subsequently inform the 
collection and analysis of the primary qualitative and quantitative data used in this thesis.   
 
The Path to the Flexible New Deal and the Rationale for Reform 
The academic research offered in the previous chapter outlined that both New Deal for Young People 
and Employment Zones enjoyed a degree of success. The urgent need for reform of active labour 
market policy in the UK was not therefore apparent. Nevertheless, by 2005 the Labour government was 
keen to adjust the existing arrangements, in particular the New Deal programmes. The official rationale 
for change, outlined by Thomas, is offered as follows: 
 The labour market has changed 
 Jobseekers increasingly have more complex barriers to employment 
 The proportion of young people recorded as leaving NDYP to employment has fallen over 
recent years 
 NDYP has been less successful with some ethnic groups, women and jobseekers with low 
qualifications 
 NDYP has focused on getting people quickly into work, but job sustainability has become an 
increasing priority  
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 Some people frequently move in and out of unemployment601602 
There is evidence in DWP administrative data supporting several of these arguments. In particular 
graphs 6.1 and 6.2 provided show that both the NDYP and Employment Zones were gradually failing in 
their ability to place individuals into long-term employment.   
 
Fig 6.1 ALMP 13 Week Outcomes over 10 Years  
 
Source: Adapted from DWP Statistics Hub603 
Looking at Figure 6.1, the different welfare to work programmes show similar declining trajectories, 
with small performance upturns in 2004 and 2007. The ND25+ line is problematic given the quite 
fundamental changes it underwent in the early 2000s which brought forward participation from 24 
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months to 18 months. This general decline in performance was, officially, the main driver of the 
government’s reform programme, particularly in light of the fact that sustained long-term employment 
has a considerable impact on future benefit duration, labour market progression, and consequently 
government expenditure. 
In a report reflecting many of the views voiced above, the National Audit Office (NAO) explained that 
‘”The work-first” approach has helped many people into work, however there is a need for programmes 
to be developed to help people stay in work.’604 Using data from the DWP, the NAO showed that the 
longer the period of the employment an active labour market programme achieves, the greater the net 
fiscal benefit the programme achieves. For example, if all of the additional job outcomes achieved by 
the NDYP were to last 3 months, the cost to the Treasury would be £176 million pounds per annum. If 
these additional jobs lasted 12 months, the cost would be £91 million to the Treasury, but if jobs were 
sustained for 2 years, the Treasury would gain £30 million pounds in additional tax receipts above the 
cost of the programmes.605606  
Reflecting upon employment programmes data, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions John 
Hutton, ordered a review of active labour market provision, citing as his core concern the ‘sustainability 
of employment.’607 In pursuit of this, Hutton wished for a system to foster innovation in the welfare-to-
work model, and attack a perceived ‘can work – won’t work’ culture, appointing the former investment 
banker David Freud to conduct the review. The report was commissioned to discover new ways to 
encourage the jobless back to work, keep them there, and to find ways of encouraging those helping 
the jobless to do more. Hutton announced three parameters for the review: 
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1. "Firstly, the design of welfare to work policy. The balance between rights and responsibilities; 
whether and how we should strengthen incentives to work; and whether there is a role for 
greater conditionality within the system. It will look at the steps we can take to promote social 
mobility, especially by supporting progression through work and through an integrated 
approach to skills. 
2. "Secondly, to consider the devolution of welfare – building on the City Strategy and other local 
initiatives to open up new opportunities for delivering employment services to some of our 
most disadvantaged communities. 
3. "And thirdly, to examine the delivery of welfare in Britain over the next ten years. How we can 
build a more effective market in the provision of employment services – with a more customer-
focused welfare delivery system that better reflects the Government's wider public service 
ambitions of greater choice and empowerment."608 
 
The parameters were narrow and in keeping with the overall direction of welfare reform, asking what 
scope was there to accelerate conditionality, and what opportunities there were to incorporate the 
private sector into employment service delivery?  
 
Responding to the first question, David Freud endorsed the work-first philosophy to facilitate labour 
market attachment by the fastest route, combined with increased conditionality to ensure compliance, 
on the basis that ‘the combination of labour market contact, work experience and in-work training has 
been found to be most effective for people with low skills’609  
His response to the second question was the endorsement of a quasi-market in employment services. 
The report recommended that ‘once claimants have been supported by Jobcentre Plus for a period of 
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time, back-to-work support should be delivered through outcome-based, contracted support.610 
Specifically it argued: 
 
The private and voluntary sector would be responsible for intensive case management and for 
providing individual, tailored help for individuals to re-engage with the labour market. The 
contracting regime would set a core standard that everyone would receive, but beyond this 
there would be freedom between the provider and the individual to do what works for them.611 
 
It was these recommendations that became the blueprint for the Flexible New Deal. However, Freud did 
advise certain limitations on the structure of a quasi-market. Citing evidence provided by the DWP, 
Freud cast doubt on the utility of direct competition in the provision of jobseekers services for two key 
reasons. First, he argued that where providers operated in the same areas against each other, this 
would result in duplicated services, increasing costs to the taxpayer.  Secondly, clients would not 
exercise the choice between prime contractors effectively, citing problems arising in the New Deal for 
Disabled People, and in the Australian Jobs Network.612 This was to be one of the few aspects of the 
Freud report that was rejected by the government.   
 
The proposals in Reducing Dependency, Increasing Opportunity received a mixed reception. In the upper 
echelons of government, there was incongruity. The outgoing Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was in favour 
of the proposals, while the Chancellor of Exchequer and heir apparent Gordon Brown had serious 
reservations, specifically over the expansion of private sector delivery in the welfare market.613 The then 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Peter Hain, shared Brown’s concerns, as reported in the 
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Financial Times, he was ‘cool’ about increasing the role of the private sector.614 The change of the 
ministerial team at the Department of Work and Pensions, including the appointment of James Purnell, 
caused a change in attitudes, who announced a personal commitment to implement the majority of its 
recommendations.615 Purnell’s endorsement of the Freud Report is reflected in the similarities between 
Freud’s blueprint and the design of the Flexible New Deal. The Jobcentre Plus was to remain responsible 
for the short-term unemployed, but for those long-term unemployed the Options stage of the NDYP 
was to be replaced by private contractors incentivised through payment structures to facilitate rapid 
transitions from unemployment benefit to sustained, unsubsidized employment.  
Reactions from outside of government circles were also mixed. The government’s arms-length Social 
Security Advisory Committee took issue with the empirical basis for the review. Questioning the 
evidence, the report said ‘There are many examples of complex arguments being reduced to absolutes 
with little recognition of the intractable nature of the problems [barriers to work].616’  
The Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) took issue with the expansion of work-first along similar 
lines to those reported in the literature review.  Kate Stanley, the then IPPR director of research, argued 
that the proposals offer ‘no mechanism to allow for changes in the wider economic environment (such 
as reduced labour demand). Nor is any account taken of regional variations in current and future 
performance.’617 These concerns were voiced also by the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) who 
argued that ‘providers will be reliant upon many factors that are beyond their control – such as the 
availability of flexible, well remunerated, sustainable and accessible jobs’.618 CPAG also warned of the 
perverse incentives an outcomes-based market might create, arguing that ‘Given the financial risks 
involved for providers, it is likely that that the larger regional contracts will be given to private sector 
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providers, whose motivation will understandably be driven by profit rather than social conscience.  This 
may result in variable, possibly erratic and sometimes short-term provision. ‘619 
Potential providers on the other hand appeared supportive. Working Links, a company initially 
established to deliver Employment Zones, was generally welcoming of the report, though argued that it 
might have gone further, bringing in the private and voluntary sectors at an earlier stage.620 
WorkDirections (now Ingeus Deloitte) were equally welcoming of the report, advocating large, long-
term contracts, of which they had developed experience in the Australian Jobs Network, and 
recommended the immediate testing of financing models.621 
FND Objectives 
Ahead of exploring the design of the Flexible New Deal, it is appropriate to consider briefly the 
objectives of the programme; only then can a judgement be made as to whether the scheme is likely to 
achieve these targets.  At the core is the desire to shift a larger section of the welfare caseload into 
sustained employment. Broadly, the Department of Work and Pensions sets out five key targets: 
1. A stronger framework of rights and responsibilities to move benefit customers from being 
passive recipients to active jobseekers 
2. A personalised and responsive approach to individual customer needs which will provide 
tailored employment and skills support to meet the needs of both customers and local 
employers 
3. A partnership approach with public, private and third sector organisations working together to 
maximise innovation, leading to more and better outcomes 
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4. Devolving and empowering communities for future sustainable employment which will be at 
the heart of neighbourhood renewal 
5. Not just jobs, but jobs that pay and offer opportunities for progression, with an emphasis on 
sustaining and progressing in work to ensure all customers who need help to develop their skills 
have access to the relevant pre-employment and in-work training 622 
These objectives go beyond the traditional pursuit of increasing employment and decreasing benefit 
receipt, to include community renewal, and an emphasis on in work progression and pay. The question 
of whether these additional objectives could become tangible pursuits is perhaps answered in the more 
narrow and measurable objectives required of suppliers. These are the targets, or ‘Critical Success 
Factors’, to be implemented:  
1.  Suppliers will meet or exceed the Short Job Outcome targets (13 weeks actual work) agreed in 
their contract;  
2.  Suppliers will meet or exceed the Sustained Job Outcome
 
targets (26 weeks actual work) 
agreed in their contract;  
3.  Suppliers will ensure every customer receives a level and type of support appropriate to their 
individual needs, including those customers with more substantial or specialist needs;  
4.  Suppliers will deliver a service that represents excellent value for money and a step-change 
improvement in performance compared with previous programmes; and  
5.  Suppliers will deliver high quality provision to all customers in line with the DWP Quality 
Framework and achieve high standards at external inspection by developing their continuous 
improvement strategy in line with the relevant Common Inspection Framework. Section 3 
describes in more detail elements of the service requirement that relate to quality, evaluation, 
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performance and contract management.623 
 
The critical success factors are more relevant than the broader objectives because it is these that 
providers were expected to implement. Critical Success Factors 1 and 2 will be explored further in this 
chapter, and represent the benchmark against which the programme’s actual performance will be 
compared, but it is Success Factor 4 which is the most ostensibly ambitious, seeking to surpass existing 
programmes at a lower cost to the exchequer. Notably absent in the demands of providers is any 
mention of human-capital development pertaining to education or training or indeed reference to  ‘jobs 
that pay and offer opportunities for progression’, even though the structure of the programme dictates 
that only the provider could deliver on such a target. The discrepancy between the targets set and 
instructions given to providers exposes a common cleavage between the rhetoric of welfare reform and 
practice. The emphasis in the first section on developing human capital is entirely omitted from 
performance indicators. 
 
In summary, notwithstanding the discrepancies between the objectives, they present a series of 
ambitious goals for Flexible New Deal. The most ambitious of all is the aspiration for a significant 
improvement of long-term employment outcomes, at lesser cost. Whether the structure of the Flexible 
New Deal is equipped to deliver on these is assessed in the following sections.  
The Design of the Flexible New Deal 
In accepting the thrust of the Freud proposals, the government were gradually to dismantle the large 
and complex array of existing welfare-to-work arrangements and replace them with a single unified 
programme: the Flexible New Deal. 
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In spite of the considerable administrative overhaul required, the introduction of the Flexible New Deal 
displayed many hallmarks of the incremental approach to policy-making where many of the existing 
structures were maintained, homogenised and adapted into one programme. In the previous structures, 
clients would participate in the generic JSA programme for the first six months of their claim. A failure 
to enter work by this point resulted in participation within the (usually) Jobcentre led ‘Gateway’ stage 
for a further four months. The Gateway stage offered clients more personal interaction with their 
jobcentre advisors through intensive and directed help tackling the barriers they face to entering the 
labour market. With more ‘hands-on’ help in the process of getting them into work, and therefore 
greater expectations of participation, and the acceptance of job opportunities reinforced by sanctions. 
The reported success of the Gateway stage under NDYP resulted in its retention under the FND regime 
with the minor adjustment that younger clients were to join the Gateway two months later than on 
NDYP before joining the specialist private and third sector providers.624  This would perhaps expose the 
resilience of the Public Employment Service in delivering intensified job search, but scrutiny of the detail 
exposes that while clients aged between 18-24 have an additional two months with the PES than they 
did with the NDYP, older clients over the age of 25 have their period with Jobcentre Plus reduced by six 
months to unify the system. On this evidence therefore, the Flexible New Deal is continuing the trend of 
the state incrementally withdrawing from the delivery of employment programmes for the vast majority 
of long-term unemployed.  
With the extension of the Gateway for clients under 25 and the contraction for those over 25, the FND 
also changed the conditionality regime. For the over 25s who were used to longer periods of the 
(relatively) passive jobsearch regime, enhanced conditionality arrived six months earlier than under the 
New Deal for Long Term Unemployed (or ND25+). Figure 6.2 illustrates that the conditionality regime 
has been enhanced for all customers. 
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Figure 6.2 Stages of Flexible New Deal 
 
Source: Work and Pensions Select Committee625 
As seen in Figure 5.1, once a client has exhausted their time with the Jobcentre they move on to stage 
four, and the Flexible New Deal begins. It is this stage that represents the fundamental shake-up of the 
welfare system by contracting out employment services for those out of work for a year.  Before a 
discussion of the market takes place, there is a need for clarification of what customers could expect 
from the fourth stage beyond ‘personalised support’.  
 
What is in the black box?  
If individuals (now referred to as customers) have not found employment after 52 weeks, they are 
transferred onto the Flexible New Deal, which lasts up to another minimum of 52 weeks. There is the 
possibility to extend FND provision beyond a year, to an additional 26 with the consent of both 
customer and provider. After their first 52 weeks on the Jobseekers Allowance, customers leave the 
Jobcentre Plus and are allocated (randomly or deliberately) to a private or voluntary sector ‘prime 
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contractor’.626 What occurs during this stage varies is contingent on the capabilities and structures of 
the individual provider, with the general consent of the Department of Work and Pensions. Discussed as 
a ‘black box’ approach Mulhearn and Menne explain its possible advantages as follows: 
 
The ‘black box approach’ of FND means that there are very few process requirements 
on the contractor. Rather, they are allowed the freedom to try different approaches to 
getting people back to work. The combination of few restrictions and outcome-based 
payment gives contractors strong incentives to find out what works best for each 
client.627  
 
The FND does not allow delivery organizations absolute discretion with respect to the program of 
activities. A number of processes are explicitly mandated to ensure a degree of quality control, and to 
ensure that customers are required to participate in some form of activity. These are explained in the 
statutory instruments where they were introduced, mandating that the FND customers experience on 
or more of the following: 
 
(aa) assisting in the completion of an action plan to record the activity that 
he will undertake whilst attending the programme in order to improve 
his employment prospects or to obtain employment 
(bb) a work placement, training or other work-related activity lasting for a 
continuous period of at least four weeks; 
(cc) other work experience or training, guidance, support, motivation, 
assistance with job search or in pursuing self-employed earner’s 
employment or other activity designed to assist him to select, train for, 
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obtain and retain suitable employment.628 
 
In detailed guidelines intended for the delivery organisations, the DWP set out the minimal programme 
requirements for the FND. The general guidance and demands were as follows:  
 
‘It is for you to assess and decide the best training and support tailored to the customer’s 
individual needs. During this time we expect that:  
 You will invite customers to a face-to-face initial meeting, ensuring the customer is aware 
of possible sanction activity if they fail to attend. When the customer attends, you will 
undertake an individual assessment to assess their needs, agree an action plan and notify 
JCP of their start;  
 If a customer fails to attend/ comply/ participate, or if the customer’s actions bring about 
doubts of their entitlement to JSA, you will consider if a referral to JCP for sanction activity 
is appropriate;  
 You undertake meaningful fortnightly contact with each customer;  
 You will ensure that every customer undertakes a minimum of four weeks continuous full-
time work-related activity within their 52 weeks of participation if the customer has not 
previously had at least four weeks continuous full-time paid work since starting FND.’629 
  
It was with the fourth requirement that the DWP have written workfare into the contracts.630 The 
purpose of this regulation could be threefold. First, it serves as a threat of the type described in Chapter 
3.  Second, it ensures customers have, after 52 weeks, at least something on their CV.  Third, it prevents 
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the parking of customers who are furthest from the labour market, as appeared to be occurring in 
previous programmes.631  Indeed as workfare tends to be expensive, and the costs will be borne by 
providers, it provides an additional incentive to assist all of the caseload.  
 
Putting aside the workfare regulation, requirements on providers were intended to be minimal. This 
should not imply the ‘black box’ left the DWP unaware or uninterested in what their suppliers were 
doing. Though the DWP resisted instructing providers from the outset what practices (beyond those 
above) were expected of them, the awarding of contracts was made on the basis of providers’ 
submitted plans. These detailed how different customers were to treated, and what services were to be 
provided (either directly by the provider or indirectly via sub-contractors). These submissions would 
inform the DWP’s contracting decisions,632 and also providers were expected to stick to them.  
Commonalities amongst all prime contractors were to be expected. As explained in the following 
chapter, the processes undertaken by contractors were very similar to those of Jobcentre Plus during 
the Gateway phase, and providers of Employment Zones, including intensive jobsearch supported by 
sanctions, CV redrafting, practice interviews and work experience. 
 
Given these commonalities, an obvious question arises as to the necessity of contracting at all. For 
instance, why could Jobcentre Plus and local government not deliver a ‘black-box’ system? This very 
question was put to Employment Minister Tony McNulty before the House of Commons Work and 
Pensions committee. This was his response:  
 
I do not doubt that it could [deliver the ‘black box’ system] but I am told that we would 
probably be here about two or three years just going through the legislation to get us from 
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where Jobcentre Plus is now to a period of absolute individualisation and specialisation, literally 
building a package around each and every individual, and I do not think that there is merit in 
that.633 
The apparent, relative, ease of contracting over legislating appears to provide the sufficient positive 
feedback mechanism necessary to enshrine the path towards more private involvement in employment 
programmes.  
 
(Re) inventing the Quasi-market  
The deployment of a quasi-market in employment services with ‘black box’ regulation was not a 
novelty; both were used for the contracting arrangements of Employment Zones. Unique to the Flexible 
New Deal was the scale of the undertaking- no quasi-market in national provision had existed for such a 
large proportion of the unemployed. 
 
The decision to proceed with a market of such a scale was nonetheless courageous, particularly given 
the architect’s remark that ‘there is no conclusive evidence that the private sector outperforms the 
public sector on current programmes’634  and the junior minister in charge noting that ‘the evidence 
base for public provision versus private and voluntary provision is limited.’635 Further still, the UK’s 
experience of privatisation was mixed at best. As Hasluck explained, experiments with private delivery 
have proven problematic, with the DWP’s preferred performance indicators showing that private sector 
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led delivery had proven relatively poor.636   
 
Despite the concerns, the DWP had invested considerable time and money building up a welfare market 
and experimenting with contracted delivery.  For the DWP, Employment Zones had proven that 
government could work with private sector providers, and that the private sector could deliver whole 
programmes, and in some cases at least as effectively as the state, if not more so.637  
 
The Flexible New Deal market, like EZs, sees the government retaining primary financial responsibility 
for the programme as purchaser of the services, and delivery is supplied by the private and voluntary 
sectors. As with Employment Zones in the UK, and the Job Network in Australia, suppliers will earn a 
proportion of their income by achieving specified employment outcomes. 
To allow for competition between a large number of providers, the DWP carved up the UK into 28 
different areas, known as Contract Zones. Phase 1 of the roll out established delivery contracts in 14 of 
these areas, with Phase 2 expected to implement the remaining 14 contracts in October 2010. These 
contracts tendered were to be larger and longer than had previously been issued by the DWP, and for 
two reasons. One, it was believed that larger ‘prime contractors’ could deliver the capital and 
economies of scale in ways previous programmes could not.  Second, the DWP was looking for ways 
they could to reduce the vast number of contracts they had to oversee.638  As the Work and Pensions 
Committee iterate, the large prime contractor model was familiar to the DWP, having used it with both 
New Deal for Young People and Employment Zones; the difference was that such a model was to be 
implemented across the entire country.639 With fewer contractors operating a national programme 
across wide geographical boundaries, it should be easier for the DWP to determine contractor 
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performance, rather than having to assess hundreds of small contracts.   
 
Subcontractors were to play little role in the bidding for contracts, but a significant role in delivering the 
Flexible New Deal. The terms of these relationships were largely dictated by the prime contractors and 
not the DWP. As such by design the prospects for smaller contractors was to become dependent on the 
primes for business rather than the DWP. This did not mean that business was consumed entirely by the 
primes; rather relationships were often developed between the prime bidders and subcontractors as 
part of the bidding process.    
 
The contracting process was itself achieved through a private auction. Sealed bids were submitted to 
the DWP outlining the services, costs and employment outcome each provider believed they could 
deliver in each region they bid for. In Phase 1, of the 14 contract zones 10 were designated dual 
contract zones. In Phase 2, nine of the 14 Contract Zones were designated dual contract areas.640 In dual 
contract areas bids were awarded to two providers and these ‘prime contractors’ were expected to 
compete with each other over outcomes and costs, and inevitably future contracts. A single contractor 
ran the four remaining Phase 1 zones, with the commercial pressure principally being the prospect of 
future DWP contracts. The change of government in May 2010 heralded the end of FND contracting for 
Phase 2.  However, as contracts had already been commenced in Phase 1 areas, these remained in place 
until new policy was legislated and transitional arrangements were brought into force.641  
 
While auctioning is common practice in tendering public services, the decision to auction the FND 
contracts was not without its critics.  Mulheirn and Menne argued that such a system creates a race to 
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the bottom, where ‘the more ambitious the bidding prime contractor, in terms of the anticipated 
number of outcomes it will achieve, the less money it will have to spend on each client’.642  
As an attempt to mitigate the ‘promise high – achieve low’ problem, two key targets have been built 
into the financial remuneration to ensure basic programme objectives are achieved. The performance 
expectations are for 55% of their annual clients to have achieved a ‘Short Job Outcome’ (13 weeks of 
employment) and for 50% to achieve a ‘Sustained Job Outcome’ (26 weeks of employment).643i These 
targets are ambitious; between the years of 2004 and 2008, the NDYP achieved average job outcomes 
of 39%, sustained or otherwise.644 The DWP however recognised that the deteriorating state of the 
labour market and the considerable differentiation between local labour markets means that these 
targets constitute a national average, where some will be higher and others lower. 
Outturn of Market Design and Black Box  
The DWP had hoped for a variety of delivery methods amongst the prime providers, classified by the 
degree of control the provider exerted over the entire Flexible New Deal process.  In some instances, 
the primary contractor took a backseat, principally of managing a complex supply chain of 
subcontractors.  Other contractors chose to deliver all services in house. Armstrong et al. found that the 
most common approach from the contract process ‘consist[ed] of a proportion of programmes and 
services delivered directly by the prime provider with the remainder delivered by subcontractors.’645  
Of the 14 prime providers delivering the Flexible New Deal, the majority delivered the bulk of services 
for the mainstream unemployed, though this was done using a significant variation in the structure of 
delivery.646  Under this model, subcontractors were deployed where clients appeared to have more 
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complex obstacles to their labour market entry such as; drug addiction, alcoholism, or emotional, 
physical, or mental difficulties. In a similar vein, where contracts were to be delivered in largely rural 
areas the volume of subcontracting was usually higher.647  
The contracting arrangements would accordingly influence the typical journey of the customer through 
the programme. Where subcontracting was a core part of the contractor’s approach, the customer’s 
time on FND would likely be divided into different stages of support, and the individual would pass 
through different suppliers; usually starting with the prime’s ‘in-house’ arrangements, and then would 
be referred for specialist support where necessary.  In some respects this fulfils the government’s desire 
to centre welfare-to-work services around individual clients, but how personalised this would be in 
reality would depend on what was in each ‘black box’.   
Additional Market Drivers: Star Ratings, Market-Sharing and Choice  
The tendering process was designed to introduce a market and some base standards into the FND. 
However, the tender itself is not sufficient to ensure quality services are implemented once the contract 
was issued. To compensate for this problem the DWP included a number of additional mechanisms to 
ensure that standards could be maintained throughout the lifetime of the contract, without the need to 
introduce market regulations.  The first of these consisted of direct checks on services by the UK schools 
inspectorate, Ofsted. According to the DWP Ofsted were to ‘[undertake] independent assurance of the 
quality of what is being provided against their own frameworks so we [DWP] have got assurance that 
the quality of the systems that the providers are using are also up to the levels that are viewed as being 
acceptable.’648 Inspections, in particular spot-checks, were designed to identify both good and bad 
practice. The use of Ofsted was a curious decision, given that the emphasis of active labour market 
policy in general, but particularly under the Flexible New Deal, has moved away from providing 
education and training in favour of the work first approach.  Perhaps this was recognised as not long 
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after FND implementation, Ofsted was replaced with the DWP’s own inspectorate. The DWP’s 
inspectorate were charged with ‘the remit to cover, in a light-touch way, some of the quality issues that 
formed part of external inspections’ alongside a new system of self-assessment.649 Whatever is thought 
of Ofsted, the decision to switch from a body required to provide publically available inspection reports, 
to an internal DWP inspectorate contradicts one of the purposes of contracting services: to provide 
greater accountability. None of these internal reports have been made available, and thus it is difficult 
to assess whether this is sufficient to ensure the quality of services.  
The inspection results were to be used to form a part of the Star Ratings system. Like Michelin stars, 
these were to publicise the quality of individual suppliers.   Providers were to be rated on a scale 
running between 1-4 Stars.  The score of contractors was decided principally on the number of clients 
the provider historically placed in employment.  In addition to historic placement records the Star rating 
incorporated quality measurements, such as (originally) Ofsted reports and customer surveys.650 The 
ratings had a number of possible implications, the first, that a company’s Star Rating would influence 
the DWP’s decision to increase/decrease the flow of participants to the provider; with more participants 
(theoretically) the more employment outcomes could be gained, and therefore more profit.651 Initially 
to protect smaller contractors, foster innovation, and stabilise the new welfare market the DWP 
introduced a fixed market share (bandwidth) where the two contractors received half of the caseload 
each. Using a range of data including Star Ratings, the prime contractor could be allotted additional 5% 
more customers by the DWP if it rated the contractor as providing an outstanding set of services.652 The 
DWP summarized their plan as follows: ‘We will incentivise suppliers to improve performance by 
moving market share from poorer performers to stronger performers. More market share for a supplier 
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means the potential to deliver their services to more customers’,653 and most obviously to make more 
money.  
 
Star Ratings also had the potential to be used as indicators of future contracting decisions, while 
shaming contractors with low ratings to improve their performance and the quality of services. This was 
because it was assumed that, as with Employment Zones, the ratings of each prime provider would be 
publically available. In sum, the Star Ratings and market allocation tool offer incentives for providers to 
maintain standards in a deregulated ‘black box’ market. 
Customer Choice  
The final tool to control and incentivise quality consisted of customer choice. Allowing customers to 
choose their welfare to work provider is at the cutting edge of the personalisation agenda, and like Star 
Ratings were piloted in the Employment Zones. Choice would top-up market share offering a further 
potential increase in the allocation of the caseload. After 12 months, participants (or perhaps 
‘customers’) in dual contract areas were to be asked to select their FND provider. 
In the early stages, the share of customers was to remain fixed to a 50:50 split, so those choosing might 
not get their preference, but after several years, choice could facilitate market dominance, where 
market share could increase to 70% or fall to 30%.654 This is a significant step in the UK welfare to work 
market, because through the combined mechanisms of choice and payment by outcomes, the money 
can follow the customer. As with real markets, providers offering services customers do not want could 
be punished by a fall in ‘customers’, and forced to find ways to attract participants again; another 
potential incentive to improve  the quality and appropriateness of services offered.  
To ensure all individuals were active, the DWP automatically allocated customers to a provider if they 
failed to exercise a choice on their own.  The risks associated with automatic allocation are similar to the 
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criticisms levelled at the secondary school selection process, where the parents not making a choice for 
their children are more likely to end up in a poorer performing school. Allocating those not making a 
choice to the weaker supplier may magnify contractor results and distort the assessment process. This is 
because those not making a selection tend to be furthest from the labour market655 and the way that 
choice was based upon Star Ratings, the practitioner with the smaller market share could be more likely 
to be allocated the harder to help, or less engaged clients. The DWP may take comfort from the 
Australian experiments with choice, where, few clients used this criterion as the basis of their 
decisions.656 Nevertheless, should clients decide to ignore the Star Ratings system and opt to select the 
weaker supplier en masse, the DWP have said it will protect the better performing practitioner’s market 
share and terminate consumer choice.657 
The combination of customer choice, inspections and Star Ratings were formulated to maintain quality 
in a deregulated welfare market to prevent corner cutting and the ‘parking’ of harder to help clients, 
which non-discriminatory outcome payments reportedly incentivise.658  
Views on Market Management Measures 
There was a range of views concerning the government’s interventions in the market post-tendering. 
Some, such as the Social Market Foundation, considered that it might serve the competitive market and 
customer better were the Department to regulate further, for example with a system to differentiate 
between types of customers to prevent ‘parking’ and ‘creaming’, or imposing fines on contractors for 
each jobseeker who remains unemployed after the allotted year.659 
Gingerbread, a third-sector organisation specialising in single-parent families, were unconvinced by 
quality control measures and prospects for a good customer experience, and argued for the 
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establishment of a local, independent ombudsman within each region, who would be tasked with 
investigating complaints about unfair, discriminatory, or degrading treatment by flexible New Deal 
providers.’660 
 
Providers approached participant choice with mixed degrees of enthusiasm. For instance, Serco 
submitted a memorandum to the Work and Pensions Committee stating:  
Customer choice is only meaningful where there are distinguishable alternatives from which to 
choose. The characteristics of effective welfare to work provision are really quite simple – it is 
the provision of a capable and motivated Personal Advisor. Given this simplicity, there is often 
little to choose between the providers.661 
Reed, another major contractor, had doubts that customer choice would drive performance, largely due 
to fears that while some customers might utilise the information given to them about different 
providers, such as Star Ratings and reputation, others might make decisions ‘based solely on issues such 
as the proximity of the nearest office.’662   
 
Those contractors less sceptical of ‘on paper’ choice have nonetheless expressed public concern over 
the systems of consumer choice the DWP have chosen to implement. Austin Hardy from the Wise Group 
(one of the FND contractors) told the Committee on Work and Pensions that ‘Jobcentre Plus will refer 
you to one of two providers, 50/50. It is not really a choice, you will be allocated to one or the other.’663  
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Summarily, when governments encourage welfare-to-work provider outcomes  by the profit motive, in 
an regulatory environment where process requirements are minimal perverse incentives are inevitable. 
‘Creaming’ and ‘Parking’ are specific risks in this environment, but generally there is the recognition that 
a set of minimum standards must be enforced to maintain quality across the board. Whether the 
measures of choice, inspections and Star Ratings fulfilled the DWP’s aspirations of high quality services 
and the application of minimum standards of provision for all jobseekers will be explored in the 
forthcoming chapter.   
 
Projected Costs 
The final aspect of the Flexible New Deal for consideration is the level of  estimating the costs of 
outcome-based contracting has difficulties, because the programme is predominantly based on 
outcome incentives, the more jobseekers the contractors move into sustained employment, the more 
the programme will cost (gross) the taxpayer. As the National Audit Office highlight however, the more 
individuals who move into and remain in work the larger the return on investment the government can 
yield. 664 This section will examine the projected costs for the programme as a whole, and the unit costs 
for moving individuals into work.  
Projected Outcomes 
When the government initially tendered the contracts for the Flexible New Deal, the maximum 
predicted cost for Phase 1 was £236 million per annum; had Phase 2 been commissioned the combined 
projected annual expenditure could have been up to £600 million per annum. Assuming targets are 
achieved (at 55% and 50% of starts into sustained employment) the expenditure on Phase 1 would 
actually fall closer to the £147 million pounds per annum range.  
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The way contractors are paid however is more complicated that it first appears. First, as a consequence 
of the capital requirements associated with start up costs, a proportion of the contract money is paid 
up-front through service fees. Service fees are paid at 20% of total contract value, so at 20% of £236 
million per annum totals just over £47million per year in service fees would be paid to contractors over 
a seven-year period. However, the stipulation is that 58% of the annual contract value will be paid as 
service fees in the first six months of the contract, 32% in the next six months and in years 2, 3 and 4, 
service fees of 13.8% of the annual contract value will be paid in service fees, with nothing in years 6 
and 7.665  The below table indicates how the programme was to be capitalised with service fees: 
 
 
Table 6.1 Projected Service Fee Outlay During Contract Years at 20% 
 
Stage of Programme Service Fee 
Months 0-6 £137.22 million 
Months 7-12 £75.708 million 
Year 2 £32.64 million 
Year 3 £32.64 million 
Year 4 £32.64 million 
Year 5 £32.64 million 
Year 6 £0 
Year 7 £0 
TOTAL £343.448 million 
Source: Adapted from DWP Invitation to Tender666  
Upfront fees were designed to help companies finance initial programme costs, such as building 
administrative capacity, IT systems and other initial expenses, but principally the frontloading of fees 
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alleviates the significant pressure on contractors in the early stages of the programme, because it will 
take at least 3 and 6 months respectively to earn any outcome based payments.667 Nevertheless, the 
arrangement created an odd incentive.  For instance, if, providers moved all people into sustained work 
would in year one they could earn between them £236million. However, because of the service fee 
structure, in during year one, companies would have been paid 89% of the total contract value without 
moving a single individual into work. As the table shows however, it also incentivises long-term planning 
because fees quickly disappear over the life of the contract. It would therefore only be problematic if 
the programme was cancelled, or the provider exited the market, early on.   
 
The total expenditure portrays a substantial investment on the government’s part in welfare to work. 
When calculated on a per participant basis, using the projected number of participants and contract 
values from the Invitation to Tender, the expenditure is £1577 per FND starter. 668 As Table 6.2 shows, 
when compared to other private sector-led programmes the Flexible New Deal is potentially generous. 
Table 6.2 Cost of Flexible New Deal Compared to Legacy Programmes 
ALMP Expenditure Per Participant 
EZ NDYP £1,296 
EZ ND25+ £1,167 
EZ NDLP £1,265 
PSL NDYP £1,177 
PSL ND25+ £1,177 
Flexible New Deal £1,577 (potential) 
 
Source: Adapted from House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee Data 669 
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Calculated as the cost per achieved sustained outcome a significantly different picture emerges. The 
Social Market foundation calculated that per 13 Week Outcome the Flexible New Deal would actually 
cost in the region of £2,800.670 £2,800 per Short Outcome may appear a large amount of money, but 
participants in the Flexible New Deal are those furthest from the labour market, largely the least 
employable individuals in their age group. Many will have limited experience of paid work and the 
majority will lack good qualifications. Attempting to integrate these individuals with the labour market 
is therefore expensive. Moreover, when compared with other employment programmes such as the 
Employment Zones experiment, the costs-per-outcome appear optimistic. Using the same calculations, 
the Social Market Foundation suggested that the Employment Zones initiative was significantly more 
expensive at £5110 per 13 week Outcomes. Indeed, the Employment Zones cost figure was in respect of 
13 week sustainment, whereas FND providers, albeit with more time to work with clients, are expected 
to achieve both short and sustained job outcomes. This led the Social Market Foundation to conclude 
that FND contractors are asked to do much more on a much smaller budget.671 Clearly therefore the 
DWP believe that there are significant efficiencies that could be found in the welfare-to-work market.  
Whether this strategy will work hinges on the question of what level of investment is necessary to yield 
employment outcomes. If the DWP are correct, then they will have successfully identified a new 
benchmark for achieving employment outcomes at a lower cost. If the level of investment is inadequate 
however, the DWP are likely find that a) they will not meet their ambitious targets, and b) the quality of 
service received by individual jobseekers may suffer.  
Quantifying the ‘Step Change’ 
The Flexible New Deal includes many elements that the literature associates with success, including 
operating as a work-first regime to attach people rapidly to the labour market and providing incentives 
for companies to achieve sustained outcomes (thus potentially mitigating the ‘carousel’ effect of where 
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the unemployed often cycle between short period of work and benefit receipt). This design should work 
in the customers’ favour, as providers should be incentivised to find work appropriate to programme 
participant, so that they are more likely to wish to remain in it. The Flexible New Deal also operates 
within a strong conditionality framework, reinforced by sanctions for refusing compliance or work 
opportunities. This should help to reduce the number of spurious claimants, drive down benefit receipt 
and ensure customers submit to programme elements and opportunities the provider believes will be in 
their best interest. A further element that has been integrated into the FND is the use of outcomes-
based contracting, which according to the literature may deliver results similar to the Public Sector, but 
possibly at a lower cost. The presence of these features offers grounds for optimism that on the chief 
objective of moving people off benefits into sustained work, the programme may be appropriately 
designed.  
In order to come to some understanding of the performance levels that expected from the FND, 
comparisons with similar existing programmes were necessary.  Private sector delivery had already 
been established in the employment delivery sector, and as the previous chapter noted, Employment 
Zones were one of the models used to inform the Flexible New Deal and establish its performance 
expectations.672 In recognition of the similarities of the two initiatives,673 the DWP argued that ‘These 
[performance] estimates were based in part upon the best performing Employment Zone contracts but 
also reflect a considered view of what DWP thinks FND providers should be able to achieve, using their 
skills and the innovation that the new approach allows for.’674 The DWP contend that the best EZ 13 
week performance was 38%, and that this is the starting point for the FND.675  
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The added performance pushing FND expectations beyond the 38%, and thus contributing to the ‘step 
change’ in performance were modelled on a number of factors outlined by the DWP to potential 
providers. These include extended programme length, earlier access for some jobseekers, and the fact 
that FND is a national programme.676 The sum of these factors amount to a performance boost of 13% 
above EZs, i.e. 51% of FND Starts should be entering 13 weeks of continuous employment.677 The final 
4% to bring outcomes to target is cited as a ‘performance boost’, but explained no further.678 Thus, if 
the expectations are realised, the FND ‘step change’ should be equivalent to shifting 17 more individuals 
for every 100 starting the programme above that achieved by the Employment Zones. This is ambitious, 
and unlikely for a number of reasons.   
Using best performances is a risk for establishing national performance targets, as the next chapter will 
show, there is significant volatility in outcomes and even variation between weaker labour markets. The 
yearly 13-week outcomes for EZ25+ are shown in table 6.3 as an example. Had the DWP used the total 
annual outcomes of the best performing part of Employment Zones, as Table 6.3 shows, they would 
have established lower, more realistic targets. Using ‘best in contract’ data is likely to manufacture 
artificially high expectations, whereas the total EZ25+ programme performance suggests that, through 
good and poor periods a performance of around the 30% mark might have been the minimum 
achievable annual outcome level for similar ALMP. To reach the FND targets performance against the 
mean of the annual EZ25+ outcomes would have required an increase by just short of 90%.  
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Table 6.3 Employment Zones 25+ 13 Week Sustainment as percentage of Starts (Spells)  
Year 13 Week Outcomes as % of 
Starts 
2000 14.7 
2001 32.9 
2002 31.3 
2003 31.8 
2004 40.7 
2005 28.7 
2006 26.7 
2007 28.3 
2008 27.9 
Mean 29.2 
 
  
Source: Adapted from DWP Statistics Hub679  
 
The DWP assumptions are problematic for a number of other reasons.  For one, the DWP assumptions 
are based on the performance of only one part of the Employment Zones initiative, for participants over 
25 (EZ25+). As the invitation to tender recognises, ‘the performance expectations for the Flexible New 
Deal are for all customer groups’680, and thus, the outcomes of all Employment Zones together must be 
taken into account to judge performance expectations, rather than the best performing aspect. The 
figures for this are lower, at a mean of 24% for all participants between 2000 and 2008.681 Even with the 
above factors taken into account, if the results continued along EZ lines, the Flexible New Deal would 
only be achieving 61% of its target, with 34% of Starts achieving 13 week outcomes.   
 
An equally substantial challenge is the assumption of the conversion rate (the proportion of participants 
turning a 13-week employment spell into one lasting 26 weeks). The performance expectations laid 
down by the DWP assume that 91% of all starters who achieve a 13-week outcome will remain in 
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employment for 26 weeks of a 30 week period.682 This conversion rate did not materialise in any other 
employment programme. In table 5.1 of the previous chapter the conversion rate for Employment 
Zones was around 70% and falling, and for New Deals was approximately 45%. Such a growth in 
performance is also unlikely because survey work undertaken for the DWP suggests that one of the 
principle reasons for the unemployed returning to benefit is because the nature of the work taken is 
temporary. 48% of respondent in a sample of 2,725 jobseekers cited the reason for returning to JSA was 
that their temporary work had come to an end,683 and the tendency for this to occur rose amongst 
those who had been on Jobseeker’s Allowance multiple times. The author argues that the ‘findings 
confirm that temporary work has a prominent impact on the causes of recycling through JSA.’684 The 
implication is that the nature of work in the UK labour market that is a significant explanation for the 
carousel effect. Thus, financial incentives for companies to maintain labour market attachment may 
therefore not be enough to resolve the sustainability problem, even with more realistic conversion 
targets.  
 
The adjustments necessary for comparison will be discussed in detail in the results chapter, but at this 
stage it is necessary to reiterate that outcomes of this magnitude had at no point been achieved 
consistently in the UK.  This was stressed by the House of Commons Work and Pensions Select 
Committee, who concluded: 
 
It is right that DWP should attach challenging targets to the Flexible New Deal (FND) programme 
but it is important that these are realistic. Evidence to us suggested that the FND targets would 
require a 37.5% improvement in job outcome performance over what has been achieved by 
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DWP contractors in the past and this is to be done with a significant reduction in funding 
compared to the best performing DWP programmes.685 
 
As argued by the Committee, there is a clear risk that government may be disappointed by FND 
employment outcomes. Predictably a number of those bidding for contracts complained that the 
financial model was not viable they were expected to deliver more than before with significantly less 
resources.686 Their grievances became increasing relevant as recession began to bite in 2008 and 
unemployment increased.687 In an interview with the Guardian, the managing director at  Serco 
predicted that unemployment would at least double during the recession,688 leading to the fear that the 
numbers joining the FND would balloon while the reward remained fixed. The economic situation, and 
the pressure from providers forced the DWP to revise both the contracts and its own expectations of 
programme outputs as several applicants withdrew from bidding in a number of contract zones.689 
Soft Outcomes  
The primary object of FND was to improve transitions to, and retention of, employment. However, it 
had potential for positive impacts in other areas. As with Employment Zones, services could be tailored 
more towards the individual needs and expectations of the client, where customers will be able to enjoy 
more tailored solutions to their employment barriers, for longer periods, than those  a ’one-size-fits-all’ 
national scheme. The Child Poverty Action Group suggests that customer’s tend to prefer private sector 
operations than those of the state, indicating that:  
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It seems that private providers in particular may have access to resources that allow the 
creation of a comfortable environment for jobseekers. Along with this, private companies 
seem to use methods of dealing with jobseekers that make people feel respected and 
confident that the provider is making serious efforts to assist in finding a suitable job.690 
The outcome-based financial arrangements may also be capable of ensuring that the customer’s needs 
and career ambitions are taken more into account. With a new emphasis on longer-term employment 
targets of six months, it may ensure that the provider considers longer and harder the type of 
employment that is being considered for the customer: knowing that the client will like the job, or the 
financial benefits accrued from it, increases the chances of it being sustained. This may also prevent the 
private companies coercing customers into seasonable employment which by nature is temporary, thus 
entrenching the carousel effect, preventing opportunities for promotion, and in any case much of the 
seasonal work tends to be of low quality and pay. Despite the emphasis on the ‘personal’, there is 
considerable risk that the financial structure facilitates a number of perverse incentives, where the 
‘black box’ may lead to a good experience for some customers, but poor treatment for others. As the 
Social Market Foundation stress 
Uniform outcome payments encourage providers to ignore, or park, the hardest-to-help clients. 
In practice, this means directing only minimal resources towards helping any client where the 
costs associated with finding them work are expected to exceed the outcome payments in case 
of success. Parking is therefore a concern from a social justice perspective, since some people 
will receive only minimal help from the contractor when they should, arguably, be entitled to at 
least the same level of support, if not support proportionate to their needs.691 
 
The minimum service requirements may not be adequate to prevent a poor level of support for those 
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most in need of it. The standards of service received are addressed through direct interviews with 
former customers.  
In sum, there are grounds for optimism that FND will achieve better results than those before it, as a 
larger cohort of customers will have access to services tailored to support them over a longer period. 
The conditionality regime, if enforced, should be sufficiently robust to ensure compliance with activities, 
such as jobsearch, which the literature review reported, accelerate labour market transitions. However, 
the programme’s design carries a number of risks, principally that it is subject to the conditions of the 
labour market. With the UK entering recession during the FND implementation, the very optimistic 
targets are even less likely.  The more difficult these outcomes are to achieve, there is an increased 
likelihood of a knock on effect on the quality of services provided, in particular for those furthest from 
the labour market.  
Conclusion 
The Flexible New Deal represents an evolution of welfare-to-work in the UK, not a revolution. Looking 
back over the last few decades of welfare policy under Conservative and Labour governments, the use 
of conditionality and contracting-out have developed in increments. Much of the structure of FND 
existed in the New Deals and Employment Zones programmes, and many of the features of these 
programmes were running in programmes developed under past administrations. 
 
This is not to underestimate the achievement of such a programme – deploying a welfare market of this 
scale, where one has never existed before, is an impressive administrative feat. With the 
implementation of Flexible New Deal the Labour Government had created a work-first programme of 
unprecedented conditionality, and privatised a significant proportion of support for the unemployed. 
With both strong conditionality and privatisation traditionally (and continuously) associated with the 
Conservative party, there is an apparent Westminster consensus about the directional future of active 
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labour market programmes in the UK.692 The eventual consensus amongst the upper echelons of 
Britain’s political elite does not however vindicate the Flexible New Deal approach. For one, the 
application of mandatory, contracted-out work-first carries significant risks both technical and political 
in nature.   
 
The technical aspects concern a tension in the personalisation agenda. The work-first strategy fits 
comfortably with basic reintegration methods to overcome simple defects in the participants’ 
employment profiles, but  the ‘any job is a good job’ modus operandi within the one-size-fits-all funding 
approach entrenched by FND financial arrangements both encourages and inhibits the private sector to 
consider individual needs, capabilities and career aspirations of their customers.  
In accordance with the path dependency outlined in Chapter 4, the narrowing supply-side approach of 
mandatory work-first delivered by contracted agents further shifts the responsibility for unemployment 
away from the state and onto the individual and the market. In doing so this approach leaves the state’s 
objectives of higher employment and lower benefit receipt vulnerable to the conditions of the labour 
market. In a buoyant market, this can accelerate transitions by reducing frictional unemployment, but in 
the recessionary climate, compulsory jobsearch and work related activities may be futile without 
sufficient vacancy destinations. Such conditions also pose challenges for fostering a sufficiently 
competitive market because under the current financial arrangements the majority of provider income 
is derived from outcomes. If there are not the quantity of destinations available in the labour market for 
companies to meet these outcome targets, the state is either paying providers to do nothing, or is 
risking market failure.693  
This problem was compounded by the fact that funds available were inadequate for an investment in 
human capital, or job creation of any scale. Under the relatively tight funding arrangements, the 
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competing companies were to be forced to adopt the cheapest methods of reintegration such as 
intensive jobsearch, mentoring and small-scale training in order to achieve  profit. Even in a buoyant 
labour market, FND targets would have been highly challenging with the given resources. In a tight 
labour market where jobs are not readily available and profit margins are consequently very small, the 
quality of services rendered would be under pressure.    
The contracting-out of the FND also created a series of political problems. The first concerns 
accountability. On the one hand, introducing individual contractors to an area of policy traditionally 
dominated by a state monopoly could have improved accountability through the increasing the 
transparency of welfare to work. The competitive market should illuminate which providers performed 
well, and which did not, while in a state monopoly performance comparisons may be more difficult to 
discern. However, citing evidence from the Australian and Dutch programmes, Finn warns that 
‘Contracting out [...]  fragments programme responsibility among multiple contractors, changes the 
relationship between those who design policy and those who deliver front-line services, and blurs lines 
of responsibility and accountability.’694 Firstly, legislative oversight has been diluted in the contracting 
process. The legislation needed to implement the Flexible New Deal was limited, and generally 
amended existing social security legislation to incorporate the new FND conditionality framework. The 
general structure of the programme could therefore be achieved without substantive primary 
legislation, as the programme was to be delivered through contracted agents rather than statutory 
public bodies. Secondly, knowing where ‘the buck stops’ is increasingly difficult, where blame can be 
passed between the state and contracted agents.  
A final problem of substance linked to accountability is transparency. There is a considerable tension in 
contracting-out as the conduct of for-profit business often involves a necessary degree of secrecy in 
order to maintain an edge over competitors; deals and contracting arrangements are therefore opaque 
                                                          
694
 Finn, D. (2008) The British Welfare Market: Lessons From Contracting Out Welfare to Work Programmes in Australia and the 
Netherlands, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, London p5 
226 
 
if not completely confidential. This has been reflected in the winding up of the Flexible New Deal 
contracts, where confidentiality clauses have prohibited FND providers from informing the Public 
Accounts Committee the extent of compensation awarded to them at the point of contract 
termination.695 Without the capacity to scrutinise detail, or in this case even establish public 
expenditure, the task for politicians to make informed judgements concerning the quality of their own 
policies is impossible.  
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CHAPTER 7 Flexible New Deal Results and Analysis  
 
 
This chapter will evaluate the efficacy of the Flexible New Deal. It will do so in stages, beginning with a 
review of the Flexible New Deal against national targets assigned to it by the government. The second 
stage reviews the Flexible New Deal’s performance against comparable welfare to work programmes 
the FND was intended to replace, and thus addressing the second question. The third stage involves 
examining the local labour market performance of competing contractors in each contract, and the 
labour market variables determining their performance, addressing the two supplementary questions. 
The final stage will examine the resources of the programme to determine whether the financing of FND 
explains its performance, addressing the second part of the primary question. 
 
McConnell, in appraising the success or failure of public policy, stated that the ‘first basis, and the one 
most in line with the formalities of policy processes is [the] original intentions.’696 For this project policy-
makers have clearly outlined the objectives for the Flexible New Deal in the format of five critical 
success factors (CSF) circulated to all of the selected delivery organisations: 
 
1. Suppliers will meet or exceed the Short Job Outcome targets (13 weeks employment) 
agreed in their contract;  
2. Suppliers will meet or exceed the Sustained Job Outcome
 
targets (26 weeks employment) 
agreed in their contract;  
3. Suppliers will ensure every customer receives a level and type of support appropriate to 
their individual needs, including those customers with more substantial or specialist needs;  
4. Suppliers will deliver a service that represents excellent value for money and a step-change 
improvement in performance compared with previous programmes;  
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5. Suppliers will deliver high quality provision to all customers in line with the DWP Quality 
Framework and achieve high standards at external inspection by developing their 
continuous improvement strategy in line with the relevant Common Inspection 
Framework.697 
 
Critical success factors 1, 2 and 4 are germane to the core research question because the FND job 
outcome targets exceeded those achieved by the legacy policies discussed in Chapter 5. The fourth CSF 
is in effect the primary research question – as it demands suppliers achieve ‘a step change improvement 
in performance compared with previous programmes.’ The other two factors, three and five, are 
beyond the scope of this thesis for two reasons; first, they are not directly related to either primary or 
sub-questions. Second, both are subject to review by other bodies, where the third factor is part of an 
ongoing research project by the Policy Studies Institute on behalf of the Department of Work and 
Pensions the fifth factor was an internal review procedure, the results of which have not yet been made 
public.  
 
Analytical Approach 
The methodology utilises data published by the government, and other internationally recognised 
labour market bodies, in order to provide an analysis of FND.  In particular, it focuses on data that can 
combine national and local labour market information to elicit the actual performance of the 
programme. An analysis of the CSFs 1 and 2 is without methodological controversy given that the 
Department of Work and Pensions issued the full dataset recording the programmes’ operating 
achievements. This dataset is the cornerstone of the analysis. The more challenging analysis concerns 
the fourth success factor. Certainly, the achievements of factors one and two are part of the answer to 
factor four as the targets were set above previous achievements of UK active measures. Typically, 
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according to De Koning, addressing the net benefits of a programme involves experimental methods 
using a treatment group and a non-treatment group and assessing the differences using longitudinal 
data.698  This type of data was requested from the DWP, and subsequently acknowledged and rejected 
upon grounds of data protection legislation. Nevertheless, simultaneous programme comparisons 
remain possible through the amalgamation of multiple programme performance indicators, and these 
are explored later in the chapter.    
 
Data Collection  
The fundamental source of programme performance is the Delivery Directorate Performance Report 
(DDPR). The DDPR was a database established by the Department of Work and Pensions and organised, 
by them. The database was divided by the DWP into the fourteen different contract areas. A single 
provider served four of the areas, while the remaining ten were served by two competing providers.  In 
total therefore, the DDPR’s report offered detailed information from 24 different Flexible New Deal 
operations. 
   
The providers in each of these 14 geographic districts collect the data and the recording of it was a legal 
obligation of the provider organizations, managed through the Provider Referrals and Payments System 
(PRaP) (the IT network which the DWP uses to exchange personal information with contractors). The 
DWP supplies the providers with each new customer’s personal information, their Jobcentre 
agreements, and any notes on the customer that might be necessary (e.g. the customer has a history of 
violence). In exchange, and as a condition of their payment, providers were expected to supply 
information on a range of basic factors, including:  
 
 Acknowledge and Accept referral;  
 Notify start; notify did not start;  
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 End provision (e.g. job outcome, transfer, no longer engaged);  
 Short Job Outcome;  
 Sustained job outcome. 699 
 
The accuracy of the contractors’ submissions can then be verified in two ways; first, the data can be 
verified by checking whether the customer has left the Jobseekers Allowance. This process is automatic 
and can be used repeatedly to check whether the customer has left the JSA for a sufficient period to 
merit the job outcome criteria. The second check was undertaken by a DWP inspectorate, the Provider 
Assurance Team, which visited providers to check their physical records.700  
 
The DDPR contains essential PRaP data that has been transformed into the three core elements that 
form the basis of analysis:  
 
1. Starts – According to the Department of Work and Pensions ‘Starts are the numbers registered 
by the providers as starting on Flexible New Deal. Figures do not include those who have been 
referred to the same provider more than once during their time on provision but do include 
those who have been referred to a different provider or had more than one spell on provision. 
2. Short Job Outcomes (SJO) - ‘Short Job Outcomes are defined as those jobs that have lasted 13 
weeks with a minimum of 16 hours each week. Only one Short Job Outcome can be claimed by 
any one provider during the participant’s time on provision. 
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3. Sustained Job Outcomes (LJO) - ‘Sustained Job Outcomes are jobs of a minimum of 16 hours per 
week in employment for at least 26 weeks out of 30 with breaks in employment totalling 4 
weeks or less.701 
 
There are obvious variables absent from the Delivery Directorate report discussed in the introduction of 
this thesis (e.g. gender and age), but the above three categories are capable of providing a vast amount 
of information over the operating period of twenty-three months, and are the cornerstone of the 
quantitative analysis employed through the remainder of this chapter.  
 
Three core elements are used to assess whether the two primary quantitative targets have been 
achieved:  
 55% of FND Starts should achieve 13 weeks uninterrupted employment (Short Job Outcome). 
 50% of FND Starts should achieve 26 weeks employment (Sustained Job Outcomes).  
 
It should be noted that since the Flexible New Deal was commissioned the Department of Work and 
Pensions were acutely aware of the deteriorating labour market conditions in the UK, but were equally 
reluctant to alter the national targets.  In fact, The DWP told the House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee that ‘it accepts that its performance expectations may not be possible during the early stage 
of the contracts, or in every labour market, and it has asked potential providers to review their 
performance offers. However, DWP will maintain the 55% and 50% targets as their goal.’702 Since the 
programme ended in August 2011, and the last customers expected to be accepted onto the 
programme in May 2011, the lifetime achievements of the programme can be explored against these 
principal targets.   
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Analysing the Flexible New Deal data   
 
There are a couple of methods available for analysing the FND Delivery Directorate data. The first 
approach to the analysis of the Flexible New Deal evaluation statistics would be simply to add together 
the total ‘Starts’, and divide this figure by the number of ‘Short Job Outcomes’, and ‘Sustained Job 
Outcomes’, respectively. These are converted into percentages to render them comparable with other 
programmes with differing volumes of participants. This is a commonly used technique to show the 
proportion of participants who have begun the programme and achieved a job outcome lasting 13 or 
more weeks. This was the method used in Chapter 5   for each UK active labour market programme and 
was used in the DWP specifically to develop FND contract targets (see Chapter 6). Applying this formula 
to the final set of data FND statistics, released on 16 November 2011 in the Delivery Directorate Report, 
the sum follows:  
 
100 / 407,690 (Programme Starts) X 75,280 (Short Job Outcomes) = 18.5% (Proportion of Starts 
registering a 13-Week Short Job Outcome)  
 
100 / 407,690 (Programme Starts) X 49,740 (Sustained Job Outcomes) =  12.2% (Proportion of 
Starts registering a 13-Week Short Job Outcome)703 
 
 These national outcomes show the Flexible New Deal performing at a level less than half of the national 
targets. The Department for Work and Pensions hoped for every 100 participants starting the Flexible 
New Deal, 55 would move into employment lasting 13 or more weeks, and one in every two participants 
would find work lasting for 26 weeks. These results show that Starts-to-Short Job Outcomes were closer 
to one in five, and for Sustained Job Outcomes one in eight. The explanations for this shortfall are 
                                                          
703
 This and all subsequent FND data consolidated from DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 )  
233 
 
discussed in detail below.   
 
Continuing with the performance totals it is possible to begin to examine the effects of competition by 
partitioning the totals of the two contract models. The above method was applied to the sum of all four 
single contract areas and all ten dual contract areas, where Single Contract Areas had a monopoly over 
Flexible New Deal delivery in an assigned region, whereas and Dual Contract Areas had two contractors 
competing directly against each other. The result of this process is shown in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1 Flexible New Deal Employment Outcomes Totals and Contract Type Totals 
Contract Package Area Starts 
Short Job 
Outcomes 
Sustained 
Job 
Outcomes 
Short Job 
Outcomes as 
% of Starts 
Sustained Job 
Outcomes as 
% of Starts 
Single Contract  Areas (4) 84290 15310 9900 18.2 11.7 
Dual Contract Areas (10) 323440 59990 39860 18.5 12.3 
Total 407690 75250 49740 18.5 12.2 
Source: Adapted from DWP Delivery Directorate Report704705 
 
Partitioning the data has supplied important insight into the competition dynamic.  As is visible above 
the difference between single and dual contract zones is small, where dual contract zones outperform 
single contract zones by 0.3% for Short Job Outcomes at 18.5% and 18.2% respectively; similarly for 
Sustained Job Outcomes 12.3% and 11.7% provides only a marginal outperformance of 0.7%.  
 
The lack of a large distinction between the single and dual contract areas is important given the 
expectation that direct competition would facilitate a step-change in performance. In dual contract 
areas the competition dynamic was originally to be driven by the incentive of a shifting market share of 
participants (see discussion presented in previous chapter). Shifting customer volumes for each provider 
was intended to incentivise contractor competition by offering better performers more customers, and 
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therefore potentially higher profits. A closer inspection of the total volumes of clients allocated to 
contractors show evidence of variation, with some contractors being responsible for 10% more Starts 
than others. However, this did not appear to be linked to performance, as the best performing 
contractor (Maximus Employment) had fewer Starts than its contract area competitor, Skills Training 
UK. This was also the case in the Birmingham and Solihull contract, where Seetec outperformed 
Fourstar E&S, but had 1,700 less Starts. The given evidence therefore shows that market sharing, one of 
the core drivers of competition, was never implemented.  
 
The other driver of competition intended to give Dual Contract Areas the edge over the Single Contract 
Area was the mechanism of customer choice. Allowing participants to choose their contractor had been 
expected to drive performance and quality through the system, but as discussed in the previous chapter 
(6) this element was also abandoned. Thus, the two distinct features intended to push up performance 
in Dual Contract Areas through direct competition were abandoned. Ultimately therefore, the resulting 
competition incentives reflected the suspicions of the Social Market Foundation that ‘the concentrated 
prime contractor structure places more weight on the re-tendering process to keep contractors’ power 
in check’706 rather than direct competition between contractors. As the implementation of FND was 
different from what the original policy documents had intended, and the difference between Single and 
Dual Contract Areas was limited, the little distinction between the respective performances should not 
be unexpected.  
 
The unadjusted totals show results considerably below national targets and that the competition 
dynamic had yet to expose strongly the merits of direct competition between contractors. However, the 
national outcomes presented by this method are unfair. The unadjusted totals disguise an obvious 
methodological weakness; they do not offer sufficient time for the programme to reach a steady state, a 
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problem recognized by the DWP.707 The risk of using unadjusted totals is explained by the Employment 
Related Services Association:  
 
Taking the total number of referrals and comparing them with the total numbers of job 
outcomes does not give an accurate picture. As job outcomes can only be paid after three and 
six months in work, the fluctuations in customer referrals mean there are three and six months 
worth of referrals that are simply not eligible for job outcomes.708  
 
The methodological implications are that looking solely at outcomes as a proportion of total starts 
offers a distorted picture of FND performance. Specifically the adoption of the original method 
unnecessarily dampens the performance of the programme because those entering the Flexible New 
Deal with either three or six months to go would not have been able to have obtained a 13 week or 26 
week employment outcome. For the 13-week category, or Short Job Outcome, there were 2,660 joining 
the programme in the final three months, for whom the achievement of a Short Job Outcome could not 
have been claimed by the end of the programme.709 Naturally therefore, the problem is greater for 
achieving 26-week outcomes, where a total 36,070 customers joined the programme in its final six 
months left providers unable to claim the achievement of Sustained Job Outcomes for this cohort. For 
the latter category of outcomes at least, of a total of 407,700 programme participants, 36,070 is not an 
insignificant proportion. This issue will hereafter be referred to as the outcome lag.  
 
To account for the outcome lag, and provide a more balanced depiction of the Flexible New Deal’s 
performance it is necessary to adjust  for this problem. With the Flexible New Deal terminating in 
August 2011 the number of programme entrants (start totals) that could not qualify for both Short and 
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Sustained Job Outcomes must be removed from the final months of the programme. For the 13-week 
category, this means removing all who began the programme in June, July and August of 2011, and for 
the 26-week category it requires the removal of the data for March, April, May, June, July and August of 
2011. As disclosed above, these figures were 2,660 exemptions for Short Job Outcomes and 36,070 for 
Sustained Job Outcomes. The elements of the first equation remain the same, but with reduced start 
totals reflecting the exemptions recorded above.  
 
Adjusted Method 
 
100 / 405,040 (Total Starts – Final 3 month starts) X 75,250 (Short Job Outcomes) = 18.6%  
 
100 / 371,630 (Total Starts – Final 6 months starts) X 49,740 (LJO) = 13.4% 
 
The resulting method provides the table below with an additional column being added to differentiate 
between total Starts: 
 
Table 7.2 Adjusted Flexible New Deal Sustained Employment Outcomes   
Contract Package 
Area 
Starts 
Adjusted 
for - 3 
Months 
Starts 
Adjusted for 
– 6 months 
Short Job 
Outcomes 
Sustained 
Job 
Outcomes 
SJO as % 
of Starts 
LJOs as % of 
Starts 
Single Contract Area 83,890 76,910 15,310 9900 18.2 12.9 
Dual Contract Area 321,460 294,970 59,990 39860 18.6 13.5 
Total 405,040 371,630 75,250 49,740 18.6 13.4 
Source: Adapted from DWP Delivery Directorate Report710 
 
 
Inevitably, the results show a marginal increase on the national employment outcomes totals with a  
0.1% rise in Short Job Outcomes, and a 1.2% rise for the Sustained Job Outcomes. The greater increase 
in the latter is a consequence of the larger volume of individuals joining in the final six months, as 
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opposed to the final three. Even with the necessary revisions the totals demonstrate that the new 
delivery mechanism perform substantially below the Department of Work and Pensions’ target of 55% 
and 50% respectively. 
 
Table 7.3 illustrates these findings in relation to stated national targets.  For this part of the analysis the 
outcomes will be calculated and shown as a percentage of the national Short Job Outcome targets of 
55% and Sustained Job Outcomes of 50%.  
 
Table 7.3 Adjusted Method FND Outcomes as Percentage of National Targets 
Contract Type % of 3M Target 
(55%) 
% of 6M Target 
(50%) 
Single Contract 33% 26% 
Dual Contract 34% 27% 
Total 34% 27% 
Source: Adapted from DWP Delivery Directorate Report711  
The above table shows the extent of the shortfall in employment outcomes. The reasons why the 
expectations-outcomes gap occurred was accounted for in the previous chapter (Chapter 6), principally 
that the Flexible New Deal national targets were premised on a narrow section of Short Job Outcomes 
achieved by one part of one employment programme. The following section looks at the performance 
of FND against the other employment programmes it was destined to replace to see whether the quasi-
market, while performing below expectations, was more effective than the New Deals and Employment 
Zones.   
The FND, the New Deals and Employment Zones  
To appreciate whether FND was more effective than the legacy employment programmes this section 
turns to programme comparisons. As Chapter 6 discussed, the most suitable programme for comparison 
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with the Flexible New Deal is Employment Zones, as they operate a broadly ‘black box’ approach 
reinforced by payment by results contracted out to the same broad selection of providers. Included in 
the comparative analysis are other programmes operating around the time of the Flexible New Deal to 
illustrate relative performance. Figure 7.1 charts the performance of five programmes over a four-year 
period using   identical calculations of 13-week employment entry as a proportion of starts.712 The 
outcomes of the New Deals and Employment Zones often show volatile swings in performance and 
consequently these were transformed into quarterly totals for the quarter for the purposes of 
visualisation. As figure 7.1 illustrates, the Flexible New Deal, as alleged by Mulheirn, endured a slow 
start,713 taking nearly a year to catch up with either modes of Employment Zone provision. 
 
Figure 7.1 UK ALMP Quarterly 13-week Outcomes as a percentage of Starts since 2008 
 
Source: Adapted from DWP Delivery Directorate Report and DWP Statistics Hub714 
 
Further evidence to support Mulheirn’s assertion was drawn from an interview with a business manager 
at one of the providers. This individual argued ‘I truly think that the thought behind the national 
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milestones and markers needs looking at, because they [the DWP] seem to expect the contract to run, 
and be up and running and hitting levels that really are not going to happen, even the larger boys 
[contractors] than us...struggled.’715 The lag occurs, according to the interviewee, because of systems 
problems, attempting to build up a base of contacts, establishing IT systems, and problems with the 
clarification of provider guidance to name only a few.716  
 
Putting aside the slow start, it is also observable that the Flexible New Deal produced results similar to 
those achieved by the New Deal for Young People and Employment Zones for Young People during the 
recession, but exceeded   both Employment Zones achievements during the final quarter of 2010. 
However this quarter’s results are not necessarily appropriate for comparison as in December 2010 the 
number of programme entrants unexpectedly fell to around half of the average months entrants, which 
exerted a strong upward pressure on that quarters Starts-to-Outcomes ratio. The lack of simultaneous 
data for the New Deals is unfortunate, but survey research undertaken by the Policy Studies Institute 
appears to support the trends in the above graph. The authors state: ‘Customers ages 25+ were equally 
likely to be in paid work in Phase 1 [FND] and Phase 2 [New Deal LTU] (29% in both areas), a slightly - 
but significantly- higher proportion of FND customers were claiming JSA at the time of interview than 
was the case in Phase 2 comparison areas (55% Phase 1, 51% phase 2).’717 Research by the National 
Audit Office offers a similar set of results. The NAO reported that the Flexible New Deal performed 
marginally worse than the non-intervention outcomes of Jobseekers Allowance for those over 25.718 
Research by the PSI found that the younger group of Jobseekers (18-24 year olds) in NDYP areas were 
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more likely to be in paid work (by 6%) than FND comparator areas, and 8% less likely to be claiming the 
Jobseekers Allowance.719  
 
Against the simultaneous legacy programmes, the outcomes of Flexible New Deal and Employment 
Zones are shown in Table 7.4 for the FND operating period. The slow start is obviously a factor in the 
weaker FND results, but isolating the start is an arbitrary exercise and each programme was subject to 
the same effects of abrupt termination resulting in a large proportion of their customer base rendered 
ineligible for job outcomes. 
 
Table 7.4 Active Labour Market Short Job Outcomes Compared 
 
ALMP 
 
 
Employment 
Zones for 18-24 
year olds 
Employment 
Zones for 25+ 
years 
Flexible New Deal  
 
Proportion of Starts 
achieving 13-weeks 
employment 
 
 
 
21.4% 25.7% 18.5% 
Source: DWP Delivery Directorate Report and DWP Statistics Hub  
 
Putting the results of the programmes into context, the local economic profiles across the simultaneous 
Employment Zones were weaker than across the FND contract areas. The specifics of local labour 
market performance are explored later, but EZ areas had a higher Claimant Count rate of 6.0% to FND 
areas’ 4.2%,720 and a higher proportion of the population without any recognised qualifications, at 
16.1% against FND’s 13.5%.721 
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Had the FND been in operation longer it might have achieved better results, as during the best 6-month 
period it delivered outcomes consistently above 30%. However, by the final two quarters of operation 
outcome levels were similar to the other two terminating AMLPs. These findings were expected since 
the three ALMP programmes were built on a similar modus operandi; private and voluntary sector 
organisations paid to deliver on the basis of sustaining employment outcomes.  
 
The above results have not thus far indicated that the Flexible New Deal achieved 3 of its five principal 
goals. It failed to meet the 55% and 50% targets respectively for Short and Sustained Job Outcomes, and 
from the data presented, nor did it deliver on Critical Success Factor 4. As stated in the previous 
chapter, the ‘step-change’ in performance was quantified at a rise of a minimum of 13% above 
Employment Zones outcomes. Even if the slow start is ignored, and the first six months of FND 
outcomes excluded, FND yields Short Job Outcome levels at only 27%, around 2% higher than the best 
performing part of Employment Zones (DWP’s preferred measure). 
  
The Sustained Job Outcomes (26-Weeks+) performance produces similar results. Full data on the 
outcomes of 26-Weeks+ has not been made publically available for the four legacy programmes. 
Nevertheless, Table 7.5, supplied by the Department of Work and Pensions provides part of the picture. 
Using the published results of 26-week employment outcomes up to the period when the Flexible New 
Deal was implemented it is possible to see what should be expected of the Flexible New Deal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
Table 7.5 Proportion of Programme Starters Attaining 26 week Job Outcomes by UK Active Labour 
Market Programme 
ALMP 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 
EZ25+ 14% 16% 14% 15% 18% 15% 
ND25+ 11% 12% 12% 14% 12% 12% 
NDYP 19% 19% 19% 18% 17% 17% 
Source: Department of Work and Pensions722 
 
The Flexible New Deal 26-week results were 12.2% of Starts or 13.4% using the adjusted measure. 
Looking at the data in Table 7.5, this puts the Flexible New Deal close to the ND25+ and below NDYP 
and EZs.   
 
An alternative method for understanding Sustained Job Outcome performance is to examine the 
conversion rate achieved by other programmes. The conversion rate is the proportion (as a percentage) 
of 13-week employment outcomes which last up to or beyond 26-weeks. Recall also that this was 
important to the DWP who, as part of the ‘step-change’ ambition reflected in their targets, hoped that 
91% of participants lasting 13 weeks in work would remain in work for 26 weeks.  
 
 From the Delivery Directorate Report we know that 49,740 out of 75,250 Short Job Outcome 
participants sustained employment for the further 13-weeks, and thus FND providers achieved a 
conversion rate of 66.1%. For comparative purposes, the conversion rates for other ALMPs are supplied 
in Table 7.6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
722
 Adapted from Thomas, A (2009) Flexible New Deal Contractor Event Slides, Department of Work and Pensions 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/fnd-event-sllides.pdf [accessed 10/07/10] p11 
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Table 7.6 Proportion of Participants Sustaining 26 Weeks of Employment  
ALMP Starts Obtaining 2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
EZ25+ Short Job Outcome 24.0 23.5 
EZ25+ Sustained Outcome 18.0 15.0 
 Conversion Rate 75.0 63.8 
ND25+ Short Job Outcome 25.7 26.2 
ND25+ Sustained Outcome 12.0 12.0 
 Conversion Rate 46.7 45.8 
NDYP Short Job Outcome 42.1 33.1 
NDYP Sustained Outcome 17.0 17.0 
 Conversion Rate 40.4 51.4 
Source: DWP and Work and Pensions Select Committee Data723  
 
Using the data from Table 7.6 it can be seen that the FND achieved a higher conversion rate than NDYP 
and ND25+ had delivered in the preceding years, whereas it produced similar results to what 
Employment Zones had achieved before. Given that the objectives for EZ25+ were similar to those of 
the FND it might not be surprising that similar results were found. However, the Flexible New Deal was 
the first national employment programme to incentivise an explicit 26-week sustainment target, rather 
than the shorter 13-week objective applicable to Employment Zones. Thus, the struggle to turn 13-
Week employment spells into ones lasting 26 weeks challenges the idea of a ‘Step Change’ in sustained 
outcomes. 
 
Contract Level Performances   
Headline figures display, with some clarity, sub-target results at a programme-wide level, but disguise 
important regional variations in the data. In particular, the purpose of establishing a competitive 
welfare market was to establish first, whether the private sector was more effective than the public 
employment service at moving the long-term unemployed into work, and second which contractors are 
                                                          
723
 Adapted from Thomas, A (2009) Flexible New Deal Contractor Event Slides, Department of Work and Pensions 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/fnd-event-sllides.pdf [accessed 10/07/10] p11 and DWP (2011) Resource Centre, Department of 
Work and Pensions [online] http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/tabtools/index.php?page=tabtool_nd [accessed 18/01/12] 
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the best at doing so. This information is essential for policy-makers, whose role in a ‘black box’ quasi-
market is not to dictate how providers move people into work, but rather to evaluate which providers 
should have contracts and which should not. As such, by making contractors compete against  each 
other, nationally or directly (as in Dual Contract Areas), policy-makers hoped to observe which providers 
are doing well and why, and which are not and why not. This information assists in the aim of 
terminating the accounts of poor performers, and providing a bigger share of the market to those doing 
better.724  
 
To begin, when the national Delivery Directorate data is broken down to contract level, there are some 
noticeable variations in the performance of contractors.  Figure 7.2 shows the performance and ranking 
of provider’s on account of the Short Job Outcomes each achieved. Where providers operated several 
contracts (3 of the 14 contractors operated 2 or more FND contracts) a mean of their performance was 
used.725 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
724
 DWP (2008) DWP Commissioning Strategy, Department of Work and Pensions, Cabinet Office, London p21 
725
 The mean was used because in this case it was the most appropriate measure of central tendency. The mean is only 
inappropriate when it subject to the distortions of outliers. In this case, there are no extreme values at either end of the Short 
or Sustained Job Outcome’s distribution. For a discussion see Bryman, A. (2008) Social Research Methods 3
rd
 Edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p325 
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Figure 7.2 Provider Organisation Short Job Outcome Performance 
 
Source: Adapted from DWP Delivery Directorate726 
 
Figure 7.2 shows that Maximus Employment, an Australian company, was the most successful company 
at achieving 13-week employment for their customers. At the other end of the scale Dudley 
Metropolitan Borough Council performed notably below average on both SJO and LJO measures, and 
was 10.7 percentage points behind Maximus.727 At first glance, it is possible to identify (relatively) 
successful contractors based on the first two critical success factors, namely their outcomes’ proximity 
to the national targets of 55% and 50% respectively. In this manner the implementation of a quasi-
market has fulfilled one of its objectives, by singling out which providers are the most and least 
effective. In the case of Short Job Outcomes, the best delivery organisation performed 75% better than 
the weakest. If we look at individual providers who won a number of contracts, there is some wide 
                                                          
726
 Data adapted from DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) 
727
 It is worth noting that Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council was the only public organisation to act as a prime contractor. 
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variance visible. Taking A4E as one example, the contractor had five Flexible New Deal contracts, but 
their performance was around 30% higher in the Cambridgeshire contract zone than it was in the Black 
Country (21.8% and 16.7% Short Job Outcomes respectively). Taking Working Links as another example, 
of their five contracts, their best performance was 19.6% and their worst was 15.3%.  
 
The inter-contract variance is much wider than the intra-contract variance.  When looking at the 
difference between the two competing providers in dual contract areas, the job outcome differentials 
are smaller. The largest gap within a contract area was observed in the Black Country contract, with a 
Short Job Outcome performance difference of 3.5% where A4E moved 16.7% of customers into 13-week 
employment to Dudley MBC’s 13.2%. The Black Country example was the largest difference between 
providers; typically however, the difference between performances in dual contract zones was smaller. 
Taking a mean of the ten contracts, the average difference between providers within a dual contract 
area was 1.8%. The range between providers within dual contract zones is narrower still for 26-week 
outcomes, with a mean of 1.4% difference between the stronger and weaker contractor. Policy makers 
face a particular difficulty when faced with two contractors in an area who have produced broadly 
similar results. The smallest intra-contract variance for 13-week outcomes occurred in the 
Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Northamptonshire contract area, where Ingeus Deloitte 
outperformed Working Links by 0.2% for Short Job Outcomes. Here, Ingeus Deloitte moved 3,180 
jobseekers into 13-week compared to Working Links’ 3,110. However, Working Links managed to get 
150 more jobseekers to remain in work for the 26-week target than Ingeus Deloitte. Clearly, on this 
evidence, picking the best contractor is not straightforward.  
 
There is more to the variance picture than this first inspection brings to light. As Maximus Employment 
moved a higher proportion of participants into 13-week employment than any other provider, their 
primary regional competitor, Skills Training UK, also produced above average results (23.9% and 21.9%). 
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At the other end of the scale, the Black Country contract area saw Dudley MBC post the weakest results, 
but their competitor, A4E, also posted outcomes below national average (13.2% and 16.75% 
respectively). The following section will show the depth of connection between the location of the 
contract and the performance of providers within it.  
   
The implications of these contract specific findings are twofold, the first is that these are not large 
differences in the performance of providers in dual contract areas, it therefore suggests that the 
improved effectiveness gained by cutting out the poorer performing providers and giving the better 
performing provider a larger market share may be small. The findings that intra-contract (within dual 
contract areas) variance is considerable smaller than inter-contract (across all areas) variance implies 
other factors are more strong influencing provider performance than their own abilities.  
 
The Labour Market Context of FND Performance  
Having demonstrated clear differentiation in the performance of contractors it would be tempting to 
suggest that the worst performing providers in the market are not effective. But, as the above also 
showed, the intra-contract variance was smaller than the inter-contract variance. It is thus necessary to 
explore the apparent causes of this. A sensible place to start is to explore  whether the location of the 
contract is influential on the level of job outcomes that providers achieved. As an initial demonstration 
of this, the following map (Figure 7.3) was created to show the location of Short Job Outcomes achieved 
against the programme average. Those in pink (Single Contract Area) and red (Dual Contract Area) 
produced lower proportions of Short Job Outcomes than the programme average; the dark green 
(Single Contract Areas) and light green (Dual Contract Areas) produced Short Job Outcomes above 
programme average.  
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Figure 7.3: Short Job Outcome Performances against the programme average by contract location 
  
Source: Template from Social Market Foundation; authors calculations728 
 
The immediate conclusion that emerges from Figure 7.3 is of a North-South divide in contractor 
performance; contractors in general achieved a greater proportion of Short Job Outcomes in the South 
than the North. This finding is reflected in the British labour market literature, such as that of Brown and 
Sessions who state that:  
                                                          
728
 Mulheirn, I. and Menne, V. (2008) The Flexible New Deal: Making it work, Social Market Foundation, London, p30 
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‘There is without doubt a higher average risk of unemployment associated with the 
northern regions relative to the South East, and this differential remains to a large extent 
even when one controls for the differing profiles of individuals resident within the various 
regions.’729 
 
Figure 7.3 also reflects the labour market research of Gilmartin and Korobilis, who identify high levels of 
unemployment in regions comprising major cities including London and Birmingham.730 Given the 
apparent connection between the location of contractors and their performances, it might have been 
appropriate for the DWP to have developed regional targets for Short and Sustained Job Outcomes, 
rather than recognising that ‘performance expectations may not be possible...in every labour market.’731  
The indication that Short Job Outcomes are contingent on labour market factors raises the question of 
the efficacy of work-first, but these factors need to be explored further to understand why the regional 
inequalities are occurring. For this analysis a range of labour supply and demand factors are explored in 
greater depth, beginning with Contract Area unemployment levels.   
 
The International Labour Organisation produces the widest measure of unemployment in the United 
Kingdom. This method involves surveying the labour market at national and regional level across its 
membership.  ILO figures tend to be preferred by those studying unemployment because it uses surveys 
rather than benefit receipt (which underestimates unemployment due to the large volume of people 
who through choice or exemption are not in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance) to measure levels of 
unemployment. The survey is conducted using interviews with 50,000 families, every 3 months, 
                                                          
729
 Brown, S. and Sessions, J. (1997) A Profile of UK Unemployment: Regional versus Demographic Influences, Regional Studies 
v31.4, p363 
730
 Gilmartin, M. and Korobilis, D. (2012) On Regional Unemployment: An Empirical Examination of the Determinants of 
Geographic Differentials in the UK, Scottish Journal of Politics Economy, v.59.2 pp179-195 
731
 DWP submission to House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2009) DWP’s Commissioning Strategy and the 
Flexible New Deal, House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee Report for Session 2008-2009 V.1, p21 
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reporting a 95% confidence level in its findings.732 The ILO data is accurate down to the regional level, 
but the Local Government Association point out that ‘the Labour Force Survey is a sample survey and 
the results for smaller districts have a wide error range.‘733 The data can offer a general impression of 
the intensity of labour market competition in the region within which the contract zone broadly sits. The 
unemployment levels appropriate for contract areas are shown in Table 7.7.  
 
Table 7.7 Contract Area Performance and ILO Unemployment Compared 
 
Contract Areas 
Short Job 
Outcomes 
% 
ILO Regional 
Unemployment 
(2009-2011) 
Surrey, Sussex and Kent 22.9 4.3 
Coventry and Warwickshire, The Marches and Staffordshire 21.2 5.9 
Cambridgeshire and Suffolk, Norfolk and Lincolnshire & Rutland 20.9 4.6 
Devon and Cornwall 19.4 3.7 
Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire 18.6 4.5 
National Average 18.5 5.8 
Edinburgh, Lothian and Borders, Lanarkshire and East 
Dunbartonshire, Ayrshire, Dumfries, Galloway and Inverclyde 
18.3 8.8 
South Wales Valleys and South West Wales 18.3 5.3 
Greater Manchester Central and Greater Manchester East and 
West 
18.0 6.0 
North and Mid Wales and South East Wales 17.6 5.3 
Birmingham and Solihull 17.6 5.9 
South Yorkshire and Derbyshire 17.2 6.3 
Central London, Lambeth, Southwark and Wandsworth 16.9 9.2 
North and East Yorkshire, Humber and Tees Valley 15.9 7.7 
Black Country 14.9 5.9 
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report734 
                                                          
732
 ONS (2011) Topic Guide to Unemployment, Office of National Statistics Online at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/labour-
market/people-not-in-work/unemployment/index.html (accessed 13/09/11) 
733
 LGA (2009) The Growth of Claimant Unemployment to Vacancy Ratio by Area, Local Government Association, 
http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/2320650 (accessed 10/10/11) p19 
734
 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) and NomisWeb (2011) Jobcentre Plus 
Vacancies, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=29  (accessed 10/10/2011) 
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 The figures generally underline the assertion that the level of labour market competition is important 
to the performance of active labour market policy, because those areas which performed best tended 
to have an unemployment level lower than the national average, and those which performed worse 
tended to have higher ILO defined levels of unemployment. While illustrative of the wide variation in 
unemployment across the country, this analysis is inadequate as the designated contract areas often 
overlapped multiple regions.  
 
Claimant Count as a Measure of Labour Market Competition 
 Relative to the ILO method, the Claimant Count measurement is a narrower, but more accurate 
depiction of labour market conditions at the local level, in this case individual contract areas. The 
Claimant count measure records the number of individuals claiming and subject to the regulations of 
Jobseekers Allowance.735 This measure is weaker at the national level because of the many unemployed 
who do not register for benefits, but because it is based on actual Jobseekers Allowance claimants 
rather than the estimates provided by the ILO it is accurate down to the smallest geographical levels 
and not subject to the error margins of survey data. In particular, it is essential to the study of the 
Flexible New Deal because participants can only enter the programme after a year of JSA receipt. 
Consequently, the Claimant Count level of unemployment within a particular area was relevant to the 
contractors because only JSA claimants become FND participants. For the analysis the Claimant Count 
data was drawn from the NOMIS labour market data bank, and consolidated local authority-by-local 
authority into the exact JSA claimants in each contract area during the period of FND operation 
(October 2009 - May 2011).736 The Claimant Count level of each contract area was then plotted against 
                                                          
735
 ONS (2011) Topic Guide to Claimant Count, Office of National Statistics Online at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/labour-
market/people-not-in-work/claimant-count (accessed 13/09/11) 
736
 The labour market data ends with May 2011 because no job attachments after this month would qualify for Short Job 
Outcomes.  
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the Short Job Outcomes achieved by each contractor; the relationship has been demonstrated using 
Figure 7.4.737 
 
Figure 7.4 Contractor Short Job Outcomes and Contract Area Claimant Count Unemployment 
compared  
 
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report738 
 
Figure 7.4 shows that Short Job Outcomes and the Claimant Count are closely, though negatively 
associated. The negative association implies the higher the proportion of the population in the contract 
area on the Jobseekers Allowance, the lower the levels of Short Job Outcomes achieved, and vice versa. 
The correlation between the two variables is statistically strong.739  
 
 
                                                          
737
 Data acquired from NomisWeb (2011) Claimant Counts by Local Authority, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=24 (accessed 10/10/11) 
738
 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) and NomisWeb (2011) Claimant Counts Rates 
and Proportions, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=construct&version=0&dataset=1   (accessed 11/11/2011) 
739
 The conventional understanding of strength is that correlations of in the range of +/-0.1 to +/-0.3 are described as weak, 
0.4-0.6 as moderate, and 0.7-0.9 as strong. See Bryman, A. and Cramer, D. in Bryman, A. and Hardy, M. (eds) (2004) The 
Handbook of Data Analysis, Sage, London, pp27-28 
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Table 7.8 Correlation of Contract Area Claimant Count Unemployment and Contractor Short Job 
Outcomes 
 Claimant 
Count 
Unemployme
nt 
Short Job 
Outcomes 
Claimant Count 
Unemployment 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.759 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 24 24 
Short Job Outcomes 
Pearson Correlation -.759 1 
Sig. (2-tailed)740 .000  
N 24 24 
 
Source: SPSS using Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report741742 
 
As a measure of labour market competition the Claimant Count data supports the theory that the 
greater the intensity of competition for jobs, the more difficultly contractors will face in trying to move 
the long-term unemployed back into work.  This appears to be a consequence of the long-term jobless 
competing not only amongst themselves for existing jobs, but also with those recently out of work. 
Thus, the larger the pool of claimants the greater difficulty the long-term unemployed will have finding 
work, as summarised by Machin and Manning: 
 
                                                          
740
 Though included in each correlation table, the statistical significance data is not applicable in most cases as  nearly all 
variables are ‘whole population’ data rather than sample data. Where sample data is used, the statistical significance is not.  
741
 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) and NomisWeb (2011) Jobcentre Plus 
Vacancies, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=29  (accessed 10/10/2011) 
742
 Correlations are operable with as few as 10 data points, here there are 24 comparable points from two variables.   
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Virtually all countries exhibit negative duration dependence (i.e. if one takes two 
unemployed people at random, one would expect the one with the shorter 
unemployment duration to leave unemployment more quickly). This negative duration 
dependence contributes to the incidence of long-term unemployment.743 
 
In the Black Country, the contract zone with the weakest performance of 14.9% starts achieving 
Short Job Outcomes, 6.6% of the working population were claiming JSA, compared with the 
best performing area, Surrey, Sussex and Kent achieved a Short Job Outcome rate of 22.9% with 
only 3% of the working age population registered unemployed.744 
 
The regression also supports the research by Mosley and Muller of the German welfare-to-work 
system, who identified that a 1% expansion in the unemployment rate was associated with a 
0.66% decline in the reintegration rate.745 In this case, a 1% rise in the Claimant Count is 
associated with a 3% fall in Short Job Outcomes obtained. The effects of unemployment on the 
Short Job Outcomes should be larger than the German findings because of the more challenging 
task providers have in not only finding jobs for participants, but that these must also last for 13 
or more weeks.  
 
Contract Performance and the JSA-Vacancy Ratio  
A more sophisticated understanding of local labour market competition and its impact on active 
labour market policy can be made by matching Claimant Count volumes with the number of 
unfilled job vacancies in that area. The number of job vacancies provides an indication of 
demand in the local economy.  The data used in this analysis is again drawn from the NOMIS 
                                                          
743
 Machin, S. and Manning, A. (1999) The Causes and Consequences of Long Term Unemployment in Europe, Handbook of 
Labour Economics, v.3 [ebook] P3107 
744
 NomisWeb (2011) Claimant Counts Rates and Proportions, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=construct&version=0&dataset=1  (accessed 11/11/2011) 
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   Mosley, H. and Muller, K. (2007) Benchmarking Employment Services in Germany, in De Koning, J. (2007) The Evaluation of 
Active Labour Market Policies, p281 
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Labour Market System, and is compiled by the public employment service, Jobcentre Plus.  They 
were statutorily responsible for collecting, recording and reporting all job vacancies notified to 
them.746 While this ‘vacancy count’ does not reflect the total demand in the labour market, it 
does provide the best publically available data on the number of vacancies available at the local 
level.747 Furthermore, because they are advertised through Jobcentre Plus, the vacancies were 
explicitly (though not exclusively) made available for Jobseekers.  As such, this data provides a 
more direct indication of labour market competition for FND customers than Claimant Count 
data alone. The claimant-to-vacancy data was recorded as a ratio and calculated on a month-
by-month basis. 
 
If local labour market competition is linked to FND contractor performance, it should be expected 
that a statistical relationship should emerge between the level of job outcomes for a particular 
contract area and the intensity of competition that exists for existing vacancies within that area. 
Using the same method as before with Claimant Counts, contractors’ Short Job Outcomes were 
plotted against the claimant-to-vacancy ratios in the individual contract areas. The results of this 
exercise are shown in Figure 7.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
746
 DWP (2005) Technical Report on Publication of Jobcentre Plus Vacancy Statistics, via Nomis Local Labour Market System, p6 
online at http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/articles/ref/vacs/LMT%20200506-363.pdf (accessed 13/09/11) 
747
Adams, L. and Kuechel, A. (2008) Jobcentre Plus Annual Employer Survey 2007-2008, Department of Work and Pensions 
Report No. 541 p42 
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Figure 7.5 Relationship between Contract Area JSA-Vacancy Ratio and Contractor Short Job 
Outcomes 
 
 Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report748 
 
The relationship between the intensity of competition for existing vacancies is negatively associated 
with the performance of contractors. The higher the ratio of jobseekers to jobs in the contract areas, 
the lower the proportion of Short Job Outcomes providers achieved. As can also be seen with the 
following table (7.9) the relationship between the two variables is moderate to strong.   
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Table 7.9 Relationship between Contract Area Claimant-Vacancy Rations and Contractor Short Job 
Outcomes 
 
 Short Job 
Outcomes 
JSA to Vacancy 
Ratio in FND 
Contract Area 
Short Job Outcomes 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.686** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 24 24 
JSA to Vacancy Ratio in 
FND Contract Area 
Pearson Correlation -.686** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: SPSS using Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report
749750
 
 
The growing evidence of this chapter is presenting a picture that the Flexible New Deal was more 
effective in some areas than others, and that this appears to be closely tied to the conditions of the 
labour market. Indeed, the regression line across Figure 7.5 permits the observation that with each 
additional jobseeker competing for one vacancy, we can expect a 3% fall in the Short Job Outcome 
rates. This may present a more sophisticated picture of labour market contingency than the Claimant 
Count alone by taking into account both supply of labour and demand for it.  
 
This relationship is profoundly important for all three of the research questions. First, having identified 
the FND as not demonstrably more effective than preceding active labour market policies, it is also clear 
that in some areas it is much less effective than in others. Second, the apparent contingency of suppliers 
performances on the labour market makes it challenging for policy makers to identify which contractors 
to eliminate. The wide differences in labour market conditions may therefore disguise successful 
providers in areas where conditions are weaker, and vice versa. Third, the evidence indicates that 
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 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) and NomisWeb (2011) Jobcentre Plus 
Vacancies, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=29  (accessed 10/10/2011) 
750
 Correlations are operable with as few as 10 data points, here there are 24 comparable points from two variables.   
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policies that try to attach people to existing vacancies will be more effective when there is less 
competition for them. That work-first reflects the inequalities in the labour market rather than 
ameliorating them suggests that this may not be the most effective strategy across all labour markets, 
and certainly not the most equitable.   
 
The relationship between vacancies and outcomes has been explored in greater detail using contract 
area vacancy volumes drawn from the NOMIS databank. To offset the distorting effect of the apparent 
‘slow start’ to FND, the central 12-months of total Short Job Outcomes (July 2010-June 2011) in each 
contract area were against the vacancy volumes in each contract area (April 2010- March 2011).751 The 
results of this exercise are presented in Figure 7.6: 
 
Figure 7.6 12 Months Contract Area Vacancy Volumes and Contractor Short Job Outcome Volumes 
Compared 752  
 
Source: Adapted from Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report 
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 Comparing Short Job Outcomes in one month against vacancies three months earlier is necessary because the individual 
achieving a Short Job Outcome, must, by definition, have found the job in the labour market 13 weeks before.  
752
 Data combined from NomisWeb (2011) Jobcentre Plus Vacancies, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=29  (accessed 10/10/2011) and DWP (2011) Delivery 
Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) 
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Graph 7.6 shows a clear relationship between the two variables indicating that the numbers of vacancies 
available in month X were closely related to the number of job outcomes achieved 3-months later. This 
adds to the evidence that work-first may be an effective strategy where vacancies are in large supply, 
but not where vacancies are lacking. In fact, the actual relationship may be closer than the data 
suggests. A hint at this comes from the ERSA, which explains that: ‘For both starts and job outcomes 
there is a delay between the occurrence and the recording on PRaP.’753 This delay in recording Short Job 
Outcomes may therefore disguise a tighter connection between the two.  
 
These findings are consistent with economic literature discussing the relationship between the number 
of vacancies and the level of unemployment found in any given area, in particular the Beveridge Curve. 
This curve presents the relationship between high levels of vacancies and lower levels of unemployment 
(and vice versa).754 The Beveridge Curve predicts that unemployment is likely to be lower in areas 
represented by more vacancies and higher when fewer opportunities exist (i.e. a positive correlation 
and upward sloping regression line). If we apply Beveridge Curve theory to the Flexible New Deal it 
suggests that the capacity of individuals, or indeed their providers, to find work is contingent on the 
number of vacancies available. The degree to which unemployed individuals found new employment 
while participating in the FND is strongly correlated to the number of jobs available in the local 
economy.   
 
It is important to consider the direction of causation. The variation in contractor outcomes is highly 
likely to be the result of the demand for labour rather than the reverse. There are a number of reasons 
for this. First, FND contractors can exert a degree of downward pressure on the number of claimants by 
                                                          
753
 ERSA (2011) ERSA Commentary on the DWP Delivery Directorate Performance Report, Employment Related Services 
Association Online 
http://www.ersa.org.uk/downloads/ERSA_commentary_on_DWP_Delivery_Directorate_Performance_Report-IFg3n9.pdf   
[accessed 12/11/11] p4 
754
 For a fuller description and discussion see Ball, L. and Mankiw, N.G. (2002) The NAIRU in Theory and Practice, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, v.16.4 pp132-133 
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moving them into vacancies advertised in local Jobcentre Plus offices (or elsewhere). However, FND 
participants comprise only a small proportion of this total and therefore it cannot predominantly be the 
success of providers that account for lower levels of competition in the labour market. To support this 
the Department of Work and Pensions outlined in the FND Invitation to Tender documents that 90% of 
JSA claimants had either left JSA or that they had managed to find work within 52-weeks.755 When 
coupled with the fact that FND moved only 18.2% of participants into 13-week employment the impact 
of even successful contractors on the claimant-vacancy ratio will be limited.756 Quite simply, the number 
of successful FND participants is such a small fraction of the total Claimant Count, and thus claimant-to-
vacancy ratio that Short Job Outcomes cannot significantly determine labour demand.  
 
The only other discernible downward pressure exerted by the FND on reducing the claimant to vacancy 
ratio has been the threat effect (as outlined in Chapter 2). However, given that this effect should occur 
prior to FND participation, it should only affect the number of starts and will exert little to no impact on 
contractor outcomes. In addition if the claimant-vacancy ratio is one indicator of labour demand, we 
would expect that in areas of lower labour demand, the outcomes for the FND contractors would be 
lower, which is as the results display. Given these points, the number of available vacancies and the 
intensity of competition in the labour market is more likely an explanation in the variation in contractor 
results than vice versa. 
 
The reason this direction of causation is important is two-fold. First, during periods, or in areas where 
the labour market competition is such that vacancies cannot absorb the unemployed, enforced job 
search of the type mandated by FND will be of limited utility. Second, judging how successful 
contractors have been becomes more difficult when local labour market conditions are noticeably 
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 DWP (2008) DWP (2008) Flexible New Deal Phase 1 Invitation to Tender, Department of Work and Pensions 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/fnd-for-info-specification.pdf (accessed 10/09/2011), p80 
756
 This is around 2% of all claimants, as 90% would clear before the 52 weeks where FND begins, and l less than 20% FND 
customers entered work.  
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affecting outcomes; if around half of the variance in outcomes is associated with labour demand 
(through vacancies) the already narrow difference between contractor performance narrows further 
still. Thus, identifying who has done well, and who less so, for the purposes of future contracts becomes 
problematic. The ramifications for the research question are equally clear, that the FND performance is 
contingent predominantly on the labour market helps to explain why it did not exceed the performance 
of previous programmes. This gets to the crux of the problem that the establishment of a quasi-market 
cannot circumvent the primary weakness of work-first programmes.  
 
The Supply Quality Context 
The previous section has discussed the importance of labour market demand for helping to explain the 
overall performance of the Flexible New Deal on a general level and particularly observed outcomes at 
the local level of individual contract areas.  It did this with an analysis that indicated the importance of 
the level of labour market competition (Claimant Count) and the claimant-to-vacancy ratios in helping 
to explain contractor performance.  However, another feasible explanation for the performance of 
Flexible New Deal contracts is the quality of labour supply, i.e. the capabilities of the claimants 
themselves. For example, a poorly performing contractor might complain that the skill levels or past 
labour market experience of their clients, were below that of their competitors’ clients. Two possible 
determinants of supply quality have been selected; local skill profiles and length of benefit receipt.  
 
A standard measure of supply quality is educational attainment and skills profiles. Educational 
attainment is an important determinant of unemployment probability, because the uneducated are 
more likely to be unemployed. In this, the literature is consistent that skills are a key determinant of 
labour market attachment. As Borjas summarises:  
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Education lowers unemployment rates for two distinct reasons. First, educated workers also 
invest more in on-the-job training. Because specific training ‘marries’ firms and workers, firms 
are less likely to lay off educated workers when the face adverse economic conditions. In 
addition, when educated workers switch jobs, they typically make the switch without suffering 
an intervening spell of unemployment.757  
 
In effect, the uneducated are often the last into work, the first put out of work, and the last back into 
employment. As such, the unskilled have a higher incidence of unemployment than their skilled 
counterparts758 and are more prone to repeated cycles of claiming benefits than the skilled.759 In light of 
this, it should be apparent that the higher level of skills in the local population, the lower the level of 
unemployment (and vice-versa).The evidence of this relationship has been identified using the Nomis 
Labour Market system, where the educational qualifications profiles of each contract area have been 
obtained. To examine this relationship, the proportion of the contract area population without any 
qualifications was plotted against Claimant Count data in each contract area. The statistical relationship 
of the two variables is shown in Table 7.10.  
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 Borjas, G. (1996) Labor Economics, McGraw Hill, Singapore, p437 
758 For example see Nickell, S. and Bell, B. (1995) The Collapse in Demand for Unskilled Labour Across the OECD; Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy v.11.1, p 41 
759
 Carpenter, H. (2006) Repeat Jobseeker's Allowance Spells, DWP Research Report, No. 394, HM Stationary Office, Norwich, 
pp66-68 
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 Table 7.10 Correlation of Contract Area population without qualifications and Contract Area Claimant 
Count 
 Claimant Count 
Unemployment 
Percentage of 
Population Without 
Qualifications 
Claimant Count 
Unemployment 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .803** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 24 24 
Percentage of Population 
Without Qualifications 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.803** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System
760
 
 
In accordance with the literature, the positive relationship between the skills profile of the contract area 
and the proportion of unemployment within it is statistically strong. We would therefore expect (given 
the close relationship between the Claimant Counts and Short Job Outcomes) a firm statistical 
relationship between qualifications profiles of contract areas and the FND provider’s Short Job 
Outcomes. 
 
Data on the qualifications of Flexible New Deal participants in individual contract areas is not available, 
and nor are qualifications data matched with unemployment duration. We know however from ONS 
data from 2004 that ‘Unemployment rates are highest for people with no qualifications, and so is the 
likelihood that they will have a longer length of unemployment.’ 761 We also know from the large sample 
of FND customers used by the Policy Studies institute that 34% of their FND interviewees reported 
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 NomisWeb (2011) Annual Population Survey, and Claimant Counts by Ward Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=29  (accessed 10/10/2011) 
761
 ONS (2004) Labour Market Characteristics of Short-term and Long-term Unemployed, Analysis in Brief, Labour Market 
Trends April 2004, p142 
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having no qualifications,762 more than double the proportion of the contract area population without 
qualifications, which across all contract areas is a mean of 13.1%.763764 Thus, it is reasonable to expect 
that the proportion of people without qualifications in the contract area will be influential on the Short 
Job Outcomes achieved by providers. By plotting the available data of contract area population with no 
qualifications against the Short Job Outcomes of contractors, an observable relationship between the 
variables exists. The relationship is moderate and statistically significant at the 95% level, as shown in 
Table 7.11. 
 
Table 7.11 Correlation of Contract Area Population Without Skills and Contractor Short Job Outcomes. 
 Short Job 
Outcomes 
Percentage of 
Population Without 
Qualifications 
Short Job Outcomes 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.478* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .018 
N 24 24 
Percentage of Population 
Without Qualifications 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.478* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .018  
N 24 24 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report
765
 
The relationship was, as expected, negative, and statistically significant to the 95% level. The findings 
show that the more people with no qualifications in the contract area was associated with lower Short 
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 Vegeris, S. et al. (2011) Flexible New Deal Evaluation: Customer Survey and Qualitative Research Findings, Policy Studies 
Institute and Department of Work and Pensions, Research Report No 758, p155 
763
 Author’s analysis of NomisWeb (2011) Annual Population Survey, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/construct/components/variableComponent.asp?menuopt=7&subcomp=130 (accessed 
10/10/2011) 
764
 At the other end of the spectrum, only 4% of the survey sample had a degree level qualification or higher.  
765
 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) and  
NomisWeb (2011) Annual Population Survey: Qualifications, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/construct/components/variableComponent.asp?menuopt=7&subcomp=130 (accessed 
10/10/2011) 
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Job Outcomes. Despite the connection, the relationship between contractor performance and 
educational attainment is problematic, due to the inadequate fit of the data; specifically the educational 
attainment data applies to the entire population and not the profile of Flexible New Deal customers. 
This is something that is not easily corrected since skills profiles of FND customers are not available at 
the Contract Area level. Further corroboration of the relationship is found by plotting each level of 
qualifications of the Contract Area (NVQ1, 2,3, and 4+) against Short Job Outcomes contracts achieved, 
as shown below in the four positive regression lines on Figure 7.7. 
 
Figure 7.7 Contract Area Skills Profiles and Contractor Short Job Outcomes  
  
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report766 
 
 Figure 7.7 shows that areas with high skills profiles tend to be associated with higher Short Job 
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http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=construct&version=0&dataset=17  (accessed 10/10/2011) 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
Sk
ill
e
d
 L
o
ca
l P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Short Job Outcomes 
NVQ1 
NVQ2 
NVQ3 
NVQ4 
266 
 
Outcomes. With more data specifying the qualifications profiles of Flexible New Deal Customers more 
could be understood of the influence of the quality of participants on Short Job Outcomes, and this data 
should be made publically available for analysis because this would serve to identify, and factor out, 
what influence labour supply was having on active labour market policy performance. Without this, it is 
only possible to speculate that qualifications of the pool of FND customers in each contract area are of 
lesser influence than the demand for labour. What is clear is that qualifications are associated with not 
only the quality of supply, but also volume of supply (shown in Table 7.10). The literature also suggests 
that labour demand can also influence skills profiles, as areas that have more vacancies attract people 
with higher skills while low skilled individuals tend to be less geographically mobile.767  
 
LTU Proportions as a performance determinant 
In light of the poor fit of the data discussed above, a better indication of client supply quality might be 
found in the claimant count data.  The evidence provided in Chapter 2 explained that deficient or 
protracted work histories make the reemployment of customers more difficult, and in particular lengthy 
unemployment spells are likely to make the long-term unemployed less attractive to employers.768  In 
order to assess the effects of unemployment history, data relating to the length of claimant 
unemployment is therefore an instructive indication of the quality of supply in individual labour 
markets. Using the Nomis Local Labour market system the fit of the data is stronger that the skills sets, 
because all of those claiming the Jobseekers Allowance for 12-months or more in the defined contract 
areas were eligible for Flexible New Deal. The total number of Jobseekers Allowance claimants over 12 
months for each contract area was calculated for the period of operation (October 2009-May 2011). The 
process was repeated for those out of work for 24-months, and 24-month claimant volumes were 
recorded as a percentage proportion of the 12-month volumes for each contract area. These were then 
                                                          
767
 See for example Borsch-Supan, A. (1990) Education and its Double-Edged Impact on Mobility, Economics of Education 
Review, v91. Pp39-53 
768
 Manning, A. (2002) Pretty Vacant: Recruitment in Low-Wage Labour Markets, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statsitics, 
v62, pp766-768 
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correlated against contractor’s Short Job Outcomes. The association between the proportion of 24-
month claimants and Short Job Outcomes can be seen in Table 7.12  
 
Table 7.12 Correlation between Contract Area Proportion of JSA claimants out of work for two or 
more years and Contractor Short Job Outcomes 
 
 Short Job 
Outcomes 
Proportion of 
FND eligible out 
of work for 2 
Years + 
Short Job Outcomes 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.259 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .222 
N 24 24 
Proportion of FND eligible 
out of work for 2 Years + 
Pearson Correlation -.259 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .222  
N 24 24 
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report769  
Table 7.12 reveals a surprisingly weak relationship between long-term unemployment and contract 
performance.770 While negative (as expected), it is not statistically significant.771 There are several 
possible explanations why such a weak relationship was identified. The first is that the proportions of 
those claiming benefits for two years is not a large enough proportion of the total to impact the data 
(as, on average, less than a quarter of those out of work for one year continue to be unemployed for 
two or more years). Further evidence is displayed by looking to the base of the second column on Table 
7.13, which indicated only a very moderate relationship between the Claimant Count and 24-month+ 
Claimant Count. An alternative explanation is that it could provide evidence of ‘cherry picking’ of clients 
– we would expect a higher proportion of 24-month+ claimants to drag on a providers outcomes; that 
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 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd (accessed 11/04/2011 ) and NomisWeb (2011) Jobcentre Plus 
Vacancies, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=29  (accessed 10/10/2011) 
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 In the Scottish Contract Area, 18% of those unemployed for 12 months continued to be unemployed at least a further 12 
months, in Birmingham and Solihull the proportion was 35%. 
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 For example see Machin, S. and Manning, A. (1999) The Causes and Consequences of Long Term Unemployment in Europe, 
Handbook of Labour Economics, v.3 [ebook] P3107 
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they do not may give grounds to speculate that results are unaffected as providers focus on those 
closest to the labour market as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6.  
 
 Table 7.13 illustrates the relationships between these factors.  As can be seen, most of the variables 
present are co-dependent. The Claimant Count is both a constituent part of the JSA-Vacancy Ratio, and 
the proportion claiming JSA for over 2-years. The only purely distinct independent variable is the no-
qualifications variable, which as predicted, is closely associated with local Claimant Count, but less 
associated with Short Job Outcomes. Summary, it is difficult to say with any certainty the exact effect of 
Claimant Count unemployment on Short Job Outcomes due to the coliniarity of skills and 
unemployment. From the data it is safer to assume that skills influence labour demand, which more 
heavily influences the Short Job Outcomes achieved by suppliers.   
Table 7.13 Triangular Correlation Matrix of Contractor 13-Week Outcomes and Key Contract Area 
Labour Market Variables 
 
 
Sh
o
rt
 J
o
b
 
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s 
C
la
im
an
t 
C
o
u
n
t 
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
JS
A
 t
o
 V
ac
an
cy
 
R
at
io
 in
 F
N
D
 
C
o
n
tr
ac
t 
A
re
a 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
Q
u
al
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
FN
D
 
el
ig
ib
le
 o
u
t 
o
f 
w
o
rk
 
fo
r 
2
 Y
ea
rs
 +
 
 
Short Job Outcomes 1.000     
Claimant Count Unemployment -.759 1.000    
JSA to Vacancy Ratio in FND 
Contract Area 
-.686 .745 1.000   
Population Without Qualifications -.478 .803 .365 1.000  
Proportion of FND eligible out of 
work for 2 Years + 
-.259 .421 .376 .194 1.000 
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report772 
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While limitations in the data indicate that the evidence must be treated with caution, there are several 
observations that can be made.  First, the variance in contractor performance can be accounted for by 
the demand and supply-side factors identified in this chapter, and these seem to account predominantly 
for the variance.773 The influence of the labour market on programme performance is also evidence 
when considering that the variance was considerably wider across the programme than within dual 
contract areas (10.7% against 3.5% respectively). These factors not only imply that that the work-first 
system is highly contingent on the local environment, but it also renders the identification of successful 
providers deserving of future contracts very difficult. If one performed well, but in a (relatively) healthy 
labour market, against another who performed badly in a weak area, the government face difficulties in 
establishing (as is intended of a contracted quasi-market) the stronger performer out of the two. As 
Glennester argued, the purpose of contracting out services is based on the following logic: ‘Those who 
seemed to offer the most efficiently run services would get the contracts. Regular tendering for new 
contracts would ensure that if a company or public agency were not performing well, it would lose its 
contract. X-inefficiency would be squeezed from the service.’774 
 
Nevertheless, all performed below expectations of both 13-week and 26-week sustained employment 
outcomes, and performances were strongly associated with where they were operating (A4E for 
instance moved 15.6% of starts in SJOs in London, but 21.8% in Cambridgeshire). Caution must be 
applied in explaining why this is the case, but from the data available it can be suggested that the 
relationships between supplier outcomes and quantity of demand variables were stronger than quality 
of supply variables, as presented in this summary of correlations: 
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 A multiple regression of all of the supply and demand factors was undertaken and returned an r-square of 0.71, implying 
that 71% of variation in Short Job Outcomes is accounted for labour market factors. The remaining 29% is attributable to 
factors not identified, including provider performance. However, the coliniarity of all but one of the variables rendered the 
multiple regression model open to the risk of over-pronouncing the effects of the of the predictors.  
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Table 7.14 Summary of Correlations  
 
Claimant 
Count 
ILO 
Unemployment 
JSA Claimant 
to Vacancy 
Ratios 
Population 
Without 
Qualifications 
Proportion of 
Population 2 
years 
unemployed 
Correlation 
with Short Job 
Outcomes 
-0.759 -0.628 -0.686 -0.477 -0.259 
R
2 
0.576 0.394 0.471 0.227 0.067 
 
Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report775 
 
On each measure, the quantity of demand for labour on the Claimant Count, JSA-Vacancy Ratios, and 
ILO Unemployment was consistently lower in poorly performing contract areas than in those producing 
above average outcome. The consequences of this have been explored in the final chapter.  
 
Expenditure as a determinant of sub-target performance 
From the evidence presented above the Flexible New Deal appeared not to deliver a ‘step-change’ in 
Employment Outcomes relative to other simultaneous and previous. This section briefly covers whether 
the level of expenditure was responsible for the programmes performance by exploring the gross cost 
per participant and comparing this to other programmes.   
 
An analysis of the cost of the programme relative to its outcomes a common tool for understanding the 
relative efficacy of a programme. As Smith indicates, it also serves to remove some of the subjectivity in 
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 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
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declaring policy success or failure in terms of its consumption of public resources.776 This is because ‘the 
central objective of most forms of cost analysis is to estimate the relative efficiency of competing policy 
alternatives.’777 It therefore does not assert that one programme is good, and another bad, rather than 
being a useful tool for implying that, on a set of given objectives, one programme might be more 
efficient than another. This section is not a Cost-Benefit Analysis per se; cost benefit analyses in 
employment programmes have traditionally undertook a net impact on government expenditure, 
inclusive of both the direct cost of the programme, and the fiscal impact of the reduction in benefit 
receipt in increase in tax receipt. Without the longitudinal data pertaining to FND net impact, such an 
exercise is not possible. However, it is common to calculate the gross expenditure per participant, per 
year, to calculate the costs of the programme, with the DWP doing exactly this in its representations to 
the Work and Pensions Select Committee in establishing estimated cost of FND778 as have the Centre for 
Economic and Social inclusion in providing estimates for the cost of FND.779 
 
To establish the costs of the Flexible New Deal requires two elements; an understanding of the overall 
costs of the programme, and the number of units the expenditure is to account for.  The second part is 
already known, that 407,730 participants joined the Flexible New Deal. The cost of the programme is 
complicated by the way payments were made. There were three elements to the funding of Flexible 
New Deal that organisations were paid for:  
 
1. The Service Fee (20% of annual contract value); 
2. The Short Job Outcome Fee (50% of annual contract value divided by expected FND customers); 
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 Smith, K.B. in Moran, M. et al. (eds) (2006) The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford University Press, p737. 
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3. The Sustained Outcome Fee (30% of annual contract value divided by expected FND 
customers).780 
 
The contract value is set by the Department of Work and Pensions and is calculated by the cost of 
anticipated outcomes. On the national level this was expected to amount to £236.59million maximum 
spend per contract year, for a period of at least five, but up to seven years. In order to ensure a healthy 
level of liquidity to absorb some of the start-up costs associated with the implementation of  an 
outcomes based contract programme (such as the purchase of offices, equipment and the employment 
of staff) the annual service fee was front-loaded.  As the DWP advised potential providers:   
 
In recognition of this, the service fee payments will be front loaded, to assist suppliers with their 
cash flow in the early part of the contract life, and will be paid at four rates over the life of the 
contract:  
 58 per cent of the average annual contract value for the first six months of the contract;  
• 32 per cent
∗ 
of the average annual contract value for the next six months; and  
• 13.8 per cent
∗ 
of the average annual contract value during years two to five; and  
• 0 (zero) per cent for years six and seven.781 
 
Initially, it was recognised that the early years the programme would cost Exchequer considerably more 
then later years. Table 7.15 provides the governments estimated service fee by year, but due to a 
change in the economic and market climate during the initial phases of the programme service fees 
were revised upwards to account for a predicted rise in FND volumes of 300%.782  As such, the service 
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 DWP (2009) Flexible New Deal Invitation to Tender and Provision Specification, Department of Work and Pensions [online] 
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fee was altered from 20% of the annual contract value to 40% of the annual contract value. On the basis 
of DWP projections of caseload volumes, a doubling of the fee for a tripling of the customers might have 
risked the quality of services delivered, and risked the health of the immature welfare market. In reality, 
caseload volumes rose only 49% above initial projections.783 This change was to last for the first two 
years of contracts and then return to 20% thereafter. The revised outcomes payments are presented 
alongside the original fees in Table 7.15. 
 
Table 7.15 Intended and Revised Flexible New Deal Service Fees by Contract Year 
Stage of Programme Service Fee at 20% 
(Millions) 
Service Fee at 40% 
(Millions) 
Year 1 £212.93 £425.86 
Year 2 £32.64 £65.28 
Year 3 £32.64 £32.64 
Year 4 £32.64 £32.64 
Year 5 £32.64 £32.64 
Year 6 £0 £0 
Year 7 £0 £0 
TOTAL £343.49 £589.06 
Source: Adapted from DWP Flexible New Deal Invitation to Tender784 
 
As Table 7.16 illustrates the revised figures added considerably to the overall costs of the programme, 
particularly as frontloaded fees would not have to be repaid to the government, despite the 
cancellation of the programme within the second year of contract. This appears to have created some 
perverse incentives in the market. Figure 7.8  provides an indication of this problem.  
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Figure 7.8 Service Fee Expenditure Before and After DWP Changes 
 
Source: Adapted from DWP Flexible New Deal Invitation to Tender785 
 
Observable from the graph is that the revision of service fees over the first two years resulted in 
payments equal to the total contract values for both years of operation. Therefore, in order to make 
profit during the first (and only) two years of the Flexible New Deal, contractors did not need to move a 
single individual into work. This adds further texture to understanding why the quasi-market did not 
deliver more outcomes exceeding the legacy employment programmes, because, in the knowledge that 
the programme was abolished a year into the contract, the pressure associated with an payment-by-
outcome system had been largely removed. Summarily, the doubling of service fees rendered a quasi-
market intended to be driven by market signals subject to severely perverse incentives.  
 
Moving onto total expenditure, the DWP provided the following breakdown of Flexible New Deal gross 
costs, shown in Table 7.17. 
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Table 7.17 Flexible New Deal Total expenditure 
Costs by Category of Payment (nearest £1m) 
Service Fee £626,000,000 
Short Job Outcomes £105,000,000 
Sustained Job Outcomes £39,000,000 
Total £770,000,000 
Source: Department of Work and Pensions786 
 
These final costs have been revised down to a total of £749.8million.787 With 407,690 participants on 
the entire programme, this equates to a gross expenditure per programme start of £1,839. These costs 
differ per year; in year one expenditure was £505.8 million with 299,250 participants, at a cost of £1690 
per individual, and in year two the total costs came down significantly, due to the fall in service fee 
outlay, to £244 million. The dramatic decline in the number of participants joining the Flexible New 
Deal, to just 108,450 in year 2 rendered the cost to the Department for Work and Pensions actually 
higher on a gross spend per individual, at £2249.This was close to the Centre for Economic and Social 
Inclusion’s original estimate of gross expenditure per participant of £2,200 per unit.788  Put into 
comparative context, the latest figures provided by the Department of Work and Pensions based on the 
same calculations are from 2005-2006 and are given in Table 7.18. 
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Table 7.18 Gross Expenditure per participant of active measures (2005-2006) 
ALMP Cost per participant 
NDYP £866 
ND25+ £983 
PSL NDYP £1,177 
PSL ND25+ £1,177 
EZ 18-24 £1,296 
EZ 25+ £1,167 
Source: Adapted from House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee789 
 
As is evident from the table, even after accounting for inflation, the Flexible New Deal had a higher level 
of expenditure per head that the legacy employment programmes. Many before had argued that the 
step-change in performance would be unachievable with the level of funding attached,790 but it is 
apparent that the FND had a higher spend per head that other programmes and yet did not produce a 
higher proportion of outcomes to reflect this.  Thus, on the question of efficiency, during the length of 
the programme the FND had not demonstrated greater efficiency that the legacy policies.   
 
Conclusion  
A number of conclusions have emerged from the data analysis presented in this chapter in relation to 
the performance of the Flexible New Deal. Foremost, it is clear that the government did not achieve 
what it set out to do with its market experiment in the delivery of the FND.  Recall, it wanted: 
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1. Suppliers to meet or exceed the Short Job Outcome targets (13-weeks actual work) agreed 
in their contract;  
2. Suppliers were to meet or exceed the Sustained Job Outcome
 
targets (26-weeks actual 
work) agreed in their contract;  
3. Suppliers were to deliver a service that represented excellent value for money and 
delivered a step-change in FND performance as compared to previous programmes; 
 
In relation to the first two success factors, the evidence presented in this chapter is clear that the FND 
did not meet either of these DWP objectives. In Northern Britain and the West Midlands, some 
providers were even further away from achieving these than others (e.g. Dudley MBC). This exposes a 
problem not uncommon to public policies that a solution to a problem in one area may not be a 
sufficient response in another. Taking McDonnell’s view, ‘the success or otherwise of policies cannot 
easily be separated from their contexts.’791 Thus to consider the Flexible New Deal as a national ‘failure’ 
might be inaccurate; the Flexible New Deal produced in the aggregate results more or less equivalent to 
those of the simultaneous programmes examined. Yet, it is clear that, first, it fell far short of its national 
targets, and second that some labour markets provided riper terrain for work-first initiatives than 
others, and therefore while the FND operation in the Black Country might be considered a failure, this is 
less the case in the Surrey contracts.  
 
The first conclusion to be drawn is that the targets established were optimistic, and when examined 
against performance of other schemes, both in circumstances, they appear to be excessive. This point 
was made prior to implementation by the Work and Pensions Select Committee, which remarked:  
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It is right DWP should attach challenging targets to the Flexible New Deal programme but it is 
important that they are realistic. Evidence to us suggested that the FND targets would require a 
37.5% improvement in job outcome performance over what has been achieved by DWP 
contractors in the past and this has to be done with a significant reduction in funding compared 
to the best performing DWP programmes.792 
 
When asked by the Committee (in writing) to explain the calculations on which targets were based, the 
Department responded that they were based on the best performances of Employment Zones and that 
‘they reflect a considered view of what the new approach allows for’.793 That a contractor might (once 
the programme outputs had matured) have been able to achieve a target of 50% of short job outcomes 
appears on the Employment Zones evidence to be difficult, if not impossible. The expectation that 91% 
of those achieving 13-week employment would continue to in work at the 26-week point was, on the 
other hand, highly unlike given that this demanded an increase exceeding 100% of past performances.  
 
While poorly conceived targets reflect badly on the Flexible New Deal, these cannot be responsible for 
why a ‘step change’ in employment outcomes did not occur. Instead, there were a collection of reasons 
as to why the policy did not make any significant advances on its predecessors, and these are 
considered below.   
Reflecting first on the contracting of active labour market policy, the establishment of a quasi-market in 
welfare-to-work did not appear to be either the problem or solution. The isolated effects of the quasi-
market were empirically difficult to gauge without a simultaneous counterfactual, but three points can 
be made. First,  the market-based policy did not yield more effective outcomes than the state run 
policies of before. Second, the quasi-market did not use fewer resources per head than previous 
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schemes, and third the market did not with any great clarity distinguish the poorer providers from the 
better.  
 
The core weakness of the quasi-market was not the presence of private sector contractors, but rather 
the incentives structure they faced. As Bredgaard and Larsen argue ‘When responsibility for financing 
activities lies with the provider, there is a clear tendency toward under-investment in long-term and 
uncertain instruments, and a clear orientation towards work-first approaches.’794 The incentives 
structure served to institutionalise work-first where the outcome payments available were attached 
predominantly to labour market sustainment. The work-first emphasis was compounded through 
payment-by-results for 13-week and 26-week employment, which serves to limited the incentive to 
invest in extensive retraining programmes. Consequently, the ‘black-box’ approach which (theoretically) 
opened up a much wider scope for hybrid programmes where a combination of education, training, 
subsidies and employment outcomes could have been operated, in practice only emphasised labour 
market attachment.   
 
The risks of using work-first are well-catalogued (see Chapter 3 part 2). The most relevant of these 
criticisms is that in difficult economic conditions vast numbers of jobseekers will be left idle, which is the 
result of insufficient vacancies in the market combined with a lack of retraining opportunities that might 
allow the unemployed to have the requisite skills to fill existing vacancies. The consequence is that the 
entire raison d’etre of work-first programmes, where inadequate employment experience is responsible 
for the individual’s unemployment, is undermined.  Where the labour market cannot absorb the 
unemployed, individuals are moved further from the labour market in a downturn and the gaps in their 
employment record are extended. Jochem summarised this problem succinctly: 
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Active labour market policy is no panacea against unemployment or falls in employment. The 
instruments of labour market policy are mainly directed towards improving matching processes 
in the labour market in an effort to ensure that employment demand on the part of companies 
is satisfied by qualified workers.795  
 
This data analysis has observed that the results of the Flexible New Deal appear to reflect, rather than 
ameliorate the prevailing economic conditions of local labour markets. Indeed, Peck makes this exact 
point arguing that ‘work-first systems are predicated on specifically local labor-market conditions, such 
that their outcomes are quite different in buoyant as opposed to depressed job markets.’796 He follows 
this with the  astute observation that ‘in some senses, the purchase of the work-first policy package is 
weakest in precisely those areas where effective welfare-to-work programs are needed most: high 
unemployment areas.’797 This chapter has demonstrated with some clarity that areas of highest 
unemployment in the UK delivered the weakest Short Job Outcome performances. The FND was 
implemented in full knowledge of declining labour market conditions. Evidence of this fact was 
presented above in the form of the financial adjustments made by the Department of Work and 
Pensions in response to predictions that the downturn in the labour market beginning in 2008 would 
lead to a 300% expansion in caseload volumes.798 If any downturn in labour market conditions 
(predicted or otherwise) can be considered unfortunate, the problem was nevertheless treated with an 
insufficient solution.   
 
To texture understanding of why the FND did not outperform the legacy programmes, a number of 
implementation decisions have been identified. Throughout the FND’s 23-month operation, 
policymakers had unpicked many of the planned mechanisms that might have aided success. In 
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particular, in a policy realm dominated by the ‘incentives’ rhetoric, policy-makers removed many 
incentivising forces. The direct competition between providers was intended to be one of these driving 
forces, and it is clear that successive governments’ believed that direct competition would stimulate 
enhance performance because multiple contract areas are features of both FND, and its successor, the 
Work Programme.  The decision to limit the use of ‘market-sharing’, and the wholesale abandonment of 
consumer choice all but removed the idea of direct competition between providers. Putting aside the 
disincentives, weakening direct competition also engendered two problems. The first is that it rendered 
Single Contract Areas effectively identical to Dual Contract Areas, which made gathering evidence to use 
one model, rather than another difficult. The second problem is linked to the first, in that the lack of the 
competition dynamic to drive performance in Dual Contract Zones rendered the identification of future 
providers (or eliminating prospective providers) even less transparent.  
 
Another clear disincentive came from the adjusted financial arrangements. The fear of tripled caseload 
volumes mentioned above prompted the DWP to double the amount of already frontloaded service 
fees (monies paid regardless of outcomes) from 20 to 40%. In spite of being technically a system of 
payment by results, the funding arrangements in the first (and only) two years of the programme were 
weighted heavily towards the service fee payments. The announced abandonment of the contracts in 
the autumn of 2010 meant that the commercial pressure of profit derived payment-by-results based on 
volumes moved into work was not fully embedded. In contractual language, the state never properly 
transferred the ‘risk’ from the public to the private sector and the result was that, like under the 
problematic NDYP contracting model, payment was focussed at the input, and not at the output. There 
is an obvious tension in welfare markets between ensuring that contractors have sufficient capital 
stocks to take on risk, whilst also attempting to provide the sufficient profit incentive to shift individuals 
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into lasting employment.799 It was not obvious that this tension was successfully navigated under the 
Flexible New Deal. 
 
The last significant disincentive was the Coalition government’s announcement of the cancellation of 
the Flexible New Deal, while allowing it a further 12 months to operate. The DWP admitted to the Work 
and Pensions committee that this would inevitably cause ‘some disruption.’800 Indeed, from field visits 
to FND contractor premises during the final months it was apparent that services were being 
demobilised and staff transferred before services were terminated officially.  
 
McConnell argued that the ‘first basis, and the one most in line with the formalities of policy processes, 
is original intentions.’ 801 If from the perspective of the policy makers the first test of a policy is whether 
it meets its own objectives, on three of the five Critical Success Factors, the FND did not. If we take 
Etzioni’s two-prong approach to organisational success that a) ‘The actual effectiveness of a specific 
organisation is determined by the degree to which it realizes its goals’ and b) ‘The efficiency of an 
organisation is measured by the amount of resources used to produce one unit of output’,802 on both of 
these measures the data analysis has shown the network of providers have not achieved the established 
goals and costs reductions by a considerable margin.   
 
Ultimately, against the research questions the empirical analysis showed that the national 
implementation of a quasi-market in employment services did not lead to a demonstrably more 
effective system for transferring jobseekers from long-term benefit receipt to sustained employment. 
The market incentivised a work-first system that appeared to reflect the regional inequalities in the UK 
labour market, performing at their weakest in areas where vacancies were in the shortest supply. The 
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reflection of these regional inequalities rendered opaque the process for identifying the strongest, and 
weakest, employment service providers.  
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Conclusions: General and Specific 
 
This final chapter will reflect upon the evidence presented in this thesis, and consider the practical uses 
of the findings to policy-makers. It will begin with a summary of the key findings of this project 
concerning the capacities of active labour market policy, the labour market attachment model, and the 
contracting out of active measures. It will go on to detail the implications of the key findings, limited to 
several areas where lessons can be learned and where research might be explored further. Before 
exploring the specific conclusions of this thesis, there are a few broad observations to make.  
The first observation is that active labour market policies, in particular work-first policies have become a 
central tenet of the British labour market strategy. This has occurred for a series of reasons outlined in 
Chapter 2, which collectively are intertwined with the UK’s macro-economic performance. While not 
unique to the United Kingdom,803 over the past four decades the British economy has faced a series of 
complex and interconnected challenges, where demographic changes are applying pressure to public 
services, and global economic competitiveness are applying pressure on the UK labour market. The 
welfare state has consequently had to adapt, to shift priorities, and reorganise to respond to these 
endogenous and exogenous challenges.804 Active labour market policies, rightly or wrongly, have been 
deployed as one solution to the problems facing both the UK economy, and the UK welfare state.805  
As the problems that confront the UK economy emerged gradually, so did active measures to respond 
to them. Since the Conservatives introduced the Restart programme in 1986, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
demonstrated that active labour market policies have developed in increments to enhance the 
conditions on benefit recipients and retrench entitlements, while in turn having been opened up 
gradually to a wider range of delivery organisations. The gradualism apparent does not mean profound 
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change has not occurred; today, British activation programmes utilise unprecedented conditionality, 
and are delivered by a burgeoning network of multinational contractors, in a manner that would be 
unfamiliar to a citizen of the 1970s.   
Complementing the first observation is that the thesis, in Chapter 4, exposed a shift in elite approaches 
to the causes of unemployment In the British labour market. Four decades ago, British governments 
were predominantly concerned with boosting the demand for labour using Keynesian-style investment 
policies as the dominant mechanism for resolving unemployment; today, the primary concern is 
boosting the supply of labour.806 The endogenous and exogenous pressures on the economy and 
welfare state are part of the explanation for this, but, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, shifting ideological 
preferences and institutional structures are pertinent to this change of approach, as are they in 
determining the choices of certain styles of active labour market policies over others.  
The compound of these changes is a transformation of the way the British state interacts with the 
unemployed citizen.807 The shift is one from macro- to micro- level, where the state once sought to 
remedy long-term unemployment by intervening in the labour market, the state now predominantly 
(seeks to) remedy long-term unemployment by intervening in the lives of the claimant citizen.  Active 
labour market policies in conjunction with the benefit system are now the tools of this intervention. The 
question posed by the shift of focus is whether this different approach to the unemployment problem 
can rescue the UK economy, and welfare state, from pressures within and without.  
The Flexible New Deal, the Quasi-Market, and Competition 
The primary question of this study was whether the transition to a national contracted market in labour 
market attachment created a more effective and efficient system for transferring the unemployed from 
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benefits into work than those policies that came before. The measure of FND effectiveness was 
understood as the transfer of a greater proportion of jobseekers into 13-week employment, and 
efficiency understood as to do so using less financial resources. Before the FND was introduced, the 
international evidence on the matter of effectiveness favouring a quasi-market in work-first was limited. 
With respect to efficiency, some evidence of quasi-market advances in this area had been found, but no 
evidence from UK policies. The data analysis of the Flexible New Deal showed that, in this case at least, 
these conclusions still stand; the data produced no evidence of enhanced effectiveness or efficiency to 
support the transition to a national quasi-market in employment services. 
On the evidence from the Delivery Directorate Performance Report, contracting out to private and 
voluntary sector agents has not yielded the anticipated ‘step change’ in performance beyond existing 
ALMPs. The DWP had hoped for a minimum 13% ‘step change’ increase in 13-week outcomes above the 
best results of Employment Zones.808 This did not occur. Instead, the results chapter presented similar, if 
slightly weaker, results to those attained by Employment Zones. Given their similarities explained in 
Chapter 5, the similarity of their employment outcomes was not improbable. Less expected were the 
survey evidence findings from the Policy Studies Institute, who observed that FND participants were 
either equally, or less likely to have entered work than the predominantly public-sector delivered New 
Deal programmes’ participants.809 This also raises the question of whether a looser regulation of 
processes through the ‘black box’ (which also distinguished FND from the New Deals) will contribute to 
an improvement in employment outcomes. At present, the literature on the effectiveness of contracting 
out welfare-to-work services to the private sector remains without definitive conclusion. The evidence 
presented in this thesis serves to suggest that, for now, private provision has yet to attain its primary 
objective of improving employment outcomes and delivering the expected gains the theoretical 
literature suggests. With respect to efficiency, contracting out was costing the Exchequer more than in-
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house delivery, though with longer to run in the contract and service fees falling year on year, the costs 
of the programme were set to decline to levels similar to public sector provision. The decision of the 
coalition government to abort the programme after only two years prevented costs from falling, and 
arguably made FND appear more inefficient than it was to become.   
One of the secondary objectives of contracting out was the identification of strong and weak providers, 
in order to adjust future contracts accordingly to improve the efficiency of the whole market.810 A key 
contribution of this research was in exposing the complexity of identifying the successful contractors 
from the unsuccessful. The Social Market Foundation wrote that ‘The theoretical advantage of a 
competitive tendering process, such as that now underway for Phase 1 contracts, is that DWP will be 
able to identify those firms that are able to operate most efficiently.’811 In turn, ‘the process of re-
contracting therefore acts as a surrogate market mechanism, forcing poorly performing companies to 
exit and rewarding better performing ones with more business.’812 Yet, despite of the wealth of 
information regarding the performance of contractors, the data analysis  of individual contractor 
performance supplied in Chapter 7 showed the differences in contracted performance in the 
competitive, dual contract areas, to be small. The widest gap between contractors in any Dual Contract 
Area was 3.5%, but typically the difference in performance between the competing providers was 2% 
for Short Job Outcomes or less, and narrower still for Sustained Job Outcomes. In two areas, the 
performance differentials were particularly opaque. The Nottinghamshire Contract Area difference was 
only 0.2% on 13-week outcomes in favour of one provider, and 1.1% 26-week outcomes in favour of the 
other. In the Edinburgh Contract area, a similar occurrence was apparent, where one provider 
outperformed the other on 13-week outcomes by 0.5%, but the other contractor were more effective 
by 0.1% with respect to 26-week outcomes.  
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The data analysis also showed that the main difference between provider outcomes at the intra-
contract level was predominantly associated with the local labour market variables. Given the individual 
labour market characteristics of each of the contract areas, it is feasible that a provider in the worst 
performing contract area would have matched the performance of the providers in the best, had the 
labour market characteristics been different. The identification problem is even greater in Single 
Contract Areas, where the basis for measuring performance is solely against the meeting of targets 
(against which all providers fell far short).  
As a practical recommendation the DWP need to develop a system that is capable of identifying, and 
therefore compensating for the performance of contractors in different labour markets. Without 
stronger tools to identify local context, the contracting process risks inaccuracy, as well as inequity. At 
present under the Coalition’s Work Programme, the DWP have maintained national targets, but at a 
lower, more realistic 13-week outcome rate of 36%.813814 
In offering an appraisal of direct competition within areas as a performance driver, the data analysis 
also showed a limited difference between the performance of monopoly provider areas and dual 
contract areas.  As the results of contractors were predominantly contingent on labour market 
variables, judging the performance of a monopoly provider in one area against one in a dual contract 
area is challenging. The 0.2% difference between Single Contract Areas and Dual Contract Areas on the 
measure of 13-week outcomes does not represent a clear endorsement for direct competition within 
the welfare market. The important caveat to this, as Chapters 6 and 7 established, is that the 
implementation of FND differed markedly from initial plans, where the proposed drivers of performance 
(shifting market-share, and customer choice) were abandoned.815 This rendered the competitive 
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characteristics of Single and Dual Contract Areas largely homogenous.816 The lack of distinguishing 
features looks therefore to explain the absence of a significant edge in dual contract areas.    
To appreciate why the FND was no more effective than preceding programmes goes further than the 
competition elements. The similarities between the FND and EZs may have explained their similar 
results, but several differences were expected to boost the performance of FND. The longer, larger 
‘black box’ contracts than those of EZ’s were believed to facilitate an environment that would foster 
investment and innovation.817 Innovation however, did not appear to occur. The Policy Studies Institute 
offered a clear summary in this respect: 
A minimum prescription (‘black box’) approach to contracting employment services does not 
necessarily equate to more innovation and a wider choice or variety of services. The main 
observation of this research was that the intensity of advisory support varied between 
customers and during the 12-month period of participation. Despite limited prescription on 
what providers should deliver, little innovation was evident in the design and content of 
services.818 
According to Bredgaard and Larsen, this is a common problem facing quasi-markets where ‘the general 
impression is that, in spite of the freedom to choose their own methods, providers hardly ever come up 
with innovative solutions. Rather than developing new methods and innovating services, the providers’ 
primary focus is on survival.’819 Interviews with participants in the programme reflected this 
observation, where interviewees identified little difference between provider companies and the 
Jobcentre Plus. A large-scale survey of FND providers by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that despite 
                                                          
816
 The opportunity to test direct competition against area monopolies at the contract level now appears lost as the new 
Coalition Work Programme has installed Dual or Multiple Contract Areas across all contract districts and no Single Contract 
Areas remain.  
817
  House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2009) DWP's Commissioning Strategy and the Flexible New Deal, 
Second Report of Session 2008-2009, The Stationary Office, London, pp5-6 
818
 Vegeris, S. et al. (2011) Flexible New Deal Evaluation: Customer Survey and Qualitative Research Findings, Department of 
Work and Pensions Research Report no.758, Policy Studies Institute and IFF Research, p6 
819
 Bredgaard, T, and Larsen F. (2008) Quasi-Markets in Employment Policy; Do they deliver on their promises? Social Policy and 
Society v7.3, p345 
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some pockets of innovation that could boost effectiveness, ‘[these] examples of innovation were 
somewhat isolated, suggesting that there is further scope for the development of innovative 
approaches under black box.’820 The consequence is that if services provided by FND suppliers are 
similar to those already present in the UK ALMP it is difficult to identify the source of enhanced 
effectiveness. Furthermore, the prospects for innovation in the future appear dim. Taking Bredgaard 
and Larsen’s perspective, the stronger emphasis on outcome payments under the replacement for FND 
will serve only to enhance the survival instinct of using tried and tested methods (mainly work-first) to 
ensure that profits can be assured.    
In sum, the FND did not deliver a ‘step change’ in performance, principally because of its similarities 
with Employment Zones, but additionally the market features intended to boost performance were only 
partially implemented (e.g. market sharing and choice), or unharnessed (e.g. innovation). 
Reflections on work-first 
The competition dynamic may not have yielded the expected gains over preceding policies, but it is 
important also to consider why Flexible New Deal was so far from attaining its own targets, and why 
only 18 of every 100 participants found work lasting 13 or more weeks. The clear explanation for this is 
that the outcomes of FND were contingent on the prevailing economic conditions. Through the analysis 
of local labour markets and provider outcomes, the results serve to support the existing theory that 
work-first may be an effective counter to frictional unemployment where jobs are plentiful, but 
‘employability based programmes will yield only limited effects when operated in slack labor 
markets.’821 In the summer of 2008, a year before FND was implemented, Claimant Count 
Unemployment stood at 924,000; by the time FND was implemented, the Claimant Count had risen to 
1.6million. FND targets were extremely challenging in stronger economic circumstances, and the 
distance between targets and outcomes at the national level showed these targets to be simply 
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 Armstong, D. et al. (2011) Welfare to Work Commissioning: Wave Two Provider Survey, DWP Research Report no 757, 
HMSO, London,p80 
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 Peck, J. (2001) Workfare States, Guildford Press, London, p347 
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unrealistic during recession. At the local level, the distance from targets was even further in some 
contract areas. Figure 8.1 serves as a reminder of the evidence presented in Chapter 7.   
Figure 8.1 Contract Area JSA-Vacancy Ratio and Contractor Short Job Outcomes 
 
 Source: Nomis Local Labour Market System and DWP Delivery Directorate Report822 
What the evidence drawn from the individual contract zones has shown is that work-first is more 
appropriate in some labour markets than others. The correlations revealed that the relatively poor 
performance of contractors was closely associated with high volumes of jobseekers and low volumes of 
vacancies to absorb them. This was most visible in the evidence of a North-South divide in contractor 
performance. The policy consequences are nontrivial, that an emphasis on labour market attachment is 
markedly less likely to transform the prospects of those participants in Bromsgrove, Walsall and West 
Bromwich, than it is in Surrey, Sussex, Brighton or Hove, to the extent that the chances of entering 
employment lasting 13 weeks or more were 35% higher in the Surrey contract area. This is not a 
surprise, but it does have some important implications and raises several political issues that are 
discussed below.   
 
                                                          
822
 DWP (2011) Delivery Directory Performance Report, Department of Work and Pensions, online 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=ddfnd [accessed 11/04/2011] and NomisWeb (2011) Jobcentre Plus Claimant 
Counts and Vacancies, Nomis Local Labour Market System [online] 
http://nmweb.dur.ac.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?theme=29  [accessed 10/10/2011] 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
10 15 20 25 
JS
A
 C
la
im
an
ts
 p
er
 
V
ac
an
cy
 
Short Job Outcomes as % of Starts 
292 
 
Ultimately, the results of the weaker outcomes in weaker labour markets highlight the contradiction in 
work-first: that if the explanatory factor for the individual’s unemployment is his/her inadequate 
employment history, then where work placements and employment are in short supply, the 
employment profiles of participants will worsen, not improve. Ironically, therefore, in order to help the 
long-term unemployed compete in the labour market when economic circumstances have improved, 
providers or governments may need to incentivise employers to take these workers on. This may 
involve wage subsidies, or employment related training; both of which were features of the old, public-
run New Deals.  
 
History Matters: Quasi-markets and positive feedback mechanisms 
The failure of FND to meet the expectations established for it by the DWP would not be of much 
consequence, were a departure from this strategy apparent. However, the continued deployment of 
quasi-market work-first in post-FND Britain reiterates the path dependency described in Chapter 4. 
Having been embedded by institutional decisions taken in the past and legitimated by public opinion, a 
departure from seemingly unsuccessful welfare reforms was improbable. For instance, the embedding 
of a ‘black box’ welfare market where processes are not rigorously governed by the central agency (in 
this case the DWP) results in an inevitable loss of control at the centre. Donahue and Zeckhauser 
warned that transferring state control can also lead to ‘unanticipated or unrecognized losses of 
control.’823  
Historical institutionalism frames the effects contracting will have on control, not only now, but in the 
future. The path-dependency argument of Chapter 4 recognised that there are intertwined ideas 
embedded in the incremental route to stricter work-first requirements and contracting out. The 
continued progress towards reducing governmental responsibility for unemployment appear a likely 
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 Donahue, J.D. and Zeckhauser, R.J. (2006) in Moran, M. et al. (eds.) (2006) The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, OUP, 
Oxford, p507 
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outcome of repeated welfare reform rounds, because straying from the approach is increasingly difficult 
as certain policy approaches and actors are ‘locked in’ to the policy-making process, which other actors 
and policy options are locked out.  The institutional arrangements influence this unrecognised loss of 
control, where one step towards a market in employment services renders a reverse step more difficult. 
Therefore, while the New Labour government may have wished to utilize the private sector ‘not to 
replace the welfare state but to augment the public mechanism for the delivery of welfare services’824, 
where competencies are lost they can be difficult to reacquire. The competencies might be personnel, 
(it is worth noting that during FND implementation the Jobcentre Plus were reducing their headcount), 
expertise, and also estate capacity as premises are sold or mothballed.825 A loss of skills, headcount and 
premises can make re-establishing delivery through the public employment service resource-intensive, 
and thus unattractive relative to the established market. This loss of capabilities is compounded by the 
use of payment-by-results that depress the costs of pursuing active labour market policies as 
(theoretically) the government will only pay for successful provision, and therefore contracting a 
outcomes-based market, in theory, is cheaper than established large, state-operated active labour 
market policies. Both examples are typical of positive feedback mechanisms, which serve to reinforce 
path-dependency. Donahue and Zeckhauser summarise this problem effectively: 
‘Opting for indirect production may discourage or even preclude the maintenance of capacity 
for direct government action. Any contractor knows that today’s contract tends to build market 
power on a contract for tomorrow. To the extent that government becomes dependent on 
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 Smith, M.J. in Ludlam, S. and Smith, M.J (eds.) (2004) Governing as New Labour: Policy and Politics under Blair, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, p223 
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private capabilities, it puts itself in a disadvantaged position in future rounds of negotiation with 
its agents.’826 
The erosion of the government’s position of power is not a new concept, and reflects a broader account 
of a loss of central control that might be difficult to claw back. Rhodes wrote the seminal Hollowing Out 
argument back in 1994 to explain the diminishing role of centralized authority through the 
fragmentation of power in the British state: as the role of autonomous agencies and private service 
providers expands, the capacity of government to control them shrinks.827  Central control, once 
relinquished to a network of private providers, may be difficult to regain; and therefore the likely 
preference of market delivery over state delivery is enhanced.  
At present, the position of the state is not irreversible but its position of power continues to weaken. At 
present, it retains a large role in the administration of employment programmes for the short- and long-
term unemployed through the public agency, Jobcentre Plus, and retains responsibility for the 
distribution of benefits. In the contracting process the state retains a reasonable negotiating position 
with contractors because it is, at least partially, able to provide a service to all unemployed people. 
However, Deakin and Walsh raised a valuable point in relation to contracting social care that seems 
pertinent to this dilemma:  
The degree to which risk is borne by the purchaser or the provider will partly depend on power. 
In social care, for example, those local authorities with fewer providers have tended to bear 
more of the contractual risk. In the second year of community care contracting some authorities 
have cut the price they are willing to pay simply because they know that providers will not be 
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able to do anything about it. The pattern of contracts that is developing is not dependent simply 
on efficiency but also power considerations.828 
The long-run ability of the state to retain a dominant position over contractors will therefore hinge on 
the direction of dependence in their relationship. If the state continues to reduce its own capacity to 
deliver labour market policies by reducing the services it provides, and handing delivery to non-state 
actors then its bargaining position will inevitably weaken as the state becomes dependent on essential, 
institutionalised contractors. This could in the long-run push up the costs of contracted delivery.  
The consequence of the weakening central control is that, despite the data analysis showing that the 
efficiency gains expected of quasi-market work-first were not realised, a reversal of policy (despite 
repeated claims by Labour and Coalition governments of adherence to an evidence-based policy 
approach) is unlikely.829  
 
 
History Still Matters – The Coalition and the Work Programme  
The continuation of the path is observed with the change of administration in Westminster. The 
termination of FND over the autumn of 2010 by the new Coalition government830  was an opportunity 
for a different approach (perhaps more centralised/regulated control) to be established. A departure 
might also have been an expected consequence given the public mauling levelled at the Flexible New 
Deal by various members of the incoming cabinet.831 However, the path was further entrenched during 
the FND wind-up period, where contractors were invited to bid for a new active labour market policy: 
the coalition government’s Work Programme.  
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The Work Programme is a mandatory, work-first active labour market programme provided principally 
by private sector providers. In all of its essentials, it is identical to the Flexible New Deal; private sector 
contractors will work with the largest group of long-term unemployed (age 25+) when they have been in 
receipt of the Jobseeker’s allowance for 12 months.832 Young jobseekers will join the programme at 9 
months and there will be flexible arrangements to fast track other claimant groups. Furthermore, 
according to the prospectus ‘The Work Programme will be a ‘black box’ contract with no prescribed way 
of working. It will be for the prime contractors to determine in discussion with partners, including 
Jobcentre Plus, how they will work collaboratively to deliver the programme.’833  
The funding arrangements contain three core components of a) an attachment fee, b) a job outcome 
fee, and c) sustainment fees contingent on how long the individual stays in work,834 a configuration 
remarkably similar to the Flexible New Deal, as is the expectation contractors will compete within 
geographical areas over quality and claimant volumes. Even on the ground, the programmes appear 
little different. A participant who had been on both the Flexible New Deal and Work programme 
recalled ‘There is no difference. I’m not entirely too sure, but it is the same structure [as] when I was on 
the FND.’835 
The similarity between the Flexible New Deal and the Work Programme has received little academic 
attention, an unusual fact given that the best indication of the performance of the new programme is 
the performance of the FND. Ian Mulheirn (director of the SMF and author of the only substantive 
critical report into the Flexible New Deal) identified this very point and argued that: ‘if the [DWP] 
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believes providers are doing a poor job, that augurs ill for the Work Programme, which builds on exactly 
the same principles as the Flexible New Deal.’836    
Interim data appears to support this argument. Full first year results for the Work Programme are due in 
late autumn, but figures leaked to Channel 4 News show one of the leading providers, A4E, as having 
achieved a Short Job Outcome rate of 3.5%.837 From the first 10 months of operation, the company 
moved 4000 out of 115,000 participants into work lasting 13 or more weeks. 838 The opening 10 months 
of the Flexible New Deal programme were slightly ahead of this in spite of accusations of a ‘slow start’. 
Between October 2009 and July 2010, providers moved 13,760 of the 260,092 participants into Short 
Job Outcomes.839 This is a rate of 5.28%. To compare like-for-like, A4E handled 51,270 of these starts, 
and moved 2,710 into work in the first 10 months, an identical proportion of Short Job Outcomes at 
5.28%. With the Work Programme struggling to get off to a strong start, Mulheirn adopts a similar 
argument to this thesis, arguing that the labour market is the key determinant of performance: 
At the root of [the problem] is the fact that providers are on the hook for something they can't 
control – the labour market. A scheme that was supposed to hold providers accountable for 
their performance has ended up holding them accountable – and penalising their customers – 
for the performance of the economy. The programme was designed in a boom. Is it any wonder 
that it can't cope with economic stagnation on a scale not seen for 80 years?840 
Mulheirn’s assertion that providers are bearing the burden of the UK’s recession is an important factor 
in the continuation of path dependency. The Work Programme’s stronger emphasis on payment by 
results than FND will continue to feed path-dependency. The greater proportion of financing that is 
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contingent on employment outcomes, the greater the burden of financial risk is transferred to the 
delivery organisations. This makes failing employment programmes appear directly inexpensive, and 
naturally makes paying for process comparatively unappealing. Thus, without a critical juncture 
involving a seismic political event, the collapse of the welfare market, or a paradigm shift in ideology, 
the loss of control at the centre will continue, the quasi-market will expand, and employment-based 
conditionality will deepen.    
 
Practical Matters 
There are a few practical issues to consider before exploring areas of future research. First, it is notable 
that much of the policy-making community and academic research in this field recognize that active 
labour market policy is not a panacea. Unfortunately, it is not clear that politicians of all stripes 
recognize this.  
Part of this appears reflected in the attitudes to unemployment and the unemployed in the UK. The 
regular emphasis on increasing conditionality and benefit sanctions on the unemployed during each 
round of welfare reform logically assigns the responsibility for labour market status with the individual, 
with little or no emphasis on the responsibilities of market or state. As chapters 1 and 2 highlight, the 
purpose of active labour market policy in the short to medium term is to solve frictional unemployment, 
rather than resolve some of the other persistent causes of unemployment, such as structural change in 
the local or national economy where communities are rendered redundant by falling demand for goods 
and factory closures. The impact, at the least in the short term, that can be made by active labour 
market programmes on demand side is unproven, and remains a theoretical premise. The implication is 
that policymakers should demonstrate more caution in conflating solutions to frictional unemployment 
with solutions to demand-deficient unemployment. In doing so, it could encourage a more holistic 
assessment of unemployment’s causes and use a multi-pronged approach.  
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In recognising that welfare-to-work programmes are not a panacea,841 programmes should be set with 
targets that are more realistic, and more sensitive to the local environment. National targets are blunt 
instruments that make providers in weaker areas look like underperformers, while exaggerating the 
performance of those in stronger markets. The model in Figure 8.1 could be a good starting place for 
establishing these targets.   
 
If work-first is here to stay, as path-dependence would suggest, in a deteriorating labour market 
something more is needed because vacancies will not exist on a level to absorb the unemployed, thus 
extending the gaps in the participants’ CVs, making them less employable in the future. What form this 
should take is open to question. The Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion have argued for an 
expansion of apprenticeships, to prepare the young unemployed for the upturn, and a series of targeted 
subsidies for private sector employers.842 This would be a ‘work-first plus’ model, but in effect it would 
bring back the Subsidized Employment Option of the New Deal for Young People, and partly return to 
the education and training models adopted by both New Deal programmes.  
What is certain is that the regional inequities in the UK labour market highlighted in this dissertation 
cannot be resolved by a pure work-first strategy. The inequities are a consequence of the regional 
imbalance in the British labour market, and it may be necessary for the state in some cases to act as an 
employer of last resort (as was the case in the NDYP) if it wishes to begin even to temporarily redress 
this structural weakness.843 Being realistic, the current economic climate of fiscal retrenchment will not 
make this an option for British policy-makers in Whitehall.   
If the quasi-market is here to stay, as its strengthening position would imply, the competitive elements 
need implementing in full; otherwise, competition is limited to the pursuit of future contracts, and does 
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not encourage the driving up of service standards. The failure of the Flexible New Deal to meet targets 
reflected a multiplicity of factors, but some interesting competitive elements such as choice, market-
sharing and Star Ratings introduced in other programmes in the UK and abroad could have pushed 
performance upwards. Having contractors compete over the price of reintegration is inevitably 
tempting for the state, particularly under the current fiscal circumstances. However, price competition 
creates problems and perverse incentives.844 For instance, if future governments set outcome prices too 
low in future, service quality would is put at risk, the creaming and parking of participants rendered 
more likely, and providers may be dissuaded from bidding for contracts. On the other hand, while 
providing contractors with ample resources may facilitate innovation and experimentation, it also 
diminishes the purpose of contracting to identify efficiency and incentivise performance; for instance 
the financial (dis)incentives that applied to the final year of the FND were clearly not helpful. Similar 
tensions exist in re-regulating the market. Demanding processes from providers could drive up costs 
and stifle innovation; loosening regulation could put service quality at risk, and increase the likelihood 
of parking. Clearly therefore, there is a balance to be struck between incentivising providers and 
regulating their activities.   
 
Future Research 
This thesis has contributed to a comparative understanding of the performance of the Flexible New 
Deal, and has begun the process of triangulation with survey data, which indicates, as the results in 
Chapter 7 portrayed, that the Flexible New Deal performed as well, if not slightly worse than other 
legacy active labour market programmes. Further research is underway by the Policy Studies Institute 
which will complete the quantitative research by establishing what, if any, net impact was accrued by 
the Flexible New Deal through the analysis of longitudinal data gleaned from benefit off flow data.  
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The limited differences between the recent outcomes of the programmes explored in this thesis serve 
to question the efficacy of quasi-markets in employment services. Indeed, the review of the literature 
and the results presented provide little convincing evidence that private provision is more efficient, less 
still more effective at moving individuals from benefits and into work. Thus, Bredgaard and Larsen’s 
conclusion in 2008 still holds:  
There is still little valid and systematic knowledge on the outcomes and effects of shifting to 
quasi-markets in employment policy. This makes it difficult to conclude whether quasi-markets 
are indeed ‘better and cheaper’ than the old public system. There can be no doubt, however, that 
contracting out results in a fundamentally different employment services system.845  
That this statement continues to stand is a consequence of the common simultaneity of welfare 
reforms.  Specifically, researchers have found it challenging to isolate the impact of the quasi-market 
because it has often occurred in parallel to the relaxing of process regulations (or the ‘black box’ 
approach). The development of experimental methods akin to those used by Behagel et al.in France are 
recommended, but the circumstances have to be similar, where  the ‘black box’ approach to regulation 
has to be applicable to the Public Employment Service in equal measure and appropriate 
counterfactuals must be chosen.846   
 
In short, more experimentation is required in a quasi-market that implements the full range of 
competitive forces. Without more data, the commitment to expanding the size and remit of a quasi-
market in active labour market policies will remain ideological, not evidence based.    
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Adjusted Delivery Directorate Data.  
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Annex B Participant and Staff Interviews 
Participant Questionnaire                            
   
                                                                         Participant Ref  __________ 
 
Employment Status 
 
1. Age ______ years Gender (Male-Female) 
2. Are you currently on the Jobseekers Allowance?  (YES/NO) 
3. How long would you estimate your total time on the JSA has been? ____Years____Months 
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4. How many times have you been on the Jobseeker’s Allowance? 
5. Are you currently in paid work / have you recently been in employment? 
i) What is your job title? 
ii) How did you find the job? 
iii) How many hours a week do you work?  
iv) How do you feel about your current job?  
Jobcentre Plus 
INTRO  This section asks you about how you remember your time with the Jobcentre Plus organisation. 
 
6. Do you recall your first visit to the Jobcentre Plus? (YES/NO) 
i) What were you asked to do at your first meeting? 
7. Do you remember discussing the Jobseeker’s Agreement? 
8. Do you remember what was agreed in the Jobseeker’s Agreement? Probe: e.g. types of work you were 
looking for, or what wages you were looking for? 
9. Do you think they considered your specific circumstances when discussing the jobseekers agreement?  
10. Was your jobseeker’s agreement changed at a later date? 
i) What about it changed? 
ii) How did you feel about these changes? 
11. What type of assistance were you offered at the Jobcentre? Probe: help looking for work, reworking your 
CV, discussion of skills, etc.  
12. How many contact hours did you have with them per week?  
13. Would you have liked more time with them, or less? Why?  
14. Did you discuss your career aspirations with your jobcentre advisor?  
i) Were these considered when they were helping you find work? 
15. Did you think you needed some kind of training to do the job you wanted? 
i) Was this training offered to you? 
ii)  If not what type of training was offered? 
16. What types of jobs were the Jobcentre encouraging you to look at? Please provide a list of examples. 
17. Did you think these jobs were appropriate for you? 
i) If not, why?  
18. Did you take any of the jobs? 
  i)  what was the job? 
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  ii)  how did you feel about it? 
  iii)  how long did you keep the job? 
19. Did you ever have your benefits sanctioned by the Jobcentre Plus? 
  i)  If so were you given warning that they would do so? 
  ii)  Did you think that their sanctioning was fair? Why?  
 
20.        Describe your relationship with your main Jobcentre Advisor?  
       (PROBE) Did you get on with them?  
       How did you feel you were treated by them?  
 
Flexible New Deal 
INTRO   This section is about your direct experience of the Flexible New Deal programme. The line of 
questioning follows a similar pattern as the previous section.  
 
21. When did you join Flexible New Deal programme? 
22. How long have you been/ were you on the Flexible New Deal? 
 
23. Prior to joining the FND Did you feel you had sufficient time with the Jobcentre? Was additional time 
available to you? 
24. Were you told you would be sent from the Jobcentre to a specialised company after a year?  
i) If so, what information did you receive about it? 
25. How did you find moving from the Jobcentre Plus to the provider?  
26. How might it be improved? 
27. Could you explain to me your experience of the FND programme? 
28. Do you remember discussing and agreeing a Flexible New Deal Action Plan? 
i) If so, what was in it/ how did it differ from the Jobseekers Agreement? 
29. Did you discuss your career aspirations with your new advisor?  
30. Were these considered when they were helping you find work? 
31. Did you think you needed some kind of training to do the job you wanted? 
32. Was this training offered to you? 
  i) If not what type of training was offered? 
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33. What types of jobs were the specialist provider encouraging you to look at? Please provide a list of 
examples. 
34. Did you think these jobs were appropriate for you? 
  i) If not, why?  
35. Did you take any of the jobs? 
  i) what was the job? 
  ii) how did you feel about it? 
  iii) how long did you keep the job? 
 
36. Did the provider ever attempt to have your benefits sanctioned? 
  i)  If so were you given warning that they would do so? 
  ii)  Did you think that their sanctioning was fair? Why?  
37. Describe your relationship with your specialist provider Advisor? 
38. What was different about your advisor at the specialist provider and the jobcentre plus? 
39. Were you required to attend any mandatory training schemes or work placement schemes?  
  i)  What were you asked to do?  
 iii) How useful did you find these tasks/training/placements ?  
  iii)  If not, what did they require you to do?  
25 Did you feel that they tailored their overall service to suit you? 
26 What differences did you notice about the provider you were sent to and the Jobcentre Plus? 
27 Did you think the provider was more helpful, less, or about the same as the Jobcentre plus? 
28 If there were a number of providers in your area, would you like to be able to pick which one you used?  
 
Rights and Responsibilities 
This section seeks to ask you how you feel about the social security system more generally, what you expect from it, 
and what it would provide for you in an ideal world.  
 
29 Do you feel you have a responsibility to work?  
 i) If so, why?  
30 Do you think that if there are not suitable jobs available, the government should provide/create them? 
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31 Do you think you have a right to receive benefits?  
  i)  If so, why?   
32 Do you think your benefits are enough, too little, or too much for your needs? 
33 Did/do you find the level of your benefits a motivating or demotivating factor in finding   work? 
34 What kind of help do you think you should be entitled to when you become unemployed? 
35 Do you feel that during your whole period of receiving jobseekers allowance you were offered you sufficient 
attention and support?  
i)  If so, which parts/areas/periods did you find particularly helpful? 
ii)  If not, what is missing? What should be included in the programmes? 
36 Do you think there is a fair balance between your rights and responsibilities for jobseekers?  
37 Do you think the conditions imposed on you throughout the scheme were reasonable? 
 
Unemployment (general)  
INTRO   This section is the last, and it is about your job prospects more generally.  
 
38 What do you want to do, career wise?  
39 What do you think you need to do to achieve this?  
40 Why do you think you have struggled to find work? 
i) Do you think the services you have received or programmes you participated in helped to solve some/any of 
these?  
41 What role should the government play in helping to solve this? 
 
42 Finally is there anything that you would like to add? 
 
Interview Terminates 
 
 
308 
 
 
 
Staff Interview        Interview Ref____________ 
 
Section 1: General  
1) How long have you been working in the welfare-to-work sector?  
2) Have you worked for a number of different welfare to work organisations? 
Section 2: First Impressions 
3) What were your initial impressions of the Flexible New Deal when it was announced? 
4) From these initial thoughts, how different was it from previous interventions such as 
Employment Zones, of the New Deal deals? And was it likely to be better (in terms of 
unemployment reductions, employment increases) Yes/No.  
Section 3: Targets 
5) Were you familiar with the core objectives of the FND programme?  
6) Were you familiar with the specific targets to short and sustained job outcomes?  (i.e. 55% 
and 50% respectively) 
7) Did you think that these were achievable? 
- If so/not why/not?  
8) Were adjusted targets, presumably lower, agreed between contractors and DWP? 
Section 4: Implementation 
9) Did the programme get underway smoothly? Teething problems?  
10) Why do contracted programmes take time to reach reasonable levels of performance?  
11) Did the size of your caseload meet, fall short of, or exceed your expectations? 
12) How were vacancies sourced? Formal, informal channels. How important to performance 
were formally advertised vacancies? 
13) Did you feel that you were competing against the other welfare to work provider in the 
area, or was a cooperative relationship between the two of you? 
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14) What was in the ‘black box’ from your experience, i.e. common tools used? 
15) What emerged as the main advantages of the Flexible New Deal system over previous 
government welfare to work initiatives? 
16) What did you consider to be its main weaknesses? Was it missing anything? 
17) The Flexible New Deal was cancelled with the change of government. Were you under any 
impression that remaining year of operation was affected by this? 
Section 4: Unemployment 
18) What do you regard as the principle causes of unemployment?  
19) What were the main characteristics and labour market barriers of the majority of your 
caseload?  
20) Did you think that the Flexible New Deal was sufficiently designed to cure these? 
21) Do you think that the state/public sector should operate as an employer of last resort?  
Section 5: Final Thoughts 
22) What do you consider to be the differences between FND and the Work Programme?  
23) Are these of substance?  
24) Is there anything in the welfare to work sector that requires particular attention? Any 
marked failures, or indeed successful practices that policy makers appear to be ignoring? 
What do active measures need in their fundamentals to be effective? 
25) Is there anything you would like to add? 
Interview Terminates. 
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